What is Neoconservatism?

Like isolationists, neoconservatives argue that their ideology is rooted in the words and actions of America's greatest Founding Fathers. George Washington, for instance, believed that America must be able to "choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by our justice, shall counsel... [1] According to William Bennett, this means that America "had to be secure, safe from foreign attack, able to prosper economically, and therefore, capable of looking beyond mere survival in foreign policy."[2] For neoconservatives, the greatest lessons of history come from what was not done rather than what was. From this perspective, if the US government had intervened earlier in many foreign conflicts, America's national security would have been much greater as a result.

Many neoconservatives view WWI as an important landmark in history because they believe that Britain could have prevented the massive devastation of the war if only it had acted earlier. According to their argument, Britain could have deterred Germany from aggressive behavior by entering into binding military alliances with France and Russia and/or by developing a large army.[3] More important than what Britain failed to do before WWI, however, was what Britain failed to do after it. According to Donald Kagan,

"[British leaders] convinced themselves that the disaster [of WWI] was the result of too much, not too little, involvement in international affairs, and too great a reliance on traditional ways of preserving the national interest. They blamed armaments and arms races, alliance systems, the willingness to send an army to the continent, and the reliance on political and military power generally."[4]

Having won WWI, according to the neoconservative perspective, Britain had a responsibility to maintain order in its sphere of interest, and it did not do so.

Like the isolationists, neoconservatives believe that the world is more complex than it may appear. As Donald Kagan argues, even though the world may seem like a relatively safe place at a given time, "change can come with lightning speed."[5] Kagan notes that

"In 1930 no power seemed willing or able to disrupt the peace. Germany was effectively disarmed and Japan seemed to pose no threat... Only a few years [later]... the world had become a very dangerous place, which Britain's armed forces were no longer in any condition to manage... Soon their allies had been conquered, their homeland was under attack, and they stood alone on the verge of defeat and conquest."[6]

For Kagan and other neoconservatives, WWII was "only one [war] among many that could have been prevented by responsible behavior on the part of those nations with the greatest reasons to preserve peace and the means to do so."[7]

The theoretical ease with which America and Britain could have prevented WWII is central to the neoconservative ideology. When Hitler withdrew Germany from disarmament negotiations and the League of Nations in 1933, Britain could have used its military power to insist on German compliance - but it failed to do so.[8] When Mussolini launched a war against Ethiopia in 1935, even Hitler expected Britain to intervene - it did not.[9] When Hitler invaded Rhineland in violation of the terms of the Versailles Treaty on March 7, 1936, he intended to retreat immediately if French or British forces moved to stop him - he was pleasantly surprised when neither nation reacted.[10] According to Donald Kagan, this provided Hitler with "something more valuable than a strong army: a knowledge that his opponents lacked the will to fight."[11] Similarly, America refused to respond adequately to Japan's military build-up and expansion in the years before WWII. America's economic sanctions against Japan had the effect of increasing Japanese anger and desperation while confirming the belief that the US government was unwilling to stand up to Japan militarily.[12] Although America proved Japan wrong by declaring a victorious war after the attack on Pearl Harbor, neoconservatives believe that the costs of prevention and deterrence would have been much less than the tremendous costs of the war.[13] As summarized by Kagan,

"The twentieth century has repeatedly shown that for a great power, and especially for the world's leading power, there is no escape from the responsibility its position imposes. Recent history has also demonstrated that the cost of these burdens is small compared with the costs of failure to bear them forthrightly; and in dealing with the issue of its power, a country like the U.S. is really dealing with its values and its security."[14]

To neoconservatives, America failed to take advantage of the tremendous opportunity presented to it in the 1990s. After demonstrating the awesome power of the US military to exert American interests in the farthest reaches of the planet by expelling Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, America was in a position to maintain its global supremacy so that no nation or individual would dare to challenge it.[15] The first major mistake the US government made, according to Robert Kagan and William Kristol, two of the most prominent neoconservatives, was to leave Saddam in power in Iraq.[16] In that one action, America demonstrated to the world that there were limits to what it could or would do in the name of its interests. When Slobodan Milosevic launched his wars against Slovenia, Croatia, and finally Bosnia, the US government did nothing to intervene, and the notion of a "new world order" was proven to be a lie.[17] As the 1990s progressed, instead of remaining the uncontested unipolar power in the world, America faced a belligerent North Korea developing nuclear weapons, a hostile China engaging in an unparalleled military buildup, an insolent Iraq defying the international community, and an unafraid Serbia slaughtering Europeans by the thousands.[18] According to Kagan and Kristol, America's failure to address these threats established

"that dictators can challenge the peace, slaughter innocents in their own or in neighboring states, threaten their neighbors with missile attacks - and still hang on to power. This constitutes a great failure in American foreign policy, one that will surely come back to haunt us."[19]

Fundamentally, neoconservatives believe that it is detrimental to America's national security when the US government delays its participation in foreign conflicts until obvious threats emerge and intervention is much more costly.

[1] Quoted in William J. Bennett, "Morality, Character and American Foreign Policy," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 290.

[2] William J. Bennett, "Morality, Character and American Foreign Policy," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 290.

[3] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 343.

[4] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 345.

[5] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 338.

[6] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 338.

[7] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 339.

[8] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 350.

[9] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 350.

[10] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 352.

[11] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 352.

[12] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 358.

[13] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 359.

[14] Donald Kagan, "Strength and Will: A Historical Perspective," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 362.

[15] William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 5.

[16] William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 6.

[17] William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 6.

[18] William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 6-9.

[19] William Kristol and Robert Kagan, "Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility," in Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy, eds. Robert Kagan and William Kristol (San Francisco, CA: Encounter Books, 2000), 7.