What it Means to Be an American

The "notion" of America and an American looks different depending upon who is doing the viewing. I think it is a thin line to tread and I am not convinced that it should or should not be so. The word notion itself is intriguing and the definition seems to capture the idealistic nature and contradictions of how those in power maintain the status quo. Merriam-Webster lists it as such:

no·tion: 1 a (1): an individual's conception or impression of something known, experienced, or imagined (2): an inclusive general concept (3): a theory or belief held by a person or group b: a personal inclination.
However, I prefer the American Heritage definition, which explains thus:
notion: (1) a belief or opinion. (2) an idea or conception. (3) a fanciful impulse; whim.

I an particularly drawn to "a fanciful impulse; whim," as a starting point in my analysis of the three Supreme Court cases, People v. Hall, Elk v. Wilkins, and Korematsu v. United States, and I believe that both Brodkin and Kochiyama's essays emphasize this concept.

During a professional writing seminar, the instructor showed a video portfolio of another student who was exploring the question of what it means to be an American. In the video, he posed the question to fifteen classmates and asked them to respond in the most honest way possible. The ethnicities and nationalities varied among the students, and all were in the range of 19 to 25 years old. The predominant answer, phrased differently of course, of what it meant to be an American was that you could do whatever you wanted. It was interesting that even the international transfer students held the same philosophy.

It is my contention that this philosophy permeates America and all of its powers-the executive, judicial and congressional, has since the inception of the country, and has passed both consciously and unconsciously, through the generations, not only within the government but also within the psyche of the American people, as well as the world at large. Those who do not benefit from this philosophy, or who are harmed by it, sometimes recognize it as a "whim," a "fanciful impulse" to be used, abused, interpreted and re-interrupted as necessary to accommodate the situation at hand, and to support whatever doctrine instituted to the advantage of the those in power at that moment.

Oftentimes those discriminated against do not readily adopt this view, as noted by Kochiyama in "Then Came the War:" "I was red, white, and blue when I was growing up" (407). It is not until the hegemonic rule determines them to be outside of the current ruling interpretation, as in Korematsu v. United States, "Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire" (577). This is clearly an interpretation of the constitutional law prohibiting race discrimination based solely on the "whim" of "Congress and the Executive" (575).

The interpretation of the Act Concerning Civil Cases brought forth in People v. Hall is the same "fanciful impulse" at work. The Act clearly states, "no Indian or Negro," and again "No Black or Mulatto person, or Indian" (548). Yet, in order to make it relevant in a case concerning a person of Chinese descent, the courts convoluted the interpretation to serve the need. I am sure that today, civil rights proponents would bristle at the comment that Asian and Native Americans have a "similarity of features" (549), however it may even now depend upon the circumstantial situation.

For example, while the Fourteenth Amendment states "that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race or color," it is as misinterpreted today as 1884 in the Elk v. Wilkins case. Then, while John Elk had "completely surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the United States" (569), it was determined by the ruling court that it was unknown if "the United States had accepted his surrender" (569). Today, the right to vote cannot be denied unless you are a felon, if you do not have appropriate identification, if you do not have a permanent address, or if you can not wait hours in line to exercise that right. The Fourteenth Amendment does not note these stipulations, they are interpretations made on the whim of the current hegemonic rule.

I view my American heritage differently than my ancestors did and differently than my children, and grandchildren. I view my heritage differently than do African-Americans, Jewish-Americans, Chinese-Americans, or probably any other hyphenated American. I struggle with the whole immigration issue and with the financial assistance awarded immigrants in light of the little assistance given citizens. I struggle with American policies, both foreign and domestic. The sad and most difficult struggle however is the pride in being an American. It is a constant battle to be an informed yet objective American.

The notion of what constitutes an American is just that, a notion that I fear will continue to be an elusive chameleon based solely on whoever is looking at it, in whatever locale. Kochiyama says, "If we can see the connections of how often this happens in history, we can stem the tide of these things happening again by speaking out against them" (414). Unfortunately, I feel this is an idealistic view. Historically, we do not speak out for the other. The American way is doing whatever we want and looking out for number one. My fear is that our ideology is closing in on us and the classic World War II poem illustrates this fear perfectly:

When the Nazis came for the communists,
I remained silent;
I was not a communist.

When they locked up the social democrats,
I remained silent;
I was not a social democrat.

When they came for the trade unionists,
I did not speak out;
I was not a trade unionist.

When they came for me,
there was no one left to speak out.