The Relationship Between Parent And Child, And Subsequent Responsibility

In her essay, A Defense of Abortion, Judith Thomson asserts that there are cases where a parent has intercourse and becomes pregnant yet is not responsible for the life of the child. She says, "surely we do not have any such 'special responsibility' for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly...if they have taken all reasonable precautions against having a child, then they do not simply by virtue of their biological relationship to the child who comes into existence have a special responsibility" (Thomson 65). Thomson seems to be saying that parents who use contraceptives, or other preventative measures against pregnancy, yet still voluntarily engage in intercourse and conceive a child, have no responsibility for the child despite biological relationships. She is clear that when the parents of the conceived child did nothing to prevent pregnancy, they are responsible for the child. I propose, however, that parents always have a responsibility toward their child, regardless of any preventative measures taken against pregnancy. After I list and explain Thomson's arguments, I will outline the extent to which parents have special responsibilities toward their children, and define the duties attributed to those responsibilities. I will then respond specifically to Thomson's arguments.

In order clarify her position, Thomson uses a number of arguments and examples to show that parents are not always responsible for the fetus, even if it is dependent on the mother, or if the parents take actions to prevent the pregnancy. The first example, and probably the least convincing, is the violinist example, which is as follows: suppose a person is kidnapped and connected to a famous violinist who is on the verge of death. The only way the violinist can live is to be connected to the other person's kidneys for a time. The other person can do nothing but lie next to the violinist and allow the use of her kidneys-if she disconnects herself and continues on with her life, the violinist will die. Thomson has several variations of the example, but the main point is that both the violinist and the other person, whose kidneys are being used, have a right to life. The woman, however, has no special responsibility toward the violist primarily because she was kidnapped and gave no consent for the use of her kidneys (49).

The second example, which I will call the stuffy room example, involves a woman in an extremely stuffy room. In order to alleviate the stuffiness, she opens a window, knowing full well that there are burglars in the area who may break into the room and burglarize. As a result of her opening the window, a burglar climbs into the room. In a second situation, the woman places bars, which are specifically designed to keep burglars out, on her windows. The bars are effective but occasionally allow a clever burglar to get inside. In the first case, the woman is at least partly responsible for the burglar being in the room, for she did nothing to prevent the intrusion and still opened the window. In the second situation, because the woman was conscientious of the fact that burglars roamed her neighborhood and put bars on the windows to keep them out, she is not responsible for the burglar's presence in the room (58).

Thomson begins both arguments with the understanding that that the fetus is a human being, or at least a potential human being, like the acorn is potentially the mature tree (Thomson 48). That understanding leads to a flaw in her reasoning because it implies that the fetus, whether actually human or just potential to be human, is actually a child with biological connections with his parents. If Thomson had argued that the fetus was not human, then her argument would have worked more effectively, but as it stands, the people who engaged in intercourse have created a child. By definition, the biological connection is a sort of union between parent and child, and with that union comes responsibility.

In an essay arguing against abortion, Patrick Lee and Robert George used an example to illustrate the arbitrary responsibility between parent and child. In their example, the parents of an unwanted child cannot have an abortion for several reasons-either abortion is not available, or they simply could not afford one. The mother gives birth, and unfortunately no one is willing to adopt the baby. The parents, lacking the funds or the motivation to raise the child, and not having accepted responsibility for the child, abandon the baby. A few hours later, someone recognizes the newborn and returns him to the parents (Lee and George 142). Throughout the entire pregnancy, labor, and birth, the parents never voluntarily accept the responsibilities of parenthood, yet that responsibility was automatically attributed because they were the child's parents. They use another example where the father has several talents and passions, like writing. His desire is to cultivate that that talent by spending time reading and writing. Unfortunately, he does not make enough money to provide food for his children and must return to his job at the coal mine. Without a doubt, his responsibility lies with his children and not with his own desires, even at the expense of his dreams (Lee and George 143).

Lee and George conclude by saying that "the physical unity or continuity of children to their parents is unique. The child is brought into being out of the bodily unity and bodies of the mother and the father. The mother and the father are in a certain sense prolonged or continued in their offspring. So, there is a natural unity of the mother with her child, and a natural unity of the father with his child" (143). It follows that since parents have a special relationship toward their children, as a result of their being unified, the responsibilities that come with that unified relationship begin without the voluntary assumption of those responsibilities. Even if the parents did everything they could to prevent the pregnancy, they fetus is still their child, and they are still unified with that child.

A fetus is dependent on the mother for survival before birth, and when the child leaves the womb, it is still dependent on the parents for survival. If the fetus is a human being, or even the potential for a human being, it is the child of his parents and has a right to life. As I have shown, parents have natural, special responsibilities toward their children, which include the child's life and well being. The parents then have the duty to either nurture the child and secure his right to life, or find other people who will take that responsibility.

The violinist example does not seem to be relevant to the issue, in that the analogy does not accurately capture intercourse and subsequent pregnancy. In the example, the person was kidnapped and connected to the violinist. The main point of the argument is that the violinist is using her body without her permission. She has no responsibility toward the violinist because she gave no consent to being kidnapped and connected to his body. Of course she is justified in disconnecting herself, regardless of the consequences. She in no way gave any sort of consent or took upon herself any form of responsibility for this violinist. Usually, though, with most cases of intercourse, the woman is not kidnapped and then impregnated against her will. A degree of consent exists in most cases of intercourse, thus the violinist example simply does not relate well. The violinist example only works with cases of rape or intercourse without consent-cases where the woman clearly has no responsibility for the fetus, a fact that Thomson recognizes.

The stuffy room example, however, is slightly more complicated. If a person is truly terrified of burglars, cannot stand the idea of a burglar entering her house and burglarizing, she must not only block the windows with bars, but also not open the window at all. Even as she places the bars on the window, she knows that they are not effective one hundred percent of the time. Furthermore, she is responsible for knowing that the bars will not keep intruders out all of the time. With the knowledge that the bars will be defective at times, and that burglars may climb through the window if it is open, she must be responsible for a burglar entering her room if she opens the window. If she will take no future responsibility for the burglar in her house, she must not open the window, for that is the only sure way to ensure her safety from burglars. It is likewise true for intercourse. The knowledge that contraceptives are not effective one hundred percent of the time is knowledge that one is responsible for. Pregnancy is always a possible consequence of intercourse (unless, of course, the reproductive anatomy is changed in either partner to prevent such a consequence-in which case, this discussion would not be necessary) and should be treated as such. If a person does not want to be pregnant, they must do the only thing possible to surely prevent it: refrain from intercourse. Because the possibility of pregnancy exists, if a person engages in intercourse, they must be willing to accept the responsibilities and duties that follow if a child is conceived.

In conclusion, Thomson fails with her assertion that parents do not have a responsibility toward their offspring if contraception is used. If a woman becomes pregnant, regardless of the measures taken before intercourse to prevent pregnancy, the parents have a special unity with the fetus. With that unity comes responsibilities and duties toward that child, including the right to preservation of life.

Works Cited

Lee, Patrick, and Robert P. George. Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Ed.
Andrew I. Cohen and Christopher Wellman. New York: Blackwell Publishers,
2005
Thompson, Judith Jarvis. "A Defense of Abortion." Philosophy and Public Affairs 1.1
(1971): 47-66