The United States' Invasion of Iraq

The decision to enter Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein from power following the events of 9/11 and a successful invasion of Afghanistan was determined to be in the best interest of global security, and rightfully so. Iraq did have chemical and biological weapons, Saddam was actively pursuing nuclear capabilities, and the United Nations' gross conflict of interest regarding the corrupt Oil-for-Food program, among others, prevented it from acting on behalf of global security. The United States, once again, was needed to restore peace and safety to the world. President Bush looked at over a decade of Iraqi belligerence in international affairs, intelligence from around the world coupled with near-unanimous agreement at home regarding the need to remove Saddam even prior to 9/11, and the Iraqi dictator's abysmal record on human rights as enough evidence to warrant regime change. Upon entering Iraq and removing Saddam from power, establishing a legitimate government and a strong Iraqi military/police force proved a tougher challenge than anticipated. Now in its sixth year, Operation Iraqi Freedom faces low support both at home and abroad, and calls for withdrawal have become louder with each passing month. The situation in Iraq improved dramatically following a sudden increase in troops early last spring, but still the Iraqi Security Forces by themselves are unable to repel the internal and external threats which fight against the legitimate government of Iraq in an attempt to reverse the trend towards democracy. Understanding the importance of Iraq in the Global War on Terror as the front in the fight against terrorism, the United States can not leave Iraq until the situation dictates, which will require a much stronger Iraqi military/police force than is currently trained. Setting a timetable for withdrawal is motivated wholly by politics and can not seriously be considered an effective strategy for ultimate victory in Iraq. The situation on the ground is too volatile to predict where things will be in a month from now, and to set concrete dates months or even years ahead regarding the withdrawal of combat forces is at best counterproductive and at worst incredibly dangerous to both U.S. forces and the possibility of sustained democracy in Iraq.

Analysis of U.S. Rationale for War with Iraq

In the early morning hours of March 19, 2003, a "coalition of the willing" led by U.S. and British forces crossed into Iraq with the intentions of disarming Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and removing Saddam Hussein from power. Operation Iraqi Freedom was underway. President George W. Bush ordered the assault on Iraq in response to Saddam's continued defiance of multiple United Nations Resolutions dating back to the First Gulf War and more recently U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441 which stated Iraq would be afforded, "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" and that Iraq "will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations" (UN Security Council, 2002). As we know, the United Nations is totally inept in dealing with breaches of international security, and, in light of France's, China's, and Russia's inevitable vetoes, action against Iraq via Security Council initiative was not going to happen. That said, the decision to go to war with Iraq was ten years overdue, and required the willingness of President Bush to act with limited multilateral support and his acknowledgment of the realist philosophy of international relations.

President Bush determined the need for action in Iraq based on careful assessments of past actions on both Iraq's part and that of the United Nations. Beginning with the cease-fire at the end of the First Gulf War and Iraq's acceptance of United Nations Resolution 687, Iraq almost immediately begin the deceptive game of repeated admittance and subsequent refusal of the inspections it agreed to until 1998, when Iraq once and for all kicked inspectors out, prompting President Bill Clinton to sign the Iraq Liberation Act. This act declared "that it should be the policy of the United States to seek to remove the Saddam Hussein regime from power in Iraq and to replace it with a democratic government" (H.R. 4655, 1998). In reading this, it's my understanding that this is then the policy of the United States. Furthermore, the United Nations would go on to pass resolution after resolution condemning Saddam's actions, but continually refuse to act against him. The Charter of the United Nations states: "The Purposes of the United Nations are...To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace" (italics mine) (UN Charter, 1945). Why wouldn't the United Nations either prevent, or if that proved impossible, remove Saddam from power? This organization once again proved to be completely ineffectual in accomplishing the goals it set out to. So where does that leave the United States? In our text, we've learned that, in the absence of any higher authority, individual states are solely responsible for their actions unless otherwise bound by international treaty. Even then, as Iraq continued to prove, they are rarely coerced into holding up their end of the deal by meaningless rhetoric. We see the necessity for the philosophy of "realpolitik" in dealing with those who know international organizations rarely move to action. Saddam's brutal tactics, disregard for international law, and proven stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons taunted the world for over a decade, and the events of 9/11 told President Bush, and those members of Congress authorizing war in Iraq, that this regime needed to go for the sake of both American and international security.

The rationale for war with Iraq, having been briefly outlined above, still requires further explanation. On the domestic front, the United States still held the images of September 11 in her mind, and our complicated history with Iraq proved to be another stone on the side of the scale demanding war. It's interesting to listen to those self-serving, back-tracking, blatantly partisan claims such as "I actually did vote for the $87 billion (troop-funding bill) before I voted against it", when a politicians base gets angry with their vote in the Senate. In both Houses of Congress, the Iraq Resolution authorizing the President to go to war with Iraq passed easily, 296-133 in the House of Representatives and 77-23 in the Senate, including that flip-flopping presidential hopeful mentioned above (Senate, 2002). Confidence in the President's ability to prosecute the War on Terror was high, and the American public overwhelmingly supported action in Iraq. Also important in the decision to go to war is President Bush's personal experiences with Iraq, and Saddam's 1993 assassination attempt on his father, then President George H.W. Bush. Surely this played into the emotional aspect of decision-making, for better or worse. Then there is the case made that President Bush was looking for guidance in his relatively weaker foreign policy goals. Here we can see the impetus of 9/11 guiding President Bush towards the international War on Terror and the implications for a strong foreign policy it entailed. We can also argue that President Bush, being from Texas, is so patriotic and wishes to defend his country so much that his "axis of evil" demanded attention, and Iraq was the next logical step, especially in light of the evidence presented to him against Saddam and his brutal regime. Human rights certainly played an issue, ever an American mission, and using chemical weapons against ones own countrymen certainly sits at the apex of gross human rights violations.

Iraqi Viewpoints on U.S. Invasion and Occupation

The country of Iraq is made up of many competing ethnic and religious factions, and, as fighting between them and that directed at the occupying forces being very fierce, has resulted in thousands of both military and civilian deaths. In the northern section of Iraq, anti-Saddam Kurds make up the dominant ethnic group and were attacked with chemical agents by Saddam in both 1974 and 1988 for attempts to overthrow the oppressive regime, which the U.S. first pledged support to and then refused to provide (U.S. State Department, 2003). In light of this genocide and in spite of U.S. abandonment, it's easy to understand how a full 65% of Kurds wish for a strong U.S. presence to remain in Iraq until security improves, at a minimum of another two years (WPO, 2007). After living under Saddam, a Sunni Muslim, for so long, and fearing a return to the severe oppression felt while he was in power, the Kurds have little faith in experiencing real security outside of a strong American presence. Their attempts at autonomy repeatedly failed with Saddam in power, and the possibility of an equal voice in a new Iraqi government is a welcome respite from the years of genocidal repression. The second of three dominant ethno-religious groups, the Sunnis, overwhelmingly favor near-immediate withdrawal of coalition forces, with only 9% in favor of an American presence for the next two years. The Sunnis live mostly around the central areas of Iraq, occupying most of Baghdad and the Sunni Triangle north and west of the city. According to one Middle Eastern expert, Sunnis are "are frightened by their sudden, dramatic loss of political power, social status, and economic well-being" (Yaphe, 2004). A majority of the Sunni population of Iraq immediately took up arms in resistance to the invading forces in an attempt to secure their complete control of political power in the country. Likewise, a strong majority of Shia, Iraq's third dominant group, favor withdrawal within a year (WPO, 2007). In the Shia faith there are several prominent religious leaders, many who have repeatedly called for attacks against coalition forces since the occupation began. First, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who languished under house arrest during the years of Saddam's Ba'ath Party rule, has established himself as the dominant Shia religious force in Iraq today. Acknowledging that Shia's make up almost 60% of Iraq's population, al-Sistani has called for aggressive action in political affairs, and at the same time rejected calls for action against coalition forces (Moubayed, 2005). In the past year, however, al-Sistani has made it known that he wishes to leave behind politics and focus on his religious duties as Grand Ayatollah. Another important figure in Iraq is Muqtada al-Sadr, another Shia cleric and leader of the Mahdi Army who has been responsible for fierce anti-coalition attacks since almost the beginning of the occupation of Iraq. A powerful military force in Iraq, estimates put al-Sadr's followers to be between 3 to 5 million young, impoverished Iraqi Shiites (Bruno, 2008).

The government of Iraq took power on May 16, 2006 from the Iraqi Transitional Government, which was elected on January 30, 2005, taking control of Iraq from the coalition-appointed Iraqi Interim Governmen (Global Security). The United States immediately recognized Iraqi sovereignty and told the newly appointed government that, if requested, coalition forces would leave Iraq. That request was never made, and coalition forces have been supporting the Iraqi Government since they took control, providing security, training, advice, and support of a political, economic, and military nature. Taking power of the newly formed government was Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari, Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zaubai, President Jalal Talabani, Assembly Speaker Mahmoud Mashhadani, and several Ministers of various offices (Marr, 2007). Made up of most of the various ethnic and religious groups contained within the borders of Iraq, the new Iraqi government has struggled to provide internal security in the face of continued attacks from terrorists groups trying to destabilize Iraq, claiming the illegitimacy of the government. Externally, Iran has both covertly and opening attempted to influence elections in Iraq in an attempt to create a dominant Shiite Islamic state (Wright, 2004). Understanding the need for security as essential to any other progress in Iraq and viewing the coalition occupation as the driving force behind continued violence, Iraqi nationalists in the Parliament have begun to round up support for requesting coalition forces to produce a dateline for withdrawal. Opposed to this are the separatist groups who support partitioning Iraq into three autonomous sections, one for each of the three separate groups (Jarrar, 2007) These groups favor continued occupation until a permanent security can be established by a well-trained and equipped Iraqi police force. Regardless, public opinion is increasingly in favor of the withdrawal of coalition forces.

U.S. Perspectives on Invasion and Occupation

In the United States, public support for the military effort in Iraq has proven to be a very inconsistent figure. At the outset of the war, public support hovered around 60-65%, depending on which poll is referenced (Zogby Poll, 2003). As casualties mounted, the media downplayed social successes and highlighted military setbacks. Thus, as little progress was seen in establishing an effective Iraqi government, public support for the war declined in every measure. Occasional successes would be reported, and public support would spike. Today, we see that public support for the military effort in Iraq is now a slim majority, with 53% believing the U.S. is capable of achieving its goals in Iraq (Pew Research Poll, 2008). This roller coaster of polling data certainly fits the disparate views of many Americans, and discussion of them is required. A growing number of people surveyed advocate pulling out of Iraq immediately and with total disregard for common sense. There are no major politicians in favor of this approach, as it makes absolutely no sense in any meaning of the word. In this coming presidential election, Senator Barrack Obama supports immediately beginning the withdrawal process over the course of sixteen months (Obama, 2008). Like Senator Obama and Senator Clinton, who also shares this view, many Americans, thinking more logically than the first group, believe U.S. forces should withdraw from Iraq, but not until Iraqi Security Forces could handle the ongoing violence. Most, however, would not set a specific date (Kuhn, 2008). Yet others, like Senator John McCain, believe the United States should maintain a strong presence in Iraq for a long time to come, similar to our continued presence in South Korea fifty years after the Korean War. The current polling numbers on these three groups are roughly 15% favoring immediate withdrawal, 50% setting a timetable, and 35% staying until the job is finished (Gallup Poll, 2008).

Breaking down these numbers even more, Democrats typically opposed the war, although not at the beginning with September 11 still fresh in their minds, and Republicans have steadily supported it, although their numbers have dipped slightly in recent months (Pew Research Poll, 2008). Numbers on Independents are typically split fairly down the middle. It's also very interesting to note that liberals in general don't readily connect Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of the larger Global War on Terror. They will mostly claim personal vendetta or oil as the primary reasons behind President Bush's decision to go to war, while Republicans view Iraq as the front in the fight against al-Qaeda, much the same way al-Qaeda views Iraq as the front in the fight against the West (Kagan, 2007). That's a pretty important point to be made, and it's very sad that few realize it. Al-Qaeda understands what is going on in Iraq, they understand what it means to either win or lose there, and they are responding accordingly. It's not an issue of destroying the bad guys, leaving the people to fend for themselves, and hoping for the best. We did that in Afghanistan after we funded the successful resistance against the Soviet invasion, and because we left afterwards, the oppressive Taliban regime was able to take over and began directly sponsoring and supporting terrorism against the West.

Arguments against our occupation of Iraq usually center on mounting casualties, imperialistic motives, unilateral action, or the cost in dollars to democratize the country. All of these are certainly worthy debates, but we need to remember to debate them responsibly and in light of the facts, disregarding emotion and partisanship. Yes, the cost in lives has proven to be high. The number of servicemen and women lost since the 2003 invasion has surpassed 4,000. That doesn't include injured vets returning home. Most Americans live with, work with, or are close to someone who has or is currently serving in the Middle East. We are all affected by this war, obviously some more than others, but America as a nation is increasingly ready to pack up and leave Iraq to its own devices. In regards to unilateral action, that argument holds absolutely no water. Obviously we had allies in this war. To claim we acted unilaterally is motivated wholly by politics. In order of their commitment, Great Britain has over 8,500 troops in theater, South Korea with 2,300, Australia with 1,400, Poland and Romania with 900 each, and the list goes on to include over twenty countries with over 17,000 troops committed to Iraq (Global Security, 2007). Including those countries with an initial commitment but since withdrawing their forces, there were 34 countries allied with the United States going into Iraq in 2003. But because the United States didn't get UN Security Council authorization, critics have contended the United States acted unilaterally. Why didn't the United States seek UNSC approval? Maybe it was because three of the veto-wielding members of the UNSC were in bed with Saddam's oil, profiting billions, in what would later be revealed as the Oil-for-Food Scandal (Gardiner, 2004). Knowing that China, Russia, and France would veto any U.S. attempts to make the United Nations act on it's multiple resolutions regarding Saddam's defiance, the United States instead choose to build a "coalition of the willing" to topple Saddam. In doing the United Nations job for them, President Bush reflected the roughly 70% majority of Americans in 2003 who viewed Saddam Hussein as a brutal dictator who needed to be dealt with (Zogby Poll, 2003).

Key Points Determining the Invasion of Iraq

First and foremost in the decision to go into Iraq can be found in the respective leaders of each nation and the power their nations possessed. President Bush's United States is the global hegemony, and in light of the United Nations' and Europe's almost total lack of military capability, the lone global power able to counter a rogue state's threats on the international stage (Kagan, 2003). Laughing in the face of weak international pressure is Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which is slapped on the hand repeatedly by empty United Nations resolution after resolution. In setting the stage for proving the UN's worthlessness, let's begin with Resolution 678, ordering Saddam to comply with previous resolutions and authorizing the UN to act if he doesn't. Obviously, he defies this resolution, which prompts Resolution 686: more of the same from the United Nations, and more of the same from Saddam. Next, Resolutions 687, 688, 707, 715, 949, 1051, 1060, 1115, 1134, 1137, 1154, 1194, 1205, and 1284, are passed, all condemning Saddam's violations of international law, human rights, etc., and his defiance of all previous resolutions (White House, 2003). It's interesting to note that only resolution 678 authorized UNSC action if compliance wasn't achieved. Each following resolution and countless other statements reiterated the need for compliance, but never again were any consequences placed on the table if Saddam refused to cooperate. Sanctions were placed on Iraq, but in light of the billions pocketed by Saddam through the incredibly corrupt Oil-for-Food program, no real consequence was ever levied on him. In providing international security, the United Nations proved its uselessness beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Equally important in the march to war were the events of September 11, 2001. As the United States resolve turned towards the Taliban and Osama bin-Laden, the wider Global War on Terror called on those countries aiding terrorists to either side with the United States and aggressively prosecute them or to side with the terrorists and face the wrath of America. Unfortunately for Saddam and regardless of the intentions, intelligence communities around the world concluded that Saddam had WMD and was in contact with al-Qaeda and other terrorists organizations (Milbank, 2003). President Bush never argued that Saddam helped plan the 9/11 attacks. Rather, he argued that several meetings between high-ranking officials from both sides had met on various occasions and began a preliminary relationship based on mutual hatred of the United States. The 9/11 Commission supports this conclusion, although the media was sure to skew their results to say no link between the two groups ever existed (Kean, 2004). Labeling Iraq as part of the "Axis of Evil" (North Korea and Iran round it out) President Bush determined it was in the nation's best interest to remove Saddam Hussein from office. Already fighting in Afghanistan under Operation Enduring Freedom, President Bush gathered all the evidence available to him, presented it to his Cabinet, and that very experienced group of individuals made up their minds. They decided Saddam presented a growing threat to the United States, to the blossoming democracy in Afghanistan and hopes for its spread in the Middle East, and lastly to our ally Israel, whom Saddam had repeatedly attacked with Scud missiles in the early 1990s (Rostker, 2000). The international community had failed to deal with him appropriately over the past decade or so, and President Bush had had enough, launching the invasion into Iraq that resulted in Saddam's capture and subsequent execution on the 30^th of December, 2006, at the hands of those he had oppressed for so long (Raman, 2006). Saddam was afforded a trial, representation, and a chance to present his own defense. He was not tortured before he died. He was afforded rights he never deserved, and by those whom he had withheld those rights from for decades.

General Issues of U.S. Foreign Policy

I do not believe that withdrawal from Iraq is necessary to satisfy any of the issues important to United States foreign policy. I firmly believe that withdrawal from Iraq should occur only if the elected government of Iraq requests it. At that time, based on Iraqi sovereignty and the United States commitment to respecting it, we should pull our troops out of Iraq. If basing rights are negotiated, as I'm sure they will be, we will stay in the country for as long as those rights prove to be in our interest, which will inevitably be for quite some time. As Iraq now begins to take over responsibility for its own security and form an effective military to combat insurgents bent on destabilizing the country, the United States needs to expect more from the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and place more of the burden of securing their country on them. This began slowly, but today, with a force of over 500,000 military and police, the ISF is now responsible for just over 70% of Iraq to include most of the heavily populated areas (Report to Congress, 2007). In regards to the national security of America, our safety is less and less threatened by the situation in Iraq, both directly and indirectly. First and foremost, the number of deaths of U.S. troops in Iraq has dropped to the lowest levels since the war began, as have the number of those wounded (Global Security, 2008). Security has vastly improved in the country, and now even the media back stateside can't ignore it any longer. Well, that's not entirely accurate. They can and do ignore it. Unfortunately, when the story in Iraq took a turn for the better post-surge, the media decided to drop coverage and has since only updated the American public when something goes wrong (Reeson, 2007). What happened to objective, fair reporting? Where are the success stories that today far outnumber the failures? Indirectly, America is far safer today than we were in the days and months leading up to 9/11. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have nearly destroyed al-Qaeda's ability to effectively organize against the United States homeland and have put these terrorists on their heels in defense as we bring the fight to them. Saddam was a threat to the world. Period. Everyone both at home and abroad agreed with that assessment. The list of those who supported removing Saddam prior to 9/11 includes John Kerry, Nancy Pelosi, Ted Kennedy, Al Gore, Hillary and Bill Clinton, Carl Levin, Madeleine Albright, and Sandy Berger, among many others (Benamon, 2006). Partisan politics is responsible for their subsequent changes in heart, as there could be no other explanation for them demanding action in one breath while serving under their party's President and then vehemently cursing President Bush's actions in response to 9/11. His desire to improve our national security necessitates a lengthy commitment to Iraq. I applaud most of his decisions in prosecuting the Global War on Terror and especially his refusal to be swayed by the ever-changing moods of a grossly uniformed electorate which depends mainly on a biased media as their source of information.

The length of our stay in Iraq is not one which needs be limited by our economic conditions. On the aggregate, our finances are not in a healthy place, but it has less to do with spending on the War on Terror as it does with poor management and a lack of fiscal responsibility by those we've elected to watch over our nation's coffers. Just about 20% of the federal budget goes to defense spending, totaling nearly $600 billion (Sammon, 2007). Compare that with the 58% which goes to individuals in the form of assistance to the needy, to include Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, welfare, etc. Medicare is a huge waste, as the program routinely spends as much as eight times what other agencies spend on drugs and supplies (Riedl, 2005). Likewise, Medicaid is a disaster. States are reimbursed by the federal government for more than half of their expenses, which lack any oversight, giving states both an incentive and the means to inflate their costs, which they routinely do. As a sad commentary on congressional responsibility, pork-barrel spending is expected to reach a record $17.2 billion in FY2008 (CAGW, 2008). That's roughly $1.6 trillion spent every year on social systems which are in desperate need of reform for various reasons. Social services are absolutely vital to a nation's stability and ultimate security; we've learned throughout this course that poverty is a fertile breeding ground for crime and terrorism. That said, the complete lack of fiscal responsibility is draining our treasury faster than it can accomodate, and we now find ourselves with a gross national debt over $9 trillion. What makes sense? Keeping in mind that the money spent on defense, even though mismanaged as every other government spending is, literally saves lives both at home and abroad, wouldn't we be more economically secure if we were to reform those programs hemorrhaging money and demand fiscal responsibility from those we've elected to lead us?

The strength of our military is certainly strained as we face long deployments half way around the world on two fronts in the Global War on Terror. There is no question that our forces are tired after five years of sustained fighting overseas, as are their families. Still, they press on, understanding what failure in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the larger War on Terror, would mean. What's interesting to see is that whereas polls indicating American attitudes towards the continued prosecution of the war swing widely from year to year, those who have actually served in the armed forces largely support the war effort. As a member of the armed forces, I have close friends throughout the service - solders, sailors, airmen, and marines - who overwhelmingly approve of our actions in the Middle East. Certainly there are those who oppose the war, but we see their stories continuously played on the evening news conveying a sense that the majority of soldiers want out, which is not the case. Of course no one wants to live in the conditions they do, but most accept it and perform their duties admirably. I spoke with a very good friend of mine who had returned from a deployment to Iraq; what he had to say about the media coverage of the war made me pause. He noted how different the situation is overseas than is conveyed to the public at home. He wondered why coverage was so negative, and why the good being accomplished is not news-worthy. He questioned why so many people believe we are losing the fight. This is not another Vietnam. America is not fighting a battle destined for failure. The surge in forces should have taken place literally years ago, but it has worked magnificently.

Still, there are indicators that our forces are feeling the effects of a prolonged war effort. As the numbers of casualties drop, the media inevitably looks to other negatives of the war to convey a sense of loss. Suicide rates are up for the military as a whole. We've recently heard about the horror that serving in the military inflicts on a young man or woman, and we are asked, "What else could we expect save an increasing rate of suicide?" Certainly, suicide is terrible end to a life, and there has been an increase in its rate of occurrence in the armed forces. First, we must note that the military has stepped up its education and prevention efforts. While not to detract from the seriousness of the situation, it's worth comparing the rate of suicide in the military with that of civilians. Prior to the war, the military rate has hovered around 12 per 100,000 (Regan, 2005). This has increased to nearly 17 per 100,000, where it stands today. Even at that higher rate, suicides in the military are lower than that of comparably aged civilians, which commit suicide at a rate of 20 per 100,000. Again, this is still a serious situation, and as lengths of deployments are slated to decrease in the coming months, the suspected main cause of the higher rate, we can expect suicides to return to the much lower averages. We are also accustomed to hearing that recruitment and retention has dropped significantly in the military due to the war. This was partially accurate in the earlier stages of the war, but the trend has since reversed, with all branches of the service to include reserve components either meeting, exceeding, or hitting recruitment levels in the high 90's (Lopez, 2008; Jelinek, 2008).

In the areas of human rights and democratization, even the most adamant anti-war protestor would be hard pressed to form a reasonable argument that the lives of the Iraqis have not significantly improved since the removal of Saddam Hussein. There can really be no doubt that what has taken place in Iraq and Afghanistan has markedly improved the level of human rights enjoyed by citizens of those countries, and that democracy has taken its first fragile steps in countries where the tyrannical rule of severely oppressive regimes once ruled. Have there been abuses by coalition forces? Yes, as will occur every time war is undertaken by any nation. War is prosecuted by fallible human beings, and while there is no excuse for such actions, an entire war effort can not be called lost by the actions of a few. The United Nations itself, champion of human rights, has been plagued in recent months by scandals involving peacekeepers sexually abusing children and women (BBC, 2006). Does this mean, as has been called of for the United States in response to Abu Ghraib, the United Nations should end peacekeeping efforts in regions of the world where the promotion of human rights is desperately needed? Of course not. Any logical person would understand that. Of equal importance to the advancement of human rights is the spread of democracy into the region. While still fragile, the elections and subsequent democratization which has taken place in both Iraq and Afghanistan have been huge successes. The gains made however post-surge are still very reversible, however. Their continuation is wholly dependent on both firm commitment and the support of coalition forces by the governments of Iraq and the United States (Branigin, 2008). This recommendation comes straight from the top U.S. military commander in Iraq, General Petraeus, as he briefed the Senate on conditions in Iraq post-surge.

As he goes on to say, and here I completely agree, the drawdown of troops from Iraq needs to be stopped until a time later to be determined. Based on what we have seen in the above paragraphs, the only time withdrawal from Iraq should occur is if either of two conditions is met. First and foremost, Iraqi sovereignty must be respected, and if the government of Iraq requests an end to the presence of coalition forces in country, then that must happen. That is very unlikely to occur, so our exit from Iraq is thus contingent on the movement of the main front in the fight against terrorism. Specifically referring to al-Qaeda, terrorism will not stop because we want it to or because we ask nicely. These people do not understand tolerance or reason and are unable to coexist with those who do. Therefore, we need to continue to confront them on their soil until there is a fundamental shift in their worldviews, leading them to either embrace diversity or at least not attack it. We could prematurely withdraw, and Iraq, unable to completely defend itself from either external or internal terrorism, would again fall into the hands of another oppressive ruler. Millions of Iraqis would again be subject to the autocratic rule of a few, and all progress towards democracy in that region would be lost. As Iraqi Security Forces increase their capabilities and expand their roles in effectively defending and securing their country, coalition forces will then be able to drawdown their numbers. This is very basic military strategy, and I simply can not understand the idea behind withdrawing our troops in the face of continued resistance. It is slowing, and the ISF is finally becoming proficient. We would be remiss if we think the cost is too high to stay in Iraq. There is no greater role America can play in the world right now than mentor, teacher, and while security is necessary, policeman, to the people of Iraq. Every Middle Eastern nation and every terrorist organization understands the significance of an early withdrawal from Iraq. Terrorists want us to fail here. If we withdraw before the job is finished, we will do just that.

Withdrawal from Iraq

I'm not quite sure how to tactfully use this particular quote or if doing so is unforgivably crass, but it holds considerable relevance to the question: How do we withdraw from Iraq? Also, I understand how unoriginal this may be, but again, its relevance can not be overstated. As the movie

Charlie Wilson's War

draws to a close, the last screen before the end credits contains words from Congressman Wilson. He says, "These things happened. They were glorious and they changed the world. Then we f***ed up the end game" (IMDB, 2007). Understanding the history behind the movie leads one to the conclusion that leaving the Afghanis to fend for themselves after the violent expulsion of Soviet troops at the end of 1989 was a gross error on the part of the United States. As we can then very clearly look back on history and see, the subsequent civil war which raged throughout the country for the following five or so years led to the Taliban seizing power and, in another five or so years, the events of 9/11 (Rashid, 2001)(Hayes, 2007). This is not speculation by any means; rather, a logical progression of events which can be clearly traced through scholarly journals and other reputable literature. The significance of these events, specifically this quote, should give us pause when determining the best plan for withdrawal from a situation eerily similar to that of Afghanistan in the late 1980's. Yes, the characters have changed. In fact, our allies in that war have become our enemies in this one, which also illuminates the need for longer-term foreign policy goals in lieu of planning solely for the immediate. Today we are engaged in another battle of ideologies, replacing communism vs. democracy with a more visceral "clash of civilizations" (Young, 2004). Western values such as freedom, human rights, and democracy are under attack from the social backwardness of militant Islam, and if we leave Iraq prematurely we will once again forgo long term security at the behest of an uniformed electorate's unwillingness to learn from history.

The battle for democracy in Iraq is far from over. We have achieved great successes and experienced tragic failures. Billions of dollars have been spent and, more importantly, thousands of American lives have been lost. Our allies have also suffered great losses, as have the Iraqi people. To set a specific timetable is to not understand the realities of the situation on the ground. There is not going to be steady progress, the likes of which would be necessary for concrete dates set for withdrawal. Yes, we must demand the Iraqi government and their police and military continue to quickly train and equip the forces necessary to provide security on their own. There will come a time in the future when American forces will play a very minimal role in policing the country, possibly only serving in an advisory role. But to arbitrarily pull a date out of a hat and say, "The situation on the ground will be such that on this date we can pull this number of troops out" flies in the face of effective prosecution of a war. Doing this would put unnecessary pressure on everyone involved, beginning with our troops overseas, continuing through the Iraqi government and military, and ending back at home with our civilian/military leaders. It is absolutely despicable that Congress has even entertained the notion of cutting funding for the war effort. That is just disgusting. Yes, President Bush and those in his inner circle underestimated the full spectrum of what regime change in Iraq would entail. There can certainly be no argument about that. Regardless, we would be na�ve to think our efforts are not working, as the media would have us believe, or that we need to pull our immediately for any reason, be it economic, military, or otherwise.

Of equal importance is the sheer numbers involved in withdrawing and the fact that there is no simple way to leave a country where we've spent the last five years dug in from one end to the other. There are over seventy-five forward operating bases in Iraq, each with critical and sensitive equipment which also needs to be removed (Korb, 2007). Each of these bases, plus the four major bases in Iraq, are fully capable of supporting deployed units daily requirements, and as you can imagine, that's a tall order to fill requiring an extensive network of tools, supplies, etc. In short, there is no quick exit, period. There are military procedures for moving both troops and supplies and equipment out of a war zone, and it is not a quick and easy process. Anyone familiar with how the military operates understands what an operation of this magnitude involves. For comparison purposes, I'm separating from the military in a few months, and the process behind separating and then moving my personal possessions from Oklahoma back to Massachusetts involves stacks of paperwork, approval from a laundry list of individuals, confirmation and briefings from dozens of separate agencies, and enough other tasks to almost give me the desire to re-enlist. I'm given a total of three months to complete the separation checklist I've been given, and it will take a good portion of that time. All told, moving people and equipment from one location to another is a very time consuming, complicated process which simply isn't going to happen in a few months, or even a year. If the order was given today, estimates suggest all of our people and most of our equipment could be out within fourteen months (Conetta, 2007). This, however, does not take into consideration the effects of an early U.S. withdrawal would have on security and the very likely prospect of full blown civil war erupting as radicals step up attacks against an ill-prepared Iraqi Security Force. We would simply be leaving behind a power vacuum which would be filled by a return to the daily violence and aggression of ethnic groups struggling for power. It is for the sake of our national interest and morality that we maintain a strong presence in Iraq until the Iraqi Security Forces can fully handle both internal and external pressures. There are and will continue to be threats to the stability of Iraq for a long time to come, and the legitimacy of that nation must be ensured through a U.S. commitment to stay until the job is finished without setting unrealistic withdrawal dates based on an ever-changing situation on the ground. Until we can predict the future, the United States must remain in Iraq. When we finally see real security and lasting stability, then and only then should we draw up dates to begin the long process of extricating ourselves from that country.

Conclusion

There simply is no quick and/or easy way to exit Iraq without throwing all progress out the window and condemning the people of Iraq to more violence and bloodshed. It is our responsibility, regardless of whether or not you or I personally agree with the rationale behind invading Iraq, to finish the job we've begun in that country. We have committed hundreds of thousands of troops and billions of dollars to creating a stable democracy in Iraq, and we can finally see how that may not be as much of a pipe dream as many would have us believe. There has been real progress in Iraq, especially in the last year or so, and for the United States to leave before Iraq is ready to stand without U.S. support would be disastrous. The citizens of this country need to see past their emotions and understand what early withdrawal would mean for the national security of both Iraq and the United States. It simply does not matter if you like President Bush, or if you think the pre-war intelligence was flawed, or if you feel we were wrong to go into Iraq in the first place. We are there and have forever changed the course Iraq will move along for the rest of history. We can not leave that country until those who wish to see it fall are either killed, captured, or have a sudden change of heart. These are the same people who want to kill American men, women, and children, and the citizens of the United States must understand that. We can not afford to cut and run. There hasn't been another attack on American soil since 9/11, and the only reason for that has been President Bush's very aggressive and proactive Global War on Terror. We need all pray that our next President understands this and takes it seriously, or there is no question we will again know tragedy in our homeland.

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