Weimar Republic: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Klaus P Fischer, in his history Nazi Germany: A New History, writes, "On the surface, the [Weimar] republic appeared to be prosperous and stable, but there were unmistakable signs of fault lines below the surface that if aggravated could pull apart the republic's tenuous lifeline" (180). When Germany conceded defeat and signed an armistice on November 11, 1918, that ended the Great War, it left the German public in a state of shock. Having been indoctrinated into the belief that the German army was victoriously fighting its way through its objectives, the disbelief of the people at defeat caused them to look to their government for answers. However, the Allies were creating a new order in Europe. It was an order that would replace the German ideal of the authoritarian regime with one that, according to the victors, would be truly representative of the people. Thus, the Weimar Republic was created, and with it, the opportunity to rebuild Germany and Europe. However, the republic was not perfect. The Weimar republic was the result of a devastating to Germany. Interwoven within its political fabric was the embittered sentiment of the people. Taking into account the economic, political, and social aspects and manifestations of the Weimar Republic between 1919 and 1929, the republic appears to be a functioning state making progress toward solidifying the new German government, but was destroyed when world depression rekindled the sentiments of dissatisfaction and fear.

The economic position of Germany after World War I was a major challenge for the Weimar Republic. Contrary to popular belief that the Treaty of Versailles was a deadly blow to the German economy, the problems they faced "stemmed primarily from a series of imprudent government fiscal policies that originated in World War I" (Fischer 1). By taking such foolish actions as "floating internal bonds" instead of taxing, "[removing] restrictions on the circulation of notes not covered by gold reserves," and providing funds by simply printing money without backing, the German government damaged its own economy (71). The inflation caused by these actions was serious, yet not critical. The eventual 33 billion dollar reparation bill that the Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to pay did not cripple the economy, but "brought the [economic] problem to the surface in dramatic terms" (71). Also, effects from losing World War I such as the "disruption of key industries" and the "[isolation] due to territorial changes and [the] dislocation from world markets" restricted Germany's economic capabilities (Weimar 1). However, it was not until the actions taken by Germany in response to France's occupation of the Ruhr on January 11, 1923, that the German economy began to buckle. The German government's policy of "passive resistance" in which "all economic activity came to a standstill" and thus, the "effort to subsidize the Ruhr workers who had gone on strike" broke the economy's back (71). The German government, by printing money with no backing at the rate required to support every former worker, caused inflation to reach cataclysmic heights. However, soon the government stepped in and, with the help of the Allies, began to normalize the economy

Through a series of steps and plans, the Weimar republic and the Allies subdued Germany's economic crisis. At the end of 1923, the introduction of the Rentenmark stabilized the German currency. Now that inflation was standing at a constant level, in July of 1924, the "Allies [met] in London to discuss the Dawes Plan, which proposed the evacuation of the Ruhr, the reduction of reparations, and loans to Germany," all in the hopes of bringing Germany's economy back to its former potential (Kaes 768). Enacted on September 1, 1924, the Dawes Plan intended "that the German reparations burden should be sustained by a domestic tax surplus and by a favourable import/export balance" (Nicholls 106). Not only would this stimulate the German economy, but it would also be beneficial to the Allies. This deal meant a more guaranteed and systematic reparations payment, and it was also "very attractive to overseas investors" because it renewed confidence in the Germany economy (106). The Dawes Plan was a definite kick-start to the economy. However, it was only a remedy and not a cure. Created in 1929, the Locarno Plan or Young Plan was a revision to the Dawes Plan. In an attempt to alleviate the stress from the reparations and occupation, the Allies dramatically reduced the reparations bill and increased the amount of time it in which it was to be paid off to 58 years (Fischer 211). The plan made concessions in the meeting of annual payments and it minimized foreign interference in Germany's economy (211). Though the Young Plan met much opposition, Germany enacted it. Relying on support from her Allies, Germany began to recreate the semblance of a functioning economy. Though major flaws were still intact when considering employment rates and standards of living, Allied investment was carrying the economy, which was seemingly on the upswing. Prophetically, Stresemann said, in 1928, "Germany is dancing on a volcano. If the short-term credits are called in, a large section of our economy would collapse...." (Economic 1). It would take a disastrous turn in the economic world for investors to call in the majority of their investments overseas and abroad. Though a frightful thought and possibility, to the world in 1928, that turn seemed highly unlikely. Though the economy of the Weimar Republic was unstable after World War I, it was making progress. From a completely shattered infrastructure, began to arise a fragile and dependent economical structure that, if continued to let grow and flourish under a stable world economy, would regain its former momentum and status.

After World War I, a power vacuum was left behind which left both the left and right wing political groups vying for power. Communist parties looked at this absence of power as an opportunity to establish a communist regime in Germany, rallying around Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, much like the way the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia after suffering defeat in war (Fischer 45). The political atmosphere in Germany at this time was highly volatile, and it required impeccable timing to make the right political moves at the right times. The Majority Socialists were able to accomplish this task of achieving recognition as the legitimate interim government by the people thereby shifting "the center of political gravity" through demanding for the resignation of the former Kaiser and proclaiming a republic (48). After the armistice was signed ending the Great War, Kaiser William II, "[o]n November 9 [1918], abdicated his throne and a republic was proclaimed by the Social Democrat Phillip Scheidmann" (Fischer 45). However, without the help of the armed forces, Ebert and Scheidmann's "government would probably not have survived the attacks launched against it by the extreme revolutionary left" (50). Fortunate for the Ebert government, the right was going to rally around anything that did not have the stench of communism. In the highly charged political atmosphere of 1919, Germans went to the polls and voted fore moderation (Fischer 55). However, Ebert's government, by agreeing not to tamper with the structure of the Germany army in order to gain support from the military, doomed the Weimar republic from the start, for the military would continue to be a rallying point for dissidents on the right (50). As a response to the great fear of the radical left and dissatisfaction with the Treaty of Versailles, the far right also benefited from gains in membership. The Freikorps was formed in order to keep the left in check and, if possible, to suppress their political movement. One such instance occurred when a dissident group from the Independent Socialist Party, named the Spartacists, launched an attack on the Ebert government with a massive strike (53). The Freikorps came to the aid of Ebert's government resulting in the deaths of both Liebknecht and Luxemburg. All the internal strife and conflict caused great distrust on the part of the German public towards party politics. Even during relative periods of calm, "the relationship between Reichstag parties, ministers and President was not developing in a manner designed to strengthen those forces in the State which were loyal to the Republic" (Nicholls 110). However, there were positive signs that show that the political situation in Germany was not as dangerous as it appeared.

The Weimar Republic was able to maintain power and make large improvements in social policy. Because of the "revolutionary troubles of 1918 and 1919 and of the emergencies of the First World War," the republic created Article 48 (Nicholls, Anthony 86). Article 48 allowed for "a Land...if danger was imminent, [to] apply the emergency powers of the Reich prophylactically and on its own initiative" (86). Therefore, the government could, upon threat, restrict constitutional rights, such as private property, in order to restore the safety of the republic. This, in essence, gave the President dictatorial power. He could use Article 48 with "no prior announcement" and without judicial scrutiny (89). It was applied liberally, and greatly contributed to the stability of the government. When threats came to fruition in "Saxony, Thuringia or in the Ruhr," Article 48, "in the first years of its existence...was a stabilizing factor for the Republic" (90). In addition, there were no further attempts to overthrow the government by Putsch or revolution after 1923. The legitimacy of the Weimar government was gaining ground. Although many historians point to the instability of party politics within the regime, voter confidence in the central, more moderate parties, remained high and increased up to 1928 (Parliamentary 1). Parties such as the Social Democrats continued to gain favor while in control of the government, whereas the extremist parties, such as the Nazis, were in decline (1). Unlike the common theory that the people were immensely dissatisfied by the Treaty of Versailles, the Dawes Plan, and were wary of democracy, voting results do not seem to reflect it. Up until 1928, the moderate parties gained seats in the Reichstag and brought progress to the people. On October 12, 1925 Germany signed a commercial treaty with the USSR and on September 8, 1926 Germany joined the League of Nations (Kaes 768-769). Germany was beginning to regain creditability as a nation with potential allies and was no longer the pariah of Europe. Although the initial political atmosphere of the Weimer republic was unstable, the extremist parties lost momentum and the moderate parties gained a relatively firm control of the government, until economic disaster struck at the heart of the world economy in 1929.

With its power relatively stable between 1923 and 1928, the Weimar Republic faced other obstacles within its borders. German civil institutions presented a problem to the republic. Institutions such as the "civil service and judiciary, [did not] [develop] anything approaching a Republican esprit de corps..." (Nicholls 107). Universities and the people who ran them reacted to the Weimar Republic with a spirit of contempt. Thus, students were not being taught about their new democracy and the possibilities associated with it, but they were shown the weaknesses present. Also undermining the Republic was the judiciary, which leaned heavily towards the right. By handing out excessively harsh sentences on the left and laughably lenient sentences on the right, they undermined the authority from which their power derived, but "such were the penalties of high treason in a state where disloyalty to the regime was the surest recommendation to mercy" (Fischer 162). Rather than submitting legal and impartial sentences concerning both crime and fiscal policy, the judiciary took upon an activist role and ruled based on personal notions of "equity and good faith" (Hughes 77). In order to help creditors, intentions set aside, the judiciary "directly [challenged] the constitutional order and government policy" (83). Eventually, the Reichstag settled the matter and the government set the revaluation rate at 15% while making sure the government itself was exempt. In terms of social policy, the government was able to pass legislation to benefit the most destitute of its citizens.

The German government's economy was still in need of repair, but in an effort to bring relief to the people, the Reichstag created a national program of unemployment relief. Although Germany's industrial workforce was already the highest paid in Europe, unemployment due to demobilization and industries associated with a wartime economy made unemployment a significant issue (Statchura 47). These plans "had been in desultory preparation by the government since 1919" and took effect on October 1, 1927 (52-53). Abbreviated the AVAVG, the legislation "combined a series of innovations with elements already established by previous legislation" (53). It included pay to the unemployed and extended relief for the long term unemployed, but with certain restrictions applied. The package created was very broad and included industrial workers to white-collar workers. However, such a widely available package would be sure to drain the Republic's funds if unemployment claims exceeded the designated amount. "The new scheme was meant to accommodate a maximum of 800,000 unemployed on average per year" (54). Unfortunately for the Republic and the German people, the AVAVG "was bound to flounder altogether in the mass unemployment scenario of the early 1930s" (55). Although there were difficulties with unemployment numbers and the ability of the government to provide to all what the package had promised, "...the entire package was considered an important step forward for the cause of social justice" (54).

The Weimar republic has been referred to as an accidental democracy. Even though the Republic ultimately fell to a radical regime does not mean that it was a failure. Economically, the Republic confronted a battered and worn economy. However, through cooperation with allies the republic was able to gain ground and stabilize inflation. Dependent on foreign support, the German economy was growing, but with the knowledge that their economy was dependent on the Allied forces economies. Caught between the extreme left and right wing revolutionaries was a government that had to confront everything from attempted Putsches to assassination attempts. With the very legitimacy of the Republic in question, the it had to confront issues such as cataclysmic inflation, unemployment and a former wartime economy that trying to stay alive after forced demobilization. Though their parliamentary system was greatly criticized, the results speak for themselves. With help from Article 48, all putsches against the government were suppressed and after 1923 there were no more attempts to seize power from the government by force. Voting records illustrate that the German people voted moderately and the moderate parties gained popularity up to 1928. The Reichstag, though confronted by a hostile civil service and judiciary, managed to create new programs to aid the destitute. The Weimar Republic was working but it was fragile. Given time and economic stability, the Republic would have been able to "root itself very firmly in German society" (Nicholls 106). However, with the Great Depression that struck the world in 1929, economic stability was not a reality and it was the beginning of the end of the Weimar Republic.

Works Cited

Fischer, Klaus P. Nazi Germany: A New History. 1995.

Kaes Anton, Martin Jay, Edward Dimendberg, eds. The Weimar Republic Sourcebook 1994

Hughes, Michel L. "Private Equity, Social Inequity: German Judges react to Inflation, 1914-1924." Central European History 16 (March 1983): 76-94.

Nicholls, Anthony, and Erich Matthias, eds. German Democracy and the Triumph of Hitler. 1971.

Nicholls, A. J. Weimar and the Rise of Hitler. Rev. ed. 1979.

Parliamentary Elections in Weimar Republic, Germany. Http://facultystaff.vwc.edu/~dgraf/weim.htm.

Stachura, Peter D. The Weimar Republic and the Younger Proletariat. 1989.

The Weimar Republic1918-1933: A Democracy and its Vicissitudes. http://icg.harvard.edu/~fc76/handouts/2__Weimar_Overview.html.