The Role of Friendship in Aristotelian and Epicurean Ethics

-Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1170b6-7

In the quote cited above from his NicomacheanEthics, we are presented with the central theme in Aristotle's ethical enterprise concerning Philia, or friendship. For Aristotle, friendship means treating another person as if she were equal to oneself. More specifically, friendship is an intrinsic virtue which involves two people reciprocating goodness. In contrast, Epicurus and his followers contended that friendship is an extrinsic good which leads to pleasure, the highest good. Though Aristotle and Epicurus differ widely in their opinions concerning the basis for friendship, they ultimately agree that friendship is an integral part of the good life and without it, one cannot achieve virtue.

Aristotle begins his discussion of friendship in Book VIII of the Ethics, continuing his project of defining and defending his view of human virtue and its relation to happiness. According to Aristotle, friendship can be based on three motives: the good, the pleasant, or the useful (Nicomachean Ethics Book VIII.2). Moreover, every friendship must satisfy these three criteria: (1) involve a mutual goodwill, (2) mutual awareness of this goodwill, and (3) fulfillment of at least one of the three motives previously mentioned (VIII.2). However, in Aristotle's view, a truly good friendship must be based on the motive of the good. To defend this point, Aristotle addresses the distinction between extrinsic motives and intrinsic motives concerning friendship: "those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is pleasant to themselves" (VIII.3). I therefore cannot truly be friends with another person if I do so for motives of pleasure or utility, because these things confer an advantage to me and may compromise my willingness to exchange goodness. So, for instance, if my friend Jamal is wealthy and I frequently borrow money from him to pay off my gambling debts then ours is a fallacious friendship. I only benefit from being Jamal's friend until the moment Jamal falls into pecuniary troubles because then Jamal will no longer possesses utility (i.e. wealth). This distinction is even more applicable in cases of friendship based on pleasure. Let us suppose that Cindy is my friend and I am a hilarious comedian. Every time Cindy and I spend time together, I tell her my best jokes and she laughs accordingly. But one day my jocose nature subsides, and I am unable to formulate even a mildly humorous quip. Cindy, according to Aristotle, will realize this deficiency and terminate our friendship because she can no longer acquire pleasure from my company. The only everlasting friendship which is permanent and not subject to change is that based on goodness. Thus, the perfect friendship involves people who wish the good on their friends for their sakes only. When one friend ceases to be wealthy or funny, then the other friend will still value the relationship, willing that his counterpart's hard times be ameliorated. This does not mean that a friendship based on a mutual goodness cannot bring about utility or pleasure. These things can be products of a perfect friendship, but they are never prior to it. The central point is that virtue is static and deliberate, while pleasure and utility are "accidental" goods. The friendship based on reciprocal goodness is therefore the surest way to acquire virtue.

We now turn to the question of who can engage in an ideal friendship and how Aristotle describes the characteristics of this friendship. Lovers, for instance, can never have a perfect friendship because theirs is based on the pleasure of the other (VIII.4). Likewise, bad men cannot befriend either bad men or good men because their bad nature prevents them from exchanging goodness. Thus, whenever there is a discrepancy between the two parties engaged in bonding, there cannot be equal, mutual goodwill. However, Aristotle believes there are exceptions to this rule, such as the unequal relationship rulers have with their subjects. Another example of this kind of friendship is that between a mother and child. The mother loves her child unconditionally and without motives of pleasure or utility. While the child is wholly incapable of reciprocating the love his mother levies upon him, Aristotle finds this point immaterial given the nature of the relationship. In our contemporary vernacular, we will find it strange to describe mothers and their children as "friends." However, the real problem lies in Aristotle's original definition of a mutual goodwill. Since an infant child is incapable of returning his mother's affection, then how can it satisfy either (1) the requirement of an equal exchange of goodwill or (2) mutual awareness of this exchange? After all, an infant child is hardly developed physically, let alone morally. We would have to believe that a child can at least fulfill the criterion of mutual awareness of the exchange of goodness in order to be considered a friend to his mother. But does an infant child realize that he is his mother's friend? It seems as if Aristotle resorts to ad hoc improvisation about his own ethical theory to be able to elucidate this apparent paradox. Another key facet to friendship is mutual pleasure and frequent contact (VIII.5). In a view almost Epicurean, Aristotle concedes, "no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant" (VIII.5). Thus, two friends have to enjoy each other's company to qualify as friends. Moreover, they must frequent each other often because as Aristotle points out earlier in the Ethics, virtue involves habit (ethos). Just as the courageous man cannot truly be courageous unless he acts in accordance with courage habitually and consistently, so too must friends frequent each other habitually in order to truly qualify as friends. In addition, a true friendship based on virtue will not be affected by suspicion, slander, rumor, or any other impediments because in such a relationship the two friends will trust each other completely and indelibly. Finally, a good friendship involves sharing likes and emotions. So Aristotle says that when one friend rejoices, the other shares in his joy and likewise for sadness (IX.4). Ultimately, Aristotle believes that his version of an ideal friendship can only occur once; in other words every person can only have one "best friend."

Given Aristotle's definition and elucidation of perfect friendship, we must address its relation to virtue. Remember that Aristotle's goal in the Ethics is to discuss the highest good (happiness) in terms of achieving virtue. Happiness, according to Aristotle, is an activity of the soul expressing virtue. How does this definition of virtue relate to the idea of friendship? The following quote from Aristotle epitomizes his entire philosophical corpus: "man is a political creature and one whose nature is to live with others" (IX.9). The idea of human beings as social animals in a biological sense is absolutely critical for Aristotle. Because human beings and society are inexorably linked, then the happy man will still have need of friends because his nature is to live and fraternize with others. Aristotle further expounds this point by saying that even a perfectly happy man will have use of friends insofar as they too are also virtuous because they will bolster his own goodness. Aristotle gives an example of a musician. Being in the company of other musicians makes the musician better, more adept at his craft, and happier as a result. Likewise, a good man in the company of other good men will be able to hone his goodness and better himself. Moreover, Aristotle argues that since friends provide pleasure, they are desirable. To avoid the perils of deficiency, one must make friends to quell this intrinsic desire. The previous arguments all adequately explain the benefits of friendship and how they contribute to virtue, yet Aristotle does not treat the opposite argument that a life without friends is completely undesirable and without virtue. Indeed, a solitary life has its drawbacks, but according to Aristotle's definition of happiness - an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue - there is no reason to believe that without friendship, one is incapable of virtue. When we look back at Aristotle's list of moral virtues (courage, temperance, modesty, etc.) many of them have a social aspect. For instance, wittiness and magnanimity depend on the way others perceive us. We therefore require certain social graces to be considered virtuous. But despite Aristotle's definition of friendship, we can still imagine a person who is virtuous, yet without friends. If, for example, Joseph is witty, modest, and friendly, many people will enjoy his company and Joseph will revel in their company. Joseph can also walk into a bar, tell some of his witty jokes, display his modesty when people applaud his hilarity, and walk out without people by his side. He thus experiences all the benefits according to Aristotle's definition of friendship, yet he does not satisfy the first two criteria for friendship (mutual goodwill and mutual awareness of this goodwill). Another example is a virtuous priest. The priest practices all of the Aristotelian moral virtues, warmly greets his congregation each Sunday, but returns home alone and solitary. In a way, his life is not totally undesirable; he is still in the company of pleasant people each week, but there is no strict exchange of goodwill nor is there strong bonding and frequent visitation between him and his parishioners. Aristotle concludes his treatise on friendship by demanding that happiness depend both on virtue and on friendship, even though the relation between the two is remains controversial.

Epicureanism, in contrast, approaches the ethical concerns of friendship based on a vastly different metaphysical framework. Epicurus believed strongly in Democritus' teachings and so was a metaphysical atomist. He believed that the Universe could be reduced to just two fundamental things: atoms and void. The atoms move through the void randomly and when they collide, they conglomerate to form beings such as trees, humans, and planets based on their speed, shape, and direction. Death, then, is purely a matter of doxa (opinion) since the atoms are indestructible and indivisible. Finally, Epicurus does not believe that the gods care about the lives of men or that they intervene in our affairs (Diogenes Laertius Letter to Herodotus 10.76-77). All these statements mean for Epicurus that the best life is that with the most pleasure and the least amount of pain. Epicurus is thus a hedonist and believes that the best state is one of katastasis or freedom from all mental anxiety and pain. This, in turn, means that any action which aims at katastasis is good insofar as it produces pleasure and minimizes pain. Pleasure is inherently good, and achieving pleasure is always good unless the activity involves an undue amount of pain. So a serial killer who derives pleasure from murdering innocent people is blameworthy according to Epicurus because the fear of getting caught will vastly outweigh the pleasure of each homicide. As simple as this doctrine is, the applications of these ideas will cause problems for Epicurus when he talks about friendship.

Epicurus follows in Aristotle's footsteps in many ways, except in the way he believes we should approach friendship. According to Epicurus, "[nothing] is more important, more fruitful, or more pleasing than friendship" (Cicero On Goals 1.65). In this regard, Epicurus seems to agree with Aristotle. In the Ethics, Aristotle proclaims that friends are the "highest of the external goods" (Nicomachean Ethics Book IX.9). He also agrees with Aristotle in that a solitary life without friends is "full of dangerous traps and fear," or simply put, friendship is necessary for the good life (Cicero On Goals 1.66). Finally, he agrees with Aristotle in that a friendship requires both parties treating each other as they would normally treat themselves. Epicurus differs from Aristotle in the way he describes the good life; for Epicurus a life of complete pleasure requires friendship, whereas for Aristotle it is a life of complete goodness. To put it differently, the real difference between the two doctrines is that Aristotle completely repudiates pleasure or utility as motives for friendship, while Epicurus believes the two are precisely necessary. After all since the highest good is pleasure and since friends seem to provide pleasure, then we must have friends. But this seems to contradict the selfless role of a friend. If we are to seek out friends with the intent of gaining pleasure, then how can we be selfless and treat our friends as equals instead of objects? Epicurus reacts to the objection as follows. People will originally meet one other and become friends for purposes linked to pleasure. But after spending time together, two people who call themselves friends will enjoy each other so much that regardless of the usefulness of their engagement, they will remain friends. Thus from (1) a motive of pleasure, we progress to (2) some time interval of mutual enjoyment to (3) a permanent bond which is now immune to judgments of utility or pleasure. Aristotle would find these steps blatantly in discord with human virtue. If two adults befriend each other originally out of motives of pleasure, then theirs is an accidental friendship. The time interval of mutual enjoyment would be transient phase according to Aristotle and would never lead to step (3). Only friendships which arise from mutual goodness between two equal participants can be virtuous and everlasting according to Aristotle.

Epicurus, like Aristotle, fails to definitively prove that a life without friends is both undesirable and an impediment to complete pleasure or the good life in general. In Seneca's Letters on Ethics, the Epicureans tackle the problem of a self-sufficient man. The problem is that a self-sufficient man seems to have no need of friends, as evidenced by his self-sufficiency. The Epicureans respond accordingly: "although a wise man is self-sufficient, he will still want to have a friend, if for no other reason...so that so great a virtue might not go to waste" (Seneca Letters on Ethics 9.8). The argument presented here is blatantly weak. According to the argument, friendship is necessary even for the self-sufficient man because it would be wasteful for him not to exercise this virtue. In other words, it is somehow better to be dependent on friends than to be self-sufficient and without friends. Epicurus and Aristotle both believe that trying to prove that friendship is a pivotal part of the good life is somewhat moot; friendship is so ubiquitous in our everyday lives, that to try to prove it is unnecessary. But given the Epicurean worldview, we have to consider the value friendship has in terms of maximizing pleasure or minimizing pain and whether or not a person can be virtuous without any friends at all. We can certainly imagine a situation where having a friend will cause undue pain. A good example is a prodigal friend who always asks for favors and seems to be in peril all the time. As either an Epicurean or an Aristotelian I should treat this friend as "another self" and help him when he is in need, no matter how precarious his needs might be. I may one day find a mob boss wielding a firearm knocking on my door looking for my friend who has sought refuge in my house. Obviously this friendship is causing me distress. I would be better off, it seems, to not be friends with this person. Conversely, there are situations where not having friends is pleasurable. Monks often live solitary lives without speaking to anybody, living alone in desolate areas. We tend to think of monks as virtuous people, yet they do not need friends. For them, it seems, being alone in peace and tranquility is more pleasurable that a frenetic lifestyle with friends. We can therefore say that friendship is not absolutely necessary, but perhaps contingently necessary for some people in some situations. Like Aristotle, Epicurus fails to provide strong support for the necessity of friends, but rather assumes that this point is apparent to the reader.

Both Epicurus and Aristotle contend that the good life, the virtuous life, the life that leads to happiness requires philia, or friendship. For Aristotle, this means a reciprocal exchange of goodwill between two equal persons acting out of goodness alone. For Epicurus, on the other hand, friendship means any relationship between two persons which will maximize pleasure or minimize pain. Despite these radically opposed definitions of friendship, both doctrines cannot account for the necessity of friendship. We have to assume, based on both accounts of friendship, that having friends is somehow part of human nature, for as Aristotle says, humans are social animals. In achieving the highest good, whether it is happiness as an activity or katastasis as a state means that along our journey to human goodness we ought to have companions by our side.

Bibliography

1. Inwood, Brad, and Lloyd P. Gerson. Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub Co Inc, 1998.

2. Ross, W D., trans. Ethica Nicomachea. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1925.