Was Nikita Khrushchev or President John Kennedy Primarily Responsible for the Cuban Missile Crisis?

The central argument that Thomas G. Paterson's "Spinning Out of Control: Kennedy's War Against Cuba and the Missile Crisis" and Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow's "Aftermath" focus on is whom is actually responsible for the escalation and the peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both arguments cite the numerous events leading up to the crisis in October of 1962, as well as the decisions and actions made by the leader whom they believe acted the most recklessly during the crisis and the leader who is more responsible for the peaceful resolution.

It is clearly evident that Paterson's essay offers criticism of Kennedy and his administration by assessing the roots of and the decisions made during the Cuban Missile Crisis and favoring Khrushchev in being responsible for the peaceful ending. Paterson portrays Kennedy as obsessed and "fixated" on Cuba, part of which stemmed from the president's time as a senator. During his term in Congress, Kennedy was supportive of the Cuban Revolution in ending the oppressive dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista (Paterson 149). Fidel Castro received support after denied being communist but later declared himself Marxist-Leninist, which made Kennedy feel betrayed by the Cuban leader.

Similarly, Kennedy felt as though Cuba was now part of the Iron Curtain due to its communist government and U.S. ties to the country were quickly cut off. Paterson cites the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April of 1961 as one of the main reasons for the Cuban Missile Crisis. The invasion sought to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro and his communist rule, but plans ultimately failed (Paterson 151). However, the Bay of Pigs worsened the problems for the U.S. as Cuba now felt its own national security was under an even greater threat. In fact, the Kennedy administration did not quit and began devising more plans to overthrow Castro and used several tactics, including economic isolation and deploying CIA-trained saboteurs, to deliver non-military blows to the country (Paterson 152).

Based on U.S. aggression during the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro still believed that Cuba needed to prepare itself for a direct invasion by the U.S. and Khrushchev offered aid to Cuba through nuclear weapons as a deterrent to any American attacks, but the plans were revealed after photographs were taken of the Cuban nuclear base (Paterson 154). Paterson's main argument that the decisions and the events leading up to the Cuban Missile Crisis were entirely Kennedy's and the U.S.'s fault: "Had there been no exile expedition at the Bay of Pigs, no destructive covert activities, no assassination plots, no military maneuvers and plans, and no economic and diplomatic steps to harass, isolate, and destroy the Castro government in Havana, there would not have been a Cuban missile crisis"( Paterson 153). The author continues to assert that in addition to being responsible for the crisis, Kennedy was also reckless and arrogant in his decisions to defuse the situation.

Paterson notes that "Kennedy showed little interest in negotiations" and that his proposed method of ending the crisis was demanding that the Soviets withdraw its missiles from Cuba (Paterson 154). Following the U.S.'s blockade, Khrushchev ordered Soviet ships to turn back and also sent two letters offering terms of resolution: the first which stated the Soviets would withdraw the missiles in Cuba if the U.S. promised not to invade and the second that offered that it would withdraw its missiles in Cuba if the U.S. withdrew its missiles in Turkey (Paterson 156). Paterson portrays Kennedy as stubborn his resolution decision and agreeing to the Soviet's terms, as he sought to keep the "deal" secretive so that it didn't appear as though the U.S. was giving into Khrushchev. Instead, the president issued a public ultimatum, as opposed to going through diplomatic confrontation, for the Soviets to remove their own missiles or the U.S. would invade in order to remove them, to which Khrushchev accepted the former.

The U.S. finally agreed to not invade Cuba and remove the Jupiters in Turkey so as long as the Cuba problems were resolved (Paterson 157), although the lack of a formal agreement or document allowed Kennedy to refuse an unqualified no-invasion (Paterson 159). The author concludes his essay by emphasizing that Kennedy and his administration's handling of the crisis was filled with "near misses, close calls, narrow squeaks, physical exhaustion, accidents, and guesses that scared officials on both sides into a settlement" (Paterson 157). Paterson finally expresses the decisions Khrushchev made at the end of the crisis in a more positive light and that it was really the Soviet leader who "withdrew his mistake" and saved Cuba from an invasion (158).

May and Philip's argument is considerably different from Paterson's and instead place the blame entirely on Khrushchev. The authors argue that Khrushchev's decision to lie and conceal the movement of missiles to Cuba was the basis for the crisis: "Had [Khrushchev] announced his intentions or even told Kennedy privately that he planned to base IRBMs in Cuba, the crisis would have unfolded different. Conceivably there might have been no crisis at all" (May and Philip 161). May and Philip also note that Khrushchev was also considered reckless in his decisions and made decisions on his own based on instinct instead of calculations (May and Philip 163).

According to the authors, the Soviet leader's decision to send missiles was motivated by different events, specifically when the U.S. continued testing its own nuclear weapons and the Jupiter missiles in Turkey. May and Philip argue that Khrushchev acted out of retaliation and spite and commented that "it was high time American learned what it feels like to have her own land and her own people threatened" (May and Philip 165) and was reckless enough in his thoughts to believe that Kennedy would allow Soviet missiles remain in Cuba (May and Philip 166).

Only until photographs revealed the Soviet plans to the U.S. did Khrushchev acknowledge the hole he had dug and he now feared America would attack Cuba (May and Philip 167). Despite a U.S. blockade, as opposed to a direct invasion, and a demand from the U.S. to withdraw its missiles, Khrushchev made another decision to outline specific terms for withdrawal. He initially set terms to withdraw the missiles if America promised not to invade Cuba but then later decided to push harder for demands, specifically to withdraw the Cuban missiles as long as the U.S. withdrew its missiles in Turkey, in which Khrushchev was convinced the latter set of terms would be obliged (May and Philip 169). May and Philip emphasize that Kennedy's administration was more organized and well thought out in its decisions and actions, including the initial blockade and the acceptance of removing the missiles in Turkey, that ended in a peaceful resolution and that Khrushchev is to blame for the escalation of the crisis.
Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy (Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev Appeals to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962) directly supports the assertions made by Paterson's essay. In his letter, Khrushchev states that he desires peace and even states that the goal of communism is peace by saying "we, communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world…War is our enemy and a calamity for all the people" (Khrushchev145). Additionally, there are similarities between Paterson's arguments and Khrushchev's words, especially when the Soviet leader states "You are threatening us with war" (Khrushchev 145). This quote correlates with Paterson's argument that the U.S. was responsible for the Cuban Missile Crisis by Khrushchev directly acknowledging Kennedy's initial actions.

The letter also displays levelheadedness and states his understanding of the outcome associated with any Soviet aggression towards the U.S.: "You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way" (Khrushchev 145). Khrushchev also includes inconsistencies between the U.S.'s statements and actions, just as Paterson argues, by noting the U.S.'s position that it was not preparing an invasion but at the same time it was supporting counterrevolutionaries (Khrushchev 146).

As further evidence that refutes the argument made by May and Philip and supports Paterson instead, Khrushchev cites the only reason that military and economic aid was provided to Cuba is to help the country defend and support itself: "Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is: we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism" (Khrushchev 146). However, while the letter overwhelmingly supports many of Paterson's claims, it also possible that it correlates with May and Philip's argument that he sent the letter as a way to defuse the possibility of a U.S. invasion.

Sources:

May, Ernest R. & Philip D. Zelikow. "Aftermath." Major Problems in American History Since 1945.

Paterson, Thomas G. "Spinning Out of Control: Kennedy's War Against Cuba and the Missile Crisis." Major Problems in American History Since 1945.

"Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev Appeals to President Kennedy, October 26, 1962."