The State of War in the International System

Realist and liberal views regarding the primary causes of war vary with each significant area of concentration, and then again within that area. There are some general assumptions but with each focus there is some modification to accommodate the theory's primary concentration.

A realist state's goals are defined by its national interest, namely sovereignty and power. This then leads to the dominant issues of international politics, and the apparent catalyst for most realist wars: military, security issues. From this one can determine that the security dilemma is the dominant characteristic of state relations. In the end, realists conclude that international politics will inevitably lead to war.

"Realists are the theorists of the 'state of war.' They discount any claims to system-wide international order other than that based ultimately on power or force" (Doyle, 1999: 43). They define this lack of organization as 'international anarchy.' In a state of anarchy each state is set in opposition towards each other in which they experience insecurities of every nature and alliances are only kept so long as they are beneficial to the participating states.

Complex realism dictates that with the lack of security in the international system, states will then protect themselves with armaments, and thus relative power. When states begin to accumulate steady gains in relative power in relation to their neighbors this is when war is most likely to occur. G.F. Hudson probably states this most eloquently; "[t]here is perhaps no factor that drives a state into war so inexorably as a steady loss of relative power. Sooner or later a desperate now-or-never mood overcomes the calculations of prudence and the belief that a war may be on today, but cannot be won tomorrow becomes the most convincing of all arguments for an appeal to the sword" (in Doyle, 1999: 46).

Because of its root in human nature, fundamentalism is subject to the desires of the prince. One of the major goals of a prince is power and "the drive for power leaves statesmen no choice other than power politics" (Doyle, 1999: 46). Thus the prince's own actions, leading to a change in the balance of power, would upset opposing states and lead to war. This balance of power is vital because it is that which prevents one state from invading another, when the states have near-equal power capabilities. Hans Morgenthau, a contemporary of fundamentalism, believed that the balance of power was essential to politics; he believed that it was the law of life for independent units interacting with other independent units (Lecture: Mearsheimer and Morgenthau).

Structuralism, based upon essentially similar institutions, distinguishes and awards power-seeking individuals because it is only they who will endure, assuming the individual is thinking rationally (46). Sovereigns are obliged to protect their citizens, thus when they feel threatened by another's capacity to eliminate them they must react. Their actions in this case are considered rational and prudent because they are acting under pressure for survival.

John Mearsheimer, a present-day professor at the University of Chicago, is another present-day realist. Mearsheimer believes that once again "power inequalities 'invite' war, the smaller the gap, the more stable the peace is" (Lecture: Morgenthau and Mearsheimer). He also indicates that bi-polar systems are less likely to go to war than multi-polar systems because it is easier to keep an eye on one enemy versus more. For him, the more horrific the prospect for war there is less likely a chance, thus states lacking nuclear weapons after doing a cost-benefit analysis are more likely to attempt war. Ethnocentrism is also a leading cause of war; other nations and nation-states are considered both inferior and threatening (Lecture). He also feels that hypernationalism will soon become a problem in the future because of its strong ties to a religion or nation.

Liberalism is characterized by its spectrum-wide view on war. It rests in an international system under anarchy, but does not necessarily in a state of war. This is because their game theory rests on positive-sum games where states can either win or lose collectively.

John Locke, our legal institutionalist, believes in two types of wars-just and unjust. A just war is one of defense, or even conquest at times; an unjust war is fought by the provoking state when they violate the natural rights of states or individuals (Doyle, 1999: 220). There are three instances where war could be imminent for Locke: 1. ignorance and bias in information; 2. partiality and negligence in adjudication; and 3. weakness and fear in execution (223). This theory has been influential in contemporary international law. The president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has defined three conditions under which a just war may be fought: "1. an imminent threat of injury to nationals; 2. a failure or inability on the part of the territorial sovereign to protect them; and 3. measures of protection strictly confined to the object of protecting them against injury" (Sir Humphrey Waldock, in Doyle, 1999: 220).

Institutional utilitarianism is the theory of Jeremy Bentham. He continued to look into Locke's theories and has built upon them. His theories warn that "[m]easures of mere self-defense are naturally taken for projects of aggression. The same causes produce on both sides the same effects; each makes haste to begin for fear of being forestalled. In this state of things, if on either side there happens to be a Minister, or a would-be Minister, who has a fancy for war, the stroke is struck, and the tinder catches fire" (Bentham, in Doyle, 1999: 227). Simply put, it is the theory of relative power gains reworded and put into context.

Commercial pacifism is comprised of the philosophies of Adam Smith and Joseph Schumpeter. Smith believed that colonialism and mercantilism are two sources of war. He felt that by "rejecting colonialism ... rational Liberal political economies would thereby eliminate two potent causes of aggressive war" (Doyle, 1999: 234). Mercantilism leads to war because it portrays one state's loss as another's gain, thus relative power theory. Schumpeter states that "modern imperialism results from the combined impact of a 'war machine,' warlike instincts, and export monopolism" (244). All of which are from what remains in the human spirit and in society from his imperialist models.

Kant's liberal internationalism is once again back to the theory of just war. States have the right to make war when they are or "believe" they have been injured, when the state experiences a threat from another state preparing for war, or when the balance of power is thrown off because of a rapid increase in power by another state (Doyle, 1999: 255). Kant also makes the case that though liberal governments seem to be peaceful towards each other, but outside of this case that they are more aggressive and war-prone. In the latter example, cases of war can be based upon any circumstance, even unjust ones. One common situation is liberals against non-liberal states, in which liberals are attempting to liberalize or to teach a lesson to the non-liberal state.

Realism and liberalism share some views on the reasons for war. However, as you progress through the types of each there are minor alterations to what makes war right or when war is imminent. I feel that the most convincing is the theories of Smith and Schumpeter, mostly because I feel that people can change, but it is the environment that we live in that makes an impact on our personalities. Thus if there are continuing faults in our society from our history then we are likely to integrate them into our character. However, I feel that as education becomes more widespread this theory may cease to be of contemporary merit but that which describes the periods before.

Doyle, Michael W. "Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism." W W Norton & Co Inc. 1997.