Truman's Recognition of Israel: Jewish Votes, Religion or Cold War Politics?

Truman's recognition of Israel, though not nearly as famous as his decision to deploy "Fat Man" and "Little Boy" on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, still generates much controversy and debate among scholars. Most of analyses of the events of 14 May 1948 divides into roughly two main camps: those who believe the recognition of Israel was a politically-motivated decision to influence the New York Jewish vote in the upcoming election,and those who believe that Truman acted out of a combination of humanitarian and religious ideals, which compelled the president to "do the right thing."Though there is some merit to both sides of this debate, there are certain other important factors that are largely ignored, or at least glossed over. In particular, how does the recognition of Israel fit into the United States' Cold War strategy?

Before addressing that question, however, it is important to acknowledge that the motivations of the United States, as well as its president, are founded upon a complex series of prejudices, perceptions, and preferences. In his memoirs, Truman acknowledged that he found the plight of the Jewish refugees to be an immediate humanitarian crisis and he asserted that the majority of the citizens of the United States may have felt the same. Truman also was well-versed in the Bible and may have relished the opportunity to become the new Cyrus, granter of Jewish nationhood. Thus, before he even took office, Truman had a moral and religious predisposition toward the creation of Israel.

But focusing on the personal motivations of Truman in the formation of Israel risks portraying the president as an individual with a closed mind, willing to risk the welfare of his nation, of Europe, and perhaps the world for a religious conviction or an emotional sentiment, an assertion Truman would greatly resent. Alternatively, some scholars suggest, and perhaps some more forcefully than others, that Truman acted out of political opportunism. Though it would be folly to expect Truman not to be influenced by the prospects of the looming 1948 election, it would be equal folly to assert that this one election was more important than the security of a battered, post-World War II world. Indeed, the whole assertion that Truman's real motivation behind recognizing Israel was politically motivated seems increasingly far fetched when examining the official and unofficial correspondence of the president.

The reality is that the end of the Second World War, the rise of Communist insurgencies, and an increasingly hostile and paranoid Soviet Union figured prominently in Truman's thoughts throughout his terms in office. In his last address to the American people on 15 January 1953, Truman stated that "We may have averted World War III up to now, and we may have already succeeded in establishing conditions which can keep that war from happening as far ahead as man can see."Therefore, it does not make sense to focus merely upon the personal beliefs of Truman in the lead up to 1948, nor upon the political motivations he may or may not have had, for a new war loomed large on the world stage and Truman knew it.

The nature of the Cold War necessitates putting the United States' de facto recognition of the State of Israel into an international context. In this paper I use "international" and "global" interchangeably, mostly because the distinction between the two seems nebulous at best, and also because the essence of the Cold War is not a struggle conducted on one or two fronts, but was in fact a strategic, economic, and political contest that used all areas of the globe as its field of battle; Europe, Middle East, and Asia for example. As the Second World War was a truly global "total" war, so too did the Cold War emerge as a totally international war. In order to understand Truman's decision and the political maneuvering, strategic considerations, and Cold War implications involved in the recognition of Israel, a historian must recreate the world of the late 1940s - complete with the knowledge, information, prejudices, and concerns of the time. To that end, this paper relies heavily upon primary, documentary evidence from the Truman Library, declassified memoranda from Secretary of State George C. Marshall and his undersecretary Robert A. Lovett, but also upon interpreting the memoirs of Harry S. Truman, Dean Acheson, and Clark Clifford while being guided by secondary works analyzing the period.

THE COLD WAR: American Perceptions of Soviet Designs

The Princeton-educated economist Edward F. Willett was a business partner of Ferdinand Eberstadt, whose advice was instrumental in the formation of the National Security Council, which was designed to facilitate communication among the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the military intelligence services. In 1946, Willett drafted a 47-page memorandum to President Truman outlining the political and economic aims of Communism in general and the Soviet Union in particular. In his "Dialectical Materialism and Russian Objectives," Willet noted that "strict application of Communist doctrine to the settlement of (problems facing the contemporary world) leads by force of logic to the possibly unexpected and certainly unwelcome conclusion that violent conflict between Soviet Communism and Capitalistic Democracy seems inevitable."Though this statement, on its face, pointed to a direct confrontation between the United States and its allies, on one hand, and the Soviet Union and its supporters on the other, the reality was far more complicated. Willett writes "it must be recognized, however, that Marxist Communism is a tremendous world force, regardless of possible logical or moral fallacies in its basic philosophy."He then went on to explain the reason for the attractiveness of Marxist ideology among those who feel themselves exploited, stating, "Communist philosophy of history...affords a basis for the Communist belief that revolutions are bound to occur until the ultimate attainment of an ideal society"

Though Willett was speaking hypothetically at this point, the reality of the situation was being played out in Europe and Asia. Ho Chi Minh was busy leading his Communist Viet Minh against the French in Indochina, part of which is now present-day Vietnam. British troops in Malaysia were facing increased attacks, including assassinations and bombings, by the Communist Party of Malaya. Closer to home, in Europe in the spring of 1948, Communists extended their power from Czech lands and seized total power from the Democratic Party in Slovakia, which was already flanked on the eastern side by the Russian-controlled Carpathian Ruthenia. Although Willett's analysis was written up to two years before these events unfolded, he had already noted that the Soviet Union had shifted its post-World War I strategy of direct confrontation with Capitalist countries to "the maintenance of a strong Russian nation which could both serve to protect existing Communism from attack and at the same time be used to unobtrusively spread Communist philosophy throughout the world."Willet's concerns were not those of the lone voice in the wilderness.

Before his now famous, or maybe infamous, "Long Telegram," George Kennan reported on the political and economic designs of Stalin's Russia. In his 12 February 1946 telegram to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Kennan noted that Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich, remarked in a politburo address to the Soviet public "we must remember that our country continues to be in Capitalist encirclement."Additionally, statements by Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov, Kennan notes, "Deserves special note as manifestations of an attitude of total suspicion of (the) outside world."A State Department analysis of Stalin's speech notes that "Politically, the contour of Soviet thinking will continue to be Marxist, with reversion to a more anti-Capitalist emphasis than that of the war years. No doubt, sufficient leeway will exist in both the industrial and the ideological program to accommodate the Soviet Union to continued collaboration with other Great Powers if that collaboration offers the best method of realizing Soviet objectives."Another anonymous memorandum states in closing that "Russian nationalism...in (the) new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before."

Clearly, even as early as 1946, the Truman administration, the State Department, and others had already recognized the looming threat of the Soviet Union as an economic and military power in its own right and as an influence, both directly and indirectly, on Communist elements beyond its borders. By 1948, Communist regimes with ties to the Soviet Union swept through Eastern Europe; Peter II of Yugoslavia, Michael I of Rumania, and Stanislaw Mikelajesyk of Poland were joined by Feremo Nagy of Hungary on the list of former heads of state ousted by communist regimes.The Soviet Union had finally effected what it had long sought; a buffer against invasion and an extension (by proxy) of its own political, economic, and military might. These developments from the end of the Second World War disturbed and alarmed not only the Americans, but the French and British as well, who put forth great effort themselves to combat the spread of Communism.The Soviet Union thus filled three important, or rather critical, roles in the decision to recognize Israel; First, because of its large population, immense natural resources, and technology plundered from Germany, only the Soviet Union stood as a credible opposition to America. Second, the Soviet Union proffered a seemingly successful alternative to capitalism. In their speeches, Kaganovich and Stalin both emphasized the economic strength and adaptability of the Soviet Union while Malenkov's statements lauded the increased (and still increasing) might of the Red Army. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Soviet Union, in its critique of the imperialist policies of France, Great Britain, and the United States, created the image of the Soviet Union - and thus Communism - as champion of the oppressed. This final role is perhaps most important to our discussion on the recognition of Israel because it informs the Truman administrations decision not to press for UN stewardship of Palestine. Offering the Soviet Union a chance to put its foot in the door, so to speak, of the Middle East would bring the Soviet - and thus Marxist/Leninist - message to the region in a more direct way, just as Soviet advisors and volunteers has helped Mao Tse-tung form his core beliefs in revolution and Leninism. The Soviet Union had proven itself adept in exploiting the post-war chaos in its Eastern European neighbors, and was working hard to spread its influence elsewhere. In light of these reports and memoranda, Truman most certainly was wary of giving the Soviet Union an opportunity to exert influence any further.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

One of the other fragile, post-war countries that the Soviet Union sought to bring into its orbit was Greece. The north of Greece was rife with Communist insurgent groups crossing the border from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia who attempted to destabilize the Greek government and often acted as part bandits, part terrorists, and part revolutionaries. United States ambassador to Greece MacVeigh reported to the Secretary of State that "Specially lively guerilla activity is reported from all Greece's northern regions beginning with mid-November 1946...that the objective is considered political...that the bands are said to receive reinforcements from across the border and operate in liaison with each other...that an effort is believed in progress to extend activity southward through central Greece to contact and strengthen the bands in the Peloponnesus and also to have it appear to the UN Commission that the main source of bandit activity is in central and northern Greece and not along the frontiers."The KKE (Communist party of Greece), he further wrote, is accepted as "cooperating fully with the Slav communist parties in an effort to bring about a situation in Greece which will call for Russian military and political intervention (to stabilize) Greece." Later that same month, a memorandum from Undersecretary Dean Acheson warned that Greece's future teetered on a precipice: "Soviet dominated governments in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria are making every effort to prevent any improvement in Greek internal affairs. These efforts are designed to make untenable the position of any Greek Government not subservient to Soviet aims."Even after Truman secured Congressional approval for aid to Greece, the confidence of the Greek people in their pro-Western government was declining, so much so that Marshall requested a special favor from Truman: "The American mission for aid to Greece when preparing its most recent periodic progress report to the Greek people, suggested that your permission be sought for the publication to be prefaced by a direct message from you [Truman] designed to encourage the Greek people and to inspire them with greater determination to take offensive action against the guerillas...in view of our special responsibilities in Greece and our interests in contributing to the morale of the Greek people, you may wish to sign the attached telegram." The Greek government, for all intents and purposes, had become a battleground between the Soviet Union and its proxies, and the United States.

Another field of contest was Turkey, a long-time rival of the Russian empire, and now a target of the Soviet Union. Despite setbacks in Greece and Iran, as well as other places, the Soviet Union continued to press for advantage in Turkey. The United States ambassador to the Soviet Union had grave misgivings about the ability of the Turks to stave off the Russians. In a telegram to the State department, Smith noted "we are less inclined than Erkin (secretary general of Turkish Foreign Office) to feel that recent events in Azerbaijan and possibly Greece hold forth any hope that USSR might show reasonable attitude toward Turkey. We doubt that Soviet dislodgement from Azerbaijan indicates likelihood that Kremlin may abandon its search for strategic lodgment (sic) toward Turkey. We have no doubt that Kremlin will resume attempts to encroach on Iranian sovereignty and that it will continue attempts to encroach on Turkish sovereignty."A strong Turkey, according to the Truman administration, was the second key to resisting the aggression of the Soviet Union, and to prevent a Russian foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. An undated memorandum from the State Department, titled simply "The American paper" outlined the need to secure Turkey, Greece and other countries bordering the Soviet Union, as well as the dangers inherent in the situation:

1) Since the basic objective of the foreign policy of the United States is the maintenance of world peace in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the United States must be concerned with any situations which might develop into international armed conflict. The eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East is an area in which such situations exist at the present time. 2) the security of the eastern Mediterranean and of the middle east is vital to the security of the United States...3)the security of the whole eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East would be jeopardized if the soviet union should succeed in its efforts to obtain control of any one of the following countries: Italy, Greece, Turkey or Iran....7)one of the greatest dangers to world peace may be the failure of the Soviet Union to understand to which extent the united states is prepared to go in order to maintain the security of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. It should, therefore, be the policy of this government to make evident in a firm but non-provocative manner the extent of the determination of the United States to assist in the preserving of world peace the security of the area.

Thus Turkey, though not nearly as internally fractured as Greece was, was still vulnerable to Soviet influence and could set a dangerous precedent in the region, particularly if Greece - Turkey's belligerent neighbor - were to receive all the American attention, and aid. Turkey's "swing" status, therefore, had to be resolved and so it became a co-beneficiary to Truman's proposed aid package.

Another country of concern for the Truman administration was Iran. As early as 1946, the Soviet Union's objectives in, and the fragility of, the Middle East became abundantly clear because, as Truman writes, "Russian activities in Iran threatened the peace of the world." The Soviet Union, in apparent breach of its agreement with the British, was increasing its presence in Iran in the months after World War II and retained troops in Iran well after the 2 march 1946 deadline. Russian troops had blocked the advance of Iranian troops into Soviet-occupied territories which presented three problems to Truman; first, the security of Turkey, of whom the Soviet Union has been pressing for territorial concessions and whose critical control of the Bosporus straight limited Russian access to the Mediterranean. Second, Soviet control of Iranian oil reserves which, according to Truman, jeopardized the "raw material balance of the world." If the Soviet Union controlled access to, and therefore the supply of, oil in Iran, it could seriously influence development - and the politics and economies - of Europe during the fragile post-war period. Finally, Truman saw the Iranian situation as further proof of Russia's "callous disregard" for small nations, UN mandates, and its own promises.

Indeed, it was this third problem which perturbed Truman the most, for it signaled a willingness on the part of the Soviet Union to "press wherever weakness showed" despite any agreements made face-to-face or within the international forum of the UN. Certainly this proclivity of the Russians to exploit weakness played a large part in the Truman administrations' decision to reverse its standing on the UN partition plan. The Soviet Union had been invited into Iran as part of a wartime supply line and was reluctant to leave once war was ended. By the end of May 1946, however, mounting diplomatic pressure, laced with strong hints of military intervention by the United States and Britain, forced the Soviet Union to back down from its bellicose stance. Truman would later write that the situation in Iran had threatened to plunge the world into another global conflict.

With plentiful evidence of Soviet designs on the region; civil war in Greece, political pressure on Turkey, and squatting on Iranian soil, Truman had, by May of 1947, been able to convince Congress to send aid to both Turkey and Greece- two mutually antipathetic countries - in order that they may "create conditions for peaceful development of nations free from coercion."The bill that Congress passed reflects the American view that there was a grave threat to the stability of the post-World War II world by stating, in the opening paragraph of Public Law 75 of the 80^th Congress, that "Whereas the governments of Greece and Turkey have sought from the Government of the United States immediate financial and other assistance which is necessary for the maintenance of their national integrity and their survival as free nations; and Whereas the national integrity and survival of these nations are of importance to the national security of the United States."Thus began the Truman Doctrine of preventing the Soviet Union from encroaching upon the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. Strong nations free of the influence of the Soviet Union (though, it should be noted, not above the influence of the United States) was an integral component of the Truman doctrine. Both of these countries were perceived as gateways to the warm waters of the Mediterranean and to the Middle East's treasured oil. The fading presence of the British in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean put the onus of checking traditional Russian plans for expansion upon the Truman administration. The Palestinian problem and the issue of Jewish refugees, however, presented a test to the Truman Doctrine.

THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Truman had long believed that Jewish immigration into Palestine was both a just and humane goal for the United States to advocate. To him, it seemed only natural that the Jewish people, after having suffered so many hardships in other countries - especially the Nazi death camps - should finally be afforded a land to call their own. As Clark Clifford would later recall, "(President Truman) has always supported the right of the Jews to have their own homeland, from the moment he became President." The reality of the situation, however, was that Truman was faced with many different voices in the decision, all of which clamored for his attention. Upon assuming office in 1945, Truman was briefed by the State Department, upon the current situation in Palestine as well as the official stance the Roosevelt administration had taken on the matter. Roosevelt's approach had been to assure all parties that no decision would be made without the full consultation of the Arabs and the Jews, a policy, Truman writes, he was already fully aware of. Beyond that, though, a memorandum from the joint State-War-Navy coordinating committee in 1946 warned that:

The political shock attending the reappearance of U.S. armed forces in the Middle East would unnecessarily risk such serious disturbances throughout the area as to dwarf any local Palestine difficulties. Such a condition would, among other effects, invalidate entirely any current estimate of required strengths of the Army and Navy. Further, the Middle East could well fall into anarchy and become a breeding ground for world war.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also rejected the notion of a partition plan and had warned since 1945 that if the United States were to adopt the position of supporting a Jewish homeland in Palestine, it would be responsible for providing security for the region, transporting the Jewish refugees, building housing, and providing for the unemployed who reached Palestine. They reiterated this view in 1946 after the Anglo-American Committee had submitted its report, adding that following the recommendations of the Committee would turn Arab sentiment away from the West, allowing the Soviet Union the chance to supplant Britain and the US in influence, and (again) jeopardize access to oil - a critical element to the reconstruction of Europe. Truman must have been more receptive to the warnings of the Joint Chiefs than the State Department for he writes that "the pressure against Turkey and the incidents in Iran all pointed only too clearly to the fact that the Russians would be ready to welcome the Arabs into their camp." The presence of American troops, then, was not only not practically viable, but even if it was, it would destabilize the region and effectively hand the region over to the Russians.

These concerns aside, Truman recognized that should the Soviet Union be allowed to provide security for one or the other side in Palestine, there certainly had to be the worry that the eastern Mediterranean would become another staging point satellite to spread Communism and Communist insurgency to Transjordan, Egypt, Iraq, and beyond as well as threatening again Greece and Turkey in a kind of political pincer movement. As The Economist's Intelligence Unit observed in April of 1948 "The whole belt of countries along the underbelly of Russia...is a political mess that beggars description...there is no impulse to pull up their socks and resist Communism...[the Russians] are in fact fomenting nationalism, because it helps them to cut the countries' established links with the West." Though this report from The Economist is rife with stereotyping and ethnocentrism, not that the Truman administration was above that,but it does mention something that brought it to the attention of State Department who passed it along to the president; "Yet they [the Arabs] sit on a crossroads of the world, and (atop) an oilfield to which the West cannot afford to be denied."

PALESTINIAN PUZZLE

There were only two options left for Truman then; first, he could institute a policy, as the British had, of actively discouraging Jewish immigration or he could let events unfold as they would and recognize the fact that the Jewish state eventually would come into being. Given the negative attention British enforcement efforts had garnered and Truman's own sympathy toward the formation of a Jewish homeland, however, left only one real option open to the United States; de facto recognition of the nascent Jewish state. Upon the infant government of Israel was hung much hope since, if it failed, it would allow the region to become a battleground whose "fighting would infect the entire Middle East and could lead to consequences of the gravest sort involving the peace of this nation and of the world." On the other hand, if it succeeded, then it would provide a stabilizing force in the region with (it was hoped) close ties to the West in general and the United States in particular. As Clifford argued in a meeting between Marshall, Lovett, the President, and himself: "I fully understand and agree that vital national interests are involved. In an area as unstable as the Middle East, where there is not now and never has been any tradition of democratic government, it is important for the long-range security of our country, and indeed the world, that a nation committed to the democratic system be established there, one on which we can rely. The new Jewish state can be such a place." When Lovett had argued that the Jews now filtering into Palestine were communist agents sent there by the Soviets, Clifford argued, was that "the United States has a great moral obligation to oppose discrimination such as that inflicted on the Jewish people. Alarmingly, it is reappearing in communist-controlled Eastern Europe."

Here, both Clifford and Lovett touch upon a sticking point in the decision to recognize the nascent Jewish state; would the United States be responsible for introducing a communist regime to the Middle East? Some members of the British and American intelligence community and the State Department clearly thought so. In addition to the "displaced persons" in and around Europe, there was a crush of Jews fleeing Eastern European countries where communist regimes had taken hold, leading some to believe that it was a clever diversion by the Soviets to introduce communists into Palestine. The New York Times even got in on the act, proclaiming on New Year 's Day, 1948 "Red 5th Columns in Palestine" on the front page. The report came from "unnamed" sources in the British Foreign Office who had intercepted two ships loaded with illegal Jewish immigrants that were from Rumania, Bulgaria, and other Eastern European states. Such accusations, however, carried little weight with either the President or the American populace in general, and drew sharp criticism from some in the Zionist movement who denounced the story as anti-Semitic.Responding to the stories of a Jewish-communist link, leaders of several Zionist organizations wrote to The New York Times on 2 January 1948, emphasizing the hardships Jews have experienced and their close ties to the United States:

Zionism, needless to say, serves as the agent of no foreign power. It is nothing more or less than the Jewish people's agent for auto-emancipation. This cause has furthermore won the support of American opinion generally, and the roster of devoted and unequivocal Christian friends of Zionism includes the names of the foremost leaders of our country, Republican and Democrats alike...As for the miserable men, women, and children aboard those two refugee ships, their only 'political affiliation' is their membership in various Zionist parties and organizations, none of which is Communist or remotely associated with the Soviet Union...the refugees were from Rumania and their position there had become increasingly difficult under the communist regime, (as they also have) in Bulgaria and other Soviet satellites.

The opinion of the vast majority of Americans seems to believe in this link as well. For example, the New York Times reported on the 4^th of January, 1948, that TNT was being smuggled to Palestine, most likely to be used by the Jewish militias. Yet a month later, after the shipment had been traced and suspects arrested, they are summarily released by the Judge, who felt that the defendants were merely attempting to assist in the creation of a Jewish homeland, and intended no criminal acts. What these stories, among others, illustrate is the supreme confidence the American people had in the ties between Israel and the United States. After all, immigration into the United States by Jewish refugees was second only to immigration into Palestine and five times more than immigration into all other countries combined. Additionally, continual drives for food, clothing, and medical aid were conducted in New York and other major American cities, raising hundreds of thousands of dollars for Jews in Palestine.

It is perhaps this confidence in the close bond between the American people and the fledgling Jewish nation, which led Clifford and Truman to have faith in a democratic Jewish state. Indeed, though certainly there was some credence in the British and American reports of communists embedded with the refugees, Truman's concerns were mollified by Eddie Jacob, who assured the president that "the extremists do not represent the whole." Though this reassurance seems at best a thin thread by which to hang the hopes of the region, there is no doubting that the Truman administration was at least somewhat aware of the shipment of explosives, arms, and money to the Jewish enclaves in Palestine. The Jewish militias, such as the Stern Gang, Haganah, and Irgun which had seen such successful attacks on the British, were comprised of veterans of the Second World War, were highly trained, well-equipped (for militias), and well-organized. These groups received much of their funding - whether directly or indirectly - from Zionist organizations, the majority of which were based in the United States. It is interesting here to also note that Eleanor Roosevelt, with whom Truman communicated regularly, also favored the formation of a Jewish state. Truman believed in the New Deal and held the Roosevelts in high regard, especially when their opinions happened to converge with his. Truman, therefore, never seems to have entertained the notion, despite Lovett's warnings to the contrary, that the new Jewish state would either be communist, or sympathize with the Soviets in any appreciable way.

Still, the Truman administration was definitely not a united front on the issue of Palestine, especially in regards to America's strategic interests. George C. Marshall, who had agreed with Truman on almost every other issue of foreign policy, was adamant that recognizing what they assumed would be called Judea would tip the balance of power in the Middle East to favor the Soviet Union. He was not a lone voice in the wilderness, either. The majority of the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense (previously War) Department, and a whole host of other experts opposed the US's recognition of Israel on the basis that it would antagonize the Arabs and push them (and their oil) into the Soviet sphere. Truman and Marshall agreed on at least one point, however; the use of large American troops would be out of the question in Palestine. Truman hoped that a partition plan would take hold, legally separating the Arabs and the Jews into two defined camps. His hopes, however, were dashed when in March 1948 the State Department had permitted the UN delegation to reverse support for partition and endorse UN trusteeship, an incident which Truman fumed about. It was perhaps this moment that set in stone Truman's resolve to recognize Israel; the embarrassment he felt gelled his personal feelings and melded them into the geopolitical considerations. The United States would recognize Israel on May 15^th, though by agreement between Lovett and Clifford, it would be a de facto recognition. The distinction was largely an academic one, serving to mollify the State Department and allow American diplomats a way to negotiate among the bruised Arab egos while seeming to fulfill the promises made to Zionists and the Jewish settlers in Palestine.

Conclusion

But what kind of promise comes complete with an in-place arms embargo? Long before Israel became a state in its own right, during the British Mandate, the international community had agreed upon an arms embargo to Palestine. Though on the surface, this seems to be a snub or abandonment of the new Jewish state, the reality is quite different. As Phillip Marshall Brown noted some dozen years earlier, American neutrality does not mean impartiality toward both sides. Though he was speaking at the time of the Italian-Ethiopian war, the phrase "malevolent neutrality" which he coined should be applied when speaking of the arms embargo. The United States was the largest private contributor to the welfare of the Jewish settlers in Palestine, in terms of both money and illegal shipments (such as the explosives described earlier). Additionally, the social ties to the United States were equally deep; Elaihu Epstein, Chaim Weizmann, and Eddie Jacobs (to name but a few) had regular contact with American elites and, more importantly, the Oval Office. Conversely, anti-Semitic pogroms in Eastern Europe had forced many Jews into exile, thereby souring any notions of receiving unconditional support for the Jewish state from Soviet sources. Finally, the firm - almost faith-based - belief that the Jews would elect to have a democratic government were at the heart of Truman's beliefs.

When Truman took office in 1945, he had before him a large collection of notes, memorandums, policy briefs, and files on various subjects ranging from the state of the war to problems and situations in countries around the globe. A memorandum from then-Secretary of State Edward Stettinus, Jr. regarding the problems in Palestine lay amongst that pile. In it, Stettinus warned Truman that the question of a Jewish homeland was going to be pressed by lobbyists from the World Zionist Organization, among other interested bodies and persons, but it also warned that the situation in the region was far more complex than it seems on the surface. Such warnings were echoes by acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew who noted "The Arabs, not only in Palestine but throughout the whole Near East, have made no secret of their hostility to Zionism and their Governments say that it would be impossible to restrain them from rallying with arms, in defense of what they consider to be an Arab country...[thus] A Jewish state in Palestine (the ultimate Zionist aim) could be established and maintained only by military force." Truman wrote of this memo in the first volume of his memoirs, narrating that he thought the "striped-pants boys" in the State department were making a humanitarian decision needlessly complicated.Clearly, Truman wanted the formation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, and its subsequent recognition, to be a simple decision. Also clear is his innate distrust of the State Department, whether well founded or not, and was inclined to dismiss many arguments against a Jewish homeland based on irritating the British or the Arabs. Who were they, after all? One was indebted to the United States both monetarily and militarily while the other does not even appear as a minor blip on his geopolitical radar. In fact, in the entire first volume of his memoirs, Truman wrote a whole paragraph pertaining to Palestine.

How deceiving appearances can be. In the years that followed, Truman would be faced with a Soviet Union on the rise and suspicious, if not downright hostile, toward the United States and her allies. Communist insurgencies began to sprout like mushrooms after a hard rain in Indochina, Malaysia, and Czechoslovakia. The stability of Greece, Iran, and Turkey were threatened by Communist elements and the Soviet Union, respectively. Now, the possibility that security issues in Palestine might introduce the Soviet Union directly into the Middle East, whose oil was important to the rebuilding of Europe and whose Suez Canal was vital to the maintenance of the British Empire and international shipping, made the Palestinian problem loom large in the early years of the Cold War. In his second volume, Truman devotes considerably more attention to the constant back-and-forth, the warnings and appeals, both for and against, the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine.

This is not to say that Truman was opposed to the formation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, far from it. As Michael T. Benson asserts, and papers from the Truman library as well as Truman's own memoirs confirm, Truman styled himself as a modern-day Cyrus the Great. When meeting with David Ben Gurion after Israel had become a reality, Truman responded with tears when told his name would be inscribed in gold letters in the history of the Jewish people. Beyond religious affinity with the Jews, Truman had long been moved by the plight of the Jewish people and entry into Palestine was viewed by him as a humanitarian effort.

Though it is true that Truman was predisposed to the plight of the Jewish people, and that he did favor the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine, the issue was not simply a matter of placing a people without a land into a land without a people, or the fulfillment of a biblical covenant, or the relief of human suffering that informed Truman's decision. The Cold War was well underway and the Soviets were working hard to spread their influence. Truman's decision to recognize Israel must be considered in that light. If, as some have suggested, Truman acted out of religious fervor, or even compassion for the plight of the Jews, he would have recognized the Jewish government before May 15^th. If, on the other hand, he felt that the Jewish government was connected in any serious way to the Soviet Union, he would not have recognized it, let alone make the United States the first to recognize Israel. If, the motivation behind recognition was to win Jewish votes, it was a poor gambit; as Clifford notes, many American Jews opposed the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Additionally, Dewey and the Republican Party had also endorsed the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine - long before the presidential race - so to credibly accuse Truman of political opportunism, one must also accuse the Republicans of the same!

Truman recalled that the Presidency was like riding a tiger; you either remained on top of everything or you were eaten alive.The same can be said of international politics, especially in the Cold War years. By recognizing Israel at that precise moment, Truman struck a balance between personal desires and political realities. By timing it as he did, he ensured that the United States recognized the existence of Israel, but claimed no responsibility for the state's welfare. Also, by recognizing on the hour of its creation, Truman restored the credibility of the United States to fulfill its promises, even in the face of a difficult or unpopular decision.

Herbert Druks The Uncertain Friendship: The US and Israel from Roosevelt to Kennedy (Westport, Connecticut; Greenwood Press, 2001) 85

John Snetsinger Truman, The Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel (Stanford; Hoover Institute Press, 1974) 140

Alonzo Hamby "The Accidental President" The Wilson Quarterly Spring 1988 12: 64

Zvi Ganin Truman, American Jewry, and Israel

Michael J. Cohen "Truman and the State Department: The Palestine Trusteeship Proposal, March 1948" Jewish Social Studies 1981 43(2) 167

Michael T. Benson "Harry S. Truman as the Modern Cyrus" Brigham Young University Studies 1994 34(1)

___Harry S. Truman and the Foundation of Israel (Westport, Connecticut; Praeger, 1997)

Evan M. Wilson "The American Interest in the Palestine Question and the Establishment of Israel" Annals of the American Academy of Political and SocialScience 1972 (401): 66

Harry S. Truman Memoirs of Harry S. Truman vol. 1: Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY; Doubleday, 1955)

Harry S. Truman Memoirs of Harry S. Truman vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY; Doubleday, 1956)

Truman Presidential Museum and Library (online)

U.S. State Department Marshall/Lovett Memorandums to President Truman, 1947-1948 [microform], reel 2, doc #508.

Stuart R. Schram The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung (New York: Praeger, 1969)

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, V, 15

Clark Clifford, Holbrooke, R. Counsel to the President (New York; Random House, 1991) 3

New York Times 1 Jan 1948, 1

Michael T. Benson Harry S. Truman and the Foundation of Israel (Westport, CT; Praeger, 1997) 190