The Self and Compassion

Buddhists have a strong commitment to manifest compassion in the world and eliminate suffering. Suffering arises through clinging, and it ceases through non-clinging. One important thing that one should not cling to is a concept of a self, which is only a conventional designation. It follows from this conventionality that one's self does not ultimately exist and the selves of others do not ultimately exist either. This is where a potential conflict arises with regards to compassion in relation to the doctrine of non self.

Having compassion for others seems to commit one to the belief that selves exist. This also seems to cause suffering by causing one to cling to the well being of others. So, does it even make sense to consider the Buddhist idea of compassion as being compatible with the doctrine of nonself, or as really being compassion at all? I will argue that the Buddhist commitment to compassion does not make sense given the nonself doctrine and offer in its place the doctrine of non compassion.

To accomplish this, I will first give a brief overview of what the doctrine of nonself is and how it is arrived at. Then I will show how the doctrine of nonself and suffering interact and the practical consequences resulting from this. Next, I will give an account of what Buddhist compassion must be, based on this interaction. Finally, I will argue that this new characterization is not truly compassion as conventionally considered, although the practical consequences resulting from accepting the nonself doctrine may look outwardly like compassion.

Most of us would think it odd if someone were to come up to us and say that there is no such thing as a self, but when we try to grasp for evidence of this self we do not find any. We cannot identify our selves with any fleeting thoughts, feelings, perceptions or forms. What we do is identify ourselves with aggregates and arbitrarily label them.

For instance, take the famous analogy of the chariot found in The Questions of King Melinda. What constitutes the chariot as a chariot? Is it the chariot's parts? Obviously, the parts alone are not the chariot. Could the chariot be all the parts together? No, the parts can be arranged in any such way. Could the chariot exist without its parts? This cannot be the case either. What about the chariot's form? No, Buddhists consider form as just being another part of the chariot. And, so we see that the chariot exists only in light of our conception of it. We give an aggregate of phenomena that we experience a name. In the same way, this is how the idea of a self comes to be.

The preceding has come to be known as the doctrine of non self. According to the Buddhists, clinging to the concept of a self is probably the most important obstacle when it comes to eliminating suffering in the world. A person who clings to a self is very likely to cling to the ideas, feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and etc. that he considers to be his own. This person posits a fundamental distinction between himself and the world, himself and others.

This clinging can definitely act as an obstacle when it comes to being a compassionate person. This is especially the case when considering suffering. A person who holds on to the concept of a self is likely to be concerned only with eliminating the suffering experienced as "my suffering" and is likely to ignore the suffering of others, unless it starts to make himself suffer. Of course, this reduction of suffering in others only because it makes you suffer is out of line with the conventional conception of compassion. This situation does not arise in one holding to the doctrine of non self.

First, from a conventional standpoint, a practical consequence of the doctrine of non self is that concern for "others" can be intensified. According to the Buddhist view, if you believe that you have no self, then you should no longer cling to the perceptions, feelings or thoughts that you usually most immediately identify with any more than those you usually consider to be other than yourself. This puts other people on a more equal footing and enables you to help them more easily.

Second, once you've eliminated clinging towards a self, then the difference between what you once conventionally considered to be yourself and the world breaks down. Experience becomes less differentiated. This has important consequences with regards to eliminating suffering. Whatever suffering arises, one looks for the specific types of clinging or causes giving rise to the suffering. Seeing other people suffer also causes suffering. This situation is to be treated just as any other situation in which one suffers. You eliminate the cause of suffering. Of course, to eliminate the suffering caused by the suffering of others, you must also eliminate the cause of their suffering. Once this twofold cause of the suffering experienced is eliminated, suffering, in general, ceases.

In this way of viewing suffering, not as my suffering, but as suffering in the world in general, one does not need to think of other people as selves, who you desperately need to help. You do not need to cling to the idea of helping them. You eliminate the suffering wherever it is found in the perceptual field.

Now, I will deal with the issue of whether eliminating all this suffering in general can be considered as compassion as conventionally thought and will attempt to offer an alternative characterization of compassion compatible with the Buddhist doctrine of non self. This alternative view certainly cannot posit us as being compassionate toward others selves, since other selves do not exist and is not self-compassion because there is no self. This issue largely hinges on the definition of compassion. Here are two definitions of compassion:

1). "Deep awareness of the suffering of another coupled with the wish to relieve it."

2). "The feeling of empathy for all those afflicted with suffering."

The first definition has two problems in relation to the nonself doctrine. The first problem has to do with the fact that it presupposes selves and the other is that it mentions a wish to relieve the suffering of these other selves. The wish is a type of desire or caring that can lead to clinging. However, the mentioning of awareness is important. Overall this definition, if put into practice, seems to cause clinging and is also underlined by a false philosophical view of Buddhism, namely the presupposition of other selves. The second definition also seems to presuppose belief that there are those we can have empathy for, though it does call for the wish to relieve suffering in its appeal to the natural feeling of empathy. Recognizing suffering is what is important here.

We can come to a view on what Buddhist compassion must be, in order to be compatible with the nonself doctrine, by taking into account awareness and empathy. Empathy is a feeling that arises. One becomes aware of this initial feeling at the same time as it arises. It is also a kind of identification; it causes us to identify with what we perceive as the situation of others and even with situation of our supposed selves. Of course, one must not fall prey to this identification because it is inconsistent with the nonself doctrine and is likely a cause of attachment.

Buddhist compassion must therefore have two conditions: these being empathy and the awareness of why suffering must be reduced in general. Something like the following would have to be the ultimate definition of Buddhist compassionl:

3). The initial feeling of empathy, which brings awareness to suffering and the at the same time the recognition of the identification created by empathy, which is a false identification, and also the realization that the suffering giving rise to empathy and this identification must be eliminated.

This is quite a convoluted definition of compassion. As gleaned from the two more conventional definitions, what seems essential to compassion is the awareness of the suffering of others, empathizing with others, and the desire to relieve this suffering of others. With the third definition there is the natural feeling of empathy that arises and of suffering, but the second aspect calls for the dissolving of the suffering giving rise to empathy. This is not at all about the wish to help others. Due to these reasons, I cannot accept this Buddhist definition as really being a definition of compassion, and I must hold onto the first definition as correctly characterizing compassion.

What the Buddhist characterization of compassion actually should be considered as is the doctrine of non compassion. The doctrine of non compassion does away with the presuppositions inherent in the definition of compassion requiring the existence of selves and a deep desire to eliminate the suffering experienced by others. The doctrine of non compassion avoids the tendencies of action, which these presuppositions produce in our actions.

No doubt, following this doctrine of non compassion leads us to act in similar ways as conventional compassion does, but it has the extra advantage of not causing us suffering with regards to helping others. It allows us to hold on to being detached from the world and eliminate suffering without thinking about who is experiencing this suffering. Also, the doctrine of non compassion reduces the suffering caused by trying to reconcile the doctrine of nonself with the conventional concept of compassion.

In conclusion, due to the following discoveries, I have had to reject the idea that the Buddhist commitment to compassion makes sense given the non self doctrine and have offered the doctrine of non compassion in its place. I have shown that not clinging to the ideas of a self breaks down the distinction between one's self and the world. Included in the world are "others." One does not even have to be committed to the view that other selves exist, which you must be attached to. Now what one experiences is just an undifferentiated field of suffering, which must be eliminated wherever it is found, whether it have one immediate cause or goes by way of two causes in the case of another person's experience of suffering.

The attempt to get around the conventional definitions of compassion calling for the awareness, empathizing, and wish to relieve suffering with others, in order to enable compassion to fit with the doctrine of nonself, ends up leading one into a convoluted characterization, which cannot be a true characterization of compassion. A doctrine of non-compassion is needed to cohere with the doctrine of nonself. Though, the effects resulting from recognition of the non self doctrine and the non compassion doctrine does seem to be in accordance with the effects that conventional compassion leads to when the wish to put compassion into action arises. The additional result in accepting these two doctrines is that one does not suffer by actively wanting to help free others from suffering, which is an advantage over the conventional view of compassion.

References
Bodhi, Bhikkhu. 2005. In the Buddha's Words: An Anthology of Discourses from the
Pali Canon. Somerville, Massachusetts: Wisdom Publications.
The Questions of King Melinda