What Went Wrong: America's Army in Iraq Before the Surge

The hot summer day at the open-air market is rent by the blast of an insurgent-planted bomb. Dozens of occupation force members as well as scored of civilian non-combatants are injured or killed. The military of the occupation force responds by raiding suspected insurgent strongholds in the middle of the night, but find nothing - the suspects have already fled - and the family returns to a house suddenly less safe. Rumors and evidence circulate about the occupation's routine abuses of its prisoners - torture, humiliation, disappearances - and stoke the fires of rage and hatred in the Muslim public.

Eventually, the occupiers and their local allies capture some of the insurgents responsible for the murderous blast, but the sacrifice is worth it - for the insurgent. Having succeeded in capturing one or two insurgents, the tactics used have spawned five, ten or twenty more volunteers for the insurgency. Outrage at home, from the international community, and the local population feeds the political necessity of bringing the occupation to an end. The occupation withdraws hastily, leaving behind a weak - and now amply vulnerable - successor regime which quickly succumbs to insurgency attacks or a coup d'etat, leaving a failed state which becomes the breeding ground for genocide, oppression, massive refugee flows, war with its neighbors, and terrorism; the Occupation won the battle but lost the war. While this opening scenario might best fit the infamous Battle of Algiers fought by the French in the late 1950's, it is in actuality a very real possibility in Iraq should the American democratization mission there fail. Certainly, this sounds nothing like the well-trained, disciplined and honorable soldiers that the United States field in the present day, it might be argued, but the truth is somewhat different.

Norman Emery, a US army Information Operations officer relates the all-too frequent experience of house-to-house searches in Iraq as "Hot, homesick, and angry young soldiers sometimes over-react and 'humiliate the men, offend the women, and alienate the very people who are supposed to be providing intelligence about terrorists and Ba'athist holdouts.' The typical result of such searches is that no weapons or targeted individuals are found."[1] Such is the typical result of to-date counter-insurgency efforts, information that is old, dubious, or just plain wrong is used by the Coalition forces while the insurgents gather intelligence that is more accurate, faster, and fed by a sympathetic populace. As the situation stands now, the Coalition is losing this particular war, though it is winning the battles.[2] What is needed now, as retired General John Nagl so aptly points out, is "a plan"[3]; a plan for eliminating, or at the least marginalizing, the insurgency, a plan for instilling a democratic tradition in Iraq, and a plan for securing Iraq's fledgling democracy from interfering neighbors.

It should be understood at the outset of this paper that the point and purpose of this examination, analysis and critique is not to moralize or pontificate about the rightness of the war in Iraq, such a debate is counter-productive. What is intended by this paper is a thorough examination of three concrete problems facing the Coalition-led forces and the fledgling Iraqi government and logical, long-term solutions for them as advised by experts in the field and the author's own synthesis and conclusions. Perhaps the most pressing, and certainly the most attention-grabbing, is the ongoing insurgency. It is the fire-fight, the improvised explosive device and the body count that makes for great ratings and circulation numbers. It is also the most immediate problem facing the long-term health of the Iraqi state. To that end, historical lessons from the French experience in Algeria and the aftermath of Soviet adventures in Afghanistan will be mixed with Counter-Insurgency (COIN) theories to acquire a clearer picture of what should and should not be a part of Coalition Counterinsurgency policy.

Another pressing, but much less flashy problem facing Iraq is the dearth of civil institutions and traditions that will foster the growth and peaceful transition to consolidated democracy desired by the Bush administration, and indeed the region itself. Here democratization theories will be added to the historical model of failed-state Afghanistan and weak-state Algeria which will serve their part as examples of what occurs should these theories not be heeded in Iraq. The final problem, that of securing Iraq's sovereignty during this transition period is the area that is neglected the most by mainstream news reporting, but may be the arena in which the United States may be the most effective in. In tackling this issue, the author will use a combination of democratization theory, as well as examples from Afghanistan and Algeria to illustrate what a failed- or weak-state Iraq would face in what Daniel Byman has succinctly termed "a dangerous neighborhood".[4] The three of these problems, though stated in order of "sexiness" to the news media outlets, are merely put in that order for ease of analysis for it is the author's assertion that all three must be tackled not as three separate issues requiring separate plans and solutions, but as integral parts of a healthy whole, for as Mona Makram Ebeid, former member of the Egyptian Parliament asked "Which leg of a stool is most important?"[5]

Separating the Fish from the Water

Daniel Byman stated that "Most of the barriers to democracy in...Iraq are related directly or indirectly to security"[6], his conclusion was based upon the fact that in order to deter the average Iraqi from participating in the reconstruction of Iraq's economy and development of its political future, insurgents have used (among other things) coercion and terror as often against civilians as against Coalition forces or Iraqi security forces, both directly, such as through threats during and directly after the January 2005 elections, and indirectly through the use of the infamous improvised explosive devices (IED). Yet despite these random attacks that harm or kill innocent civilians, the CIA warned as early as 2003 that the insurgency was gaining in popularity among the people of Iraq.[7] In fact, the insurgency's intensity and resilience has generally grown over the course of the occupation of Iraq, with no real end in sight.[8]

Part of the reason for this surprising turn of events - how can a populace ravaged by terror side with those who inflict the terror? - lies in the reputation and actions of the U.S. - led coalition forces in Iraq so far. Much of the counter-insurgency tactics employed by the US forces were learned from French and Israeli sources, techniques on how to seal off population centers, methods for information gathering through large "dragnet" sweeps, and the use of overwhelming force to punish insurgents are all similar to French and Israeli actions elsewhere.[9] It is the proactive response to insurgency promulgated and fostered by these prior experts in counter-insurgency that Ahmed Hashim blames for causing many Iraqis to "begin to unfavorably compare US military actions in November [2003] with the longstanding Israeli actions against the second intifada in the occupied territories."[10] Social scientist Neil MacMaster concurs and even goes further, stating that "As the US army became bogged down in Iraq and began to suffer increasing casualties from an urban-based resistance, so it riposted with aggressive hunt-and-destroy strategies modeled on those of colonial Algeria."[11] The result was an alienated population which either tacitly or actively begins to support the insurgency - the lesser of two evils, evidently. But it is not just the "Actions of a brutish, offensive and rash foreign invader" that invades the sanctity of the Iraqi home and disrupts the semi-normalcy of daily Iraqi life that "serve only to galvanize resistance and aid the insurgency both directly and effectively"[12], it is the actions of the US when it has control of the most vulnerable and weakest members of Iraqi society - prisoners.

Abu Ghraib. The mere name conjures images of humiliation, depravity and blatant disregard for human rights, which - theoretically, at least - should be the antithesis of a developed nation's soldiery.[13] But it has long-standing precedent in the democratic nations of the west, or at least in occupied territories facing a growing insurgency. Perhaps the most infamous case which most closely resembles the Abu Ghraib debacle is during the infamous battle of Algiers conducted by the French in 1956. According to Neil MacMaster, the French may have been greatly influenced by the work of Raphael Patai, who noted that in Arab cultures, fear of humiliation - particularly of a sexual nature - was often seen as a fate worse than all but the most gruesome of physical tortures, for it reversed gender roles and destroyed a sense of decency in the victim.[14] Most scandalous of the allegations was when prisoners were forced to dance naked in front of family members and neighbors if they did not cooperate.[15]

This form of mental and moral torture - even just the threat of it - was usually enough to break even the most resilient of prisoners, a lesson which the US seems to have taken to heart, as photos from Abu Ghraib seem to indicate. In fact, the student in this case even exceeded the master's expertise: at Abu Ghraib, unlike the many detention camps in Algeria, the sexual humiliation was carried out by women. To get a sense of just how scandalous the idea of sexual humiliation is to the Muslim perspective, one need only recall the furor that erupted over pictures of Saddam Hussein in his underwear; here was a man who was widely reviled throughout the region, yet al-Jazeera, al-Arabiyya, and other Arab-run media outlets refused to air the pictures for fear of offending their audience and yet ran unedited, uncensored footage of American contract workers' bodies as they were burned, mutilated, and mocked by a crowd of angry Iraqis. The result of Abu Ghraib, Koran-desecration stories, and pictures of Saddam is an Iraqi public that "Iraq's population has little reason to cooperate with US forces or to not cooperate with the guerillas."[16]

The problem then, is how does the US-led coalition, and the still-green Iraqi security force, deal with an insurgency that is considered the lesser of two evils? First and foremost, there needs to be a shift in the way that the United States is approaching the insurgency. As retired Special Forces major F. Andy Messing notes, the use of torture and humiliation to "soften up" suspects is counter-productive for US goals in Iraq.[17] Messing asserts that the use of torture, primarily, legitimizes the use of torture and other inhumane treatment by the insurgents against coalition and government troops. Furthermore, such treatment depends the resistance to the US's authority and ,although it may even be effective in the short-term, in the long run the US will lose the war morally, politically and in reality as resistance coalesces into a nationalist movement with international support.[18]

Ahmed Hashim supports this line of argumentation, noting that should Shi'a tolerance for the American presence evaporate in light of further instances of abuse, the US could find itself facing a Sunni and Shi'a alliance similar to what occurred in the 1920's that forced British withdrawal from the area.[19] Dire precedents in Algeria, where a half million French troops were deployed to control six million Muslims and protect a million colons,[20] might be repeated if the United States does not eliminate the "deep cultural misunderstandings" and rethink its "pervasive US tendency to view peacekeeping and policing with disdain in favor of a more 'robust' (force protection) approach."[21]

A new paradigm for US forces and their allies is suggested by US Army Information Operations officer Norman Emery. "US forces cannot sit behind walls and wait, they must neutralize the enemy by winning over the crowd and giving the enemy no place to hide" by patrolling primarily on foot instead of in vehicles and convoys, mingling openly and frequently with the local population in a friendly and honest manner, and (above all) US forces must make their primary goal law enforcement (emphasis added).[22] The logic is, "Often a population has no choice but to help the guerillas, so if US forces build a connection with the Iraqi people, some Iraqis might tell the US forces what they have heard or told to the guerillas. This method had worked for special operations forces in Afghanistan."[23] And it is through this control of the populace's goodwill that will allow the Coalition forces to deprive the insurgency of its most valuable resource; the public. It is the primary tenet in Maoist-type insurgencies that the insurgency must be able to tap into the political desires of the people, it must rely on a sympathetic public to provide information, medical care, food and recruits, and it must - above all - be able to use the population as camouflage, the insurgent must be the fish and the people the water.[24]

But we may already be beyond the point of establishing a rapport between US forces and Iraqi civilians, especially in light of Abu Ghraib, Saddam's semi-nude pictures, and recent allegations of Qur'an desecration at Guantanamo Bay's "Camp X-Ray". The most logical next step would be to utilize a proxy, in this case, Iraqi security forces. Drawn from the population and, if properly trained, the Iraqi security forces can become the secondary information conduit through which the United States can effectively deny the insurgency its source of "water." This will not be an easy, or quick, step to take. As Adeed Dawisha noted, Iraqi forces are often ill-trained, ill-equipped, and ill-prepared, especially by American standards. Most telling is perhaps the infamous incidents of April 2004 where, in a firefight between insurgents and US Marines, Iraqi security forces either refused to assist the Marines, or in some cases, switched sides and assisted the insurgency![25] Though the US will definitely have to abandon center-stage in the counter-insurgency operation in favor of a new Iraqi security apparatus, there are several silver linings which should be considered.

First, by replacing US security forces (both public and private) with loyal and trustworthy Iraqi security forces, the US lends credence to the notion of the Iraqi government's sovereignty in the public's eyes.[26] Second, it instills in the Iraqi security force a sense of confidence and loyalty to their own government by forcing them to take what Daniel Byman termed "the painful steps necessary to become more effective" policing and protection forces. Thirdly, according to some of the experts on Iraq, crime is the top concern for many Iraqis, not the insurgency, and by introducing an Iraqi police force dedicated to securing Iraqi citizenry, the desire of Iraqi citizenry to assist the insurgency will be diminished greatly.[27]

In order for the Iraqi police and security forces to become as reliable as they need to be, however, the training needs to become more intensive, longer, and with an eye toward weeding out the undesirable elements from the force; those who are in it only for the paycheck, former regime police who feel they 'already know' what to do, or (most importantly) those who are secretly working for the insurgency. The cadre, whether American or Iraqi, must continually undergo training on how to interact better with the populace as the government's and Coalition's picture of the "Iraqi psyche"[28] becomes clearer and the information coming in becomes more precise.

This retraining is important as it serves a dual purpose; to remind the policing force that its primary job is to protect the citizenry and uphold the laws of the land above all else, and the retraining will reinforce in the population that the police have the best interest of the public constantly drilled into them. As it is, this ultimate goal of a trusting public with a trustworthy security force will be an uphill battle at best, given the decades of brutality and indifference the Iraqi people experienced under Saddam Hussein, but it is one that is not only possible, but imperative for further development to succeed in Iraqi. Security, many experts agree, is paramount to the fostering of a healthy civic life in the Iraqi populace and the healthy civil life is vital to the fostering of deep-rooted and lasting Democracy in Iraq.[29] As Bruce Collins argues "The guerilla does not always prevail. But to combat guerilla activity requires sometimes more than the mastery of the tactics of counter-insurgency. It requires a sure grasp of the political conditions that give guerilla organizations their legitimacy, and a willingness to ameliorate them."[30]

Planting the Seeds of State Success

Though many an expert would write off the possibility of a healthy, successful democracy in Iraq,[31] Daniel Byman points out that "Perhaps the best argument for a democratic Iraq is that the alternatives are worse. Widespread repression, civil war, massive refugee flows, or other calamities might occur if Iraq does not gain a stable and decent government." Despite the Bush administration's lauding of the January 2005 elections as the beginnings of a true democracy in Iraq, there are many hurdles that are as of yet to be overcome. In addition to the insurgency treated previously in this chapter, which most immediately threatens the future of any coalition-sponsored government in Iraq, there are the issues of employment, stable civil life, and the instituting of democratic traditions in Iraq that must be addressed. Democracy theory is, at best, a controversial theory, with some analysts favoring economic, political or societal development over the other two. For instance, Daniel Byman insists that "If the electoral system is properly designed, it can foster ethnic moderation, leaving firebrands isolated and out of power."[32]

While Ahmed Hashim believes that US inability to restore, maintain and expand basic services - such as schools, hospitals, and electricity - to the population provides and opportunity for private organizations, both legitimate and illegitimate, to fill in the gaps while excoriating the U.S.'s 'indifference' to the Iraqi people and thus robs the Iraqi government of legitimacy.[33] And Adeed Dawisha believes that "Extensive research has shown that an independent and self-sustaining middle-class is essential for democratic civil life." In his commentary on Afghanistan, Larry P. Goodson noted that, even as early as 1986 "The seeds of Afghanistan's state failure had been well-planted by then - the deepening of ethnic tensions, the rising Islamist ideology, and the entrenching of a narcotics economy were all becoming the defining characteristics of the country."[34] Most of these conditions exist in Iraq as well, and it would be no great leap of logic to supplant Afghanistan's narcotics trade with black-market oil trade, should Iraq's state fail. Goodson's argument sets the example of what is very likely to happen in a failed-state Iraq, while Byman's, Hashim's and Dawisha's arguments represent the political, social and economic bases of democratizing theory, each convincing in their own right present the conundrum of what to prioritize. But, as Mona Makram-Ebeid noted earlier, in order for democracy to stand, all three of these pressing problems need to be addressed in Iraq and so it will have to be a coordinated effort on all three fronts; politics, society, and economics.

Ethnic tensions in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, are long-standing and are further exacerbated by the decades-long tyranny of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist party. It is widely acknowledged that the Sunni Arab minority benefited greatly under Saddam Hussein's reign, and that it comprised the pool from which he recruited his security forces, secret police, officer corps, and bureaucratic experts.[35] As a result, Iraq's majority Shi'a, as well as smaller minority Kurd, Turkman, Assyrian, and other groups largely distrust most Sunnis as a matter of course. Democracy is seen as a method to heal these communal divides, for in democracy's political arena, hostile ethnic groups would be able to voice their grievances publicly and politically instead of resorting to violence.[36] But, "the United States [cannot] simply create a history of democracy out of whole cloth.

Democratic habits will have to be learned rather than relearned." As of the writing of this paper, the Iraqi people have been able to elect a representative body, which is currently in the process of writing a permanent constitution, selecting officials, assigning duties and basically laying the foundations for a functioning government. But it is important to note that these much-hailed elections were largely boycotted by Sunni Muslims, and currently, a large upswing in insurgencies has coincided with Sunni dissatisfaction at the positions in government their representatives have been offered. One solution to this seeming crisis is to institute a Federal form of democracy in Iraq. This federal form has many attractive qualities to recommend it in Iraqi society. First, it ensures that communities will have a strong and effective voice in the decision-making process. Secondly, Federal forms of democracy are based upon binding guarantees of the diverse community's rights.

Third, the decentralized form of government ensures that no one person, such as a president, will ever control enough of the government's resources and power to become another tyrannical dictator - crucial in a post-Saddam Iraqi regime. Given the lack of trust between communities - and even within communities themselves - at present, Federal forms of democracy offer a sense of security which may afford it the greatest chance for success.[37] However, some of the aspects that make a federal form of democracy attractive to Iraqis may also leave it vulnerable. There is the potential for secession by disaffected groups which are grouped geographically (Sunni in the so-called Sunni Triangle, Kurds in the north and Shi'a in the south, for example). Or, it is entirely possible, and in fact probable, that certain less-than-desirable, quasi-political organizations may attempt to reenter the Iraqi political arena. One such example is the Muslim Brotherhood, which Ahmed Hashim warns is making the first, tentative steps at reintroducing itself into Iraq after decades of repression and outlawry.[38] Given the organization's past track record in Egypt, Syria and Jordan, it should be assumed that they will attempt to exert their radical - and often illegal - agenda in the newly formed Iraqi political arena.

It is possible that by training a professional, and a-political, security force as Daniel Byman suggests[39], as well as offering a venue for the venting of political frustrations through parliamentary procedures and rules, these risks can be ameliorated, if not eliminated outright. Law abiding law enforcers will be crucial in the monitoring, and apprehension, of wrongdoers in the political arena, while a transparent and responsible judiciary system - judges, lawyers, jails and parole boards - will round out the legal framework for politics and social responsibilities necessary for continued, healthy political debate.[40] A strong and professional security force will also help alleviate fears about security and crime which are another potential landmine on the road to democracy. Countries such as Angola and Lebanon had federal democratic governments that unraveled because of perceived - and evidently real - concerns about the effectiveness of national police and security force's ability to keep the peace.[41] As a result, different ethnic and religious factions in Angola and Lebanon turned to warlords and their militias for security, at the cost of a cohesive and strong government. If the US-led coalition is able to train the security of Iraq in the manner described earlier, and law enforcement is entrusted to a competent and a-political cadre of professionals - doubly important in the case of the army - then such concerns will have already been addressed long before the first official, post-constitution elections have been held.

Despite having the opportunity for politicaldiscourse instead of factional violence, it does not necessarily follow that Iraqis will exploit that opportunity. As Daniel Byman notes, "Democratization can foster social peace, but unrest, strife and even outright war often occur during attempted transitions to democracy."[42] This is particularly true in an Iraq that has never truly had a civil society in recent memory, with meetings between more than three people subject to police crackdowns, imprisonment or even execution in extreme cases. In order for there to be a civil society in Iraq, there needs to exist certain fundamentals of a liberal democracy, namely freedoms of assembly and speech, which can and will be exercised by the Iraqi public without fear of government interference.

Though often civil life can take political, or semi-political, forms such as unions, special interest groups, or religious associations, most are not connected to the state in any meaningful way except that they are expected to abide by the laws of the country and in turn enjoy protection from interference with legal activities. Such organizations can be as innocuous as book clubs, sports leagues, fan clubs, or aren't - Teacher Association. As Daniel Byman puts it, "Liberal Democracy fosters civility, a common domain of values, institutions, and identity, at the expense of communalism."[43] It is this communalism, the identification with one's tribe, family, ethnic group or religious sect to the exclusion of all others, which is most worrisome about the prospect for extreme exploitation of democratic principles. In order to foster a reasonable, stable and law-abiding middle class, a focus upon combating rising illiteracy and the collapse of secular schooling needs to be addressed.

Before the first gulf war, Iraq had an excellent pre-1991 war per capita income, one of the highest literacy rates in the region, is highly urbanized, has great agricultural and oil wealth potential, and was perhaps one of the most secular and progressive societies in the region before the first gulf war.[44] The combination of these factors, when mixed with a stable civil society and healthy political forum to air grievances mirrors many of the conditions that existed in Europe and the United States as they emerged into democratic forms of government. The only missing element is the groundwork for economic reform, the solid foundation of the all-important middle class.

Civil society depends greatly for it success upon an expanding middle class, something which Iraq has not had in the decade and more since the first gulf war. Dawisha argues that "Extensive research has shown that an independent and self-sustaining middle-class is essential for democratic civil life."[45], and the evidence seems to bear his argument out. Hashim notes that "The lack of basic services and security contribute to instability and the disposition towards violence", which precludes a society's inherent economic security and thus there is no grounds for a middle class revival.

Without a stable and expanding middle class to temper the radical firebrands both politically and economically, Iraq may never be able to counter the political might of insurgency, radical Islam, or other destabilizing influences within Iraqi society.[46] One way in which the United States can foster the growth of a middle class in Iraq is to cease awarding rebuilding contracts to outside companies and instead foster Iraqi entrepreneurship through the award of these contracts to internal companies. Too many contracts to rebuild Iraq were, and still are, awarded to foreign companies - even those Arab owned from Saudi, Kuwait, Jordan, etc. are seen as "foreigners" - this retards economic growth in the middle class and builds resentment to these outsiders - 'carpetbaggers', to use the post-civil war phrase. To avoid this, Iraqi companies should be contracted in the rebuilding effort or, barring that, foreign companies should be required to employ Iraqi managers, foremen, administrators and executives in the largest possible numbers as well as relying on exclusively Iraqi manual laborers.

The premise is that, firstly, legitimate jobs with good pay will reduce unemployment (and underemployment) which will draw away from the stagnant pool of the disaffected and resentful Iraqis that insurgent and other politically radical groups use as a recruiting base. Secondly, the infrastructure that is repaired by Iraqis may be less likely to be destroyed by Iraqi insurgents. Granted, there is no guarantee of this, but insurgent groups who destroy the work of their fellow Iraqis should find their welcome quickly worn out - and in all honesty, what alternatives does the US have? Already, foreign companies and governments have withdrawn their forces after the capture of various employees of many different companies that are present in Iraq precisely for the reconstruction effort.[47] Not only will such a policy mean an economic boon to Iraq, but it will enhance the security of the Iraqi state; "Even as political reform and reconstruction depend upon security, the process goes both ways. If Iraq lacks strong institutions and stalls economically (emphasis added), Iraqis will be more likely to support insurgents, while the risk of a coup will rise greatly. This is the true nightmare."[48] Even with the internal threats of insurgency, radicalism, economic instability and social inequality are either eliminated, or well on their way to being so, there is one other facet of Iraqi sovereignty upon which the US can have the greatest direct impact; external security.

A Dangerous Neighborhood

Despite all the great strides that Iraq could make under these conditions, it could all come undone very quickly should its neighbors - Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia - decide to interfere with Iraq's internal politics either directly or indirectly. One example could be when successful Iraqi Kurdish groups support Turkish Kurds in their ongoing insurgency, thus provoking Turkey to deal with such support along its borders militarily.[49] Or Iran championing, either financially or militarily or both, radical Shi'a politicians and clerics - such as The Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic of Iraq - in an effort to establish a sympathetic regime with their previously belligerent neighbor.[50] Syrian Ba'athists can be expected to support Ba'athist remnants in Iraq, and even Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia could decide to step into the Iraqi political arena should conditions prove favorable.[51] Such interference could, and should, be expected by the United States and its allies. Here the economic and political "soft" power of the United States can, and should, be brought to bear. Iraq's government, particularly during its transition to democracy, but even for a while afterwards, will lack the political power to defend its borders and political apparatus to any appreciable degree for at least the foreseeable future, and thus it will fall to other, stronger states to ensure its external sovereignty.

Already, the United States is working within the international community, through bilateral talks as well as ultimatums, to stem the flow of refugees, weapons smugglers and insurgents across Iraq's borders. Perhaps the most expedient way would be to station UN peacekeeping forces on the borders. This is a dual-edged sword, however. On the positive side, it engages the international community in the reconstruction and security of Iraq, brings international scrutiny to charges of deliberately lax border security - particularly in the Iranian and Syrian case, and it undercuts the insurgent rhetoric about US imperial intent in Iraq. The downside however is that such forces are often constrained by their mandate - a critical flaw in countries like Rwanda where foreign forces were unable or unwilling to exceed the letter of their mandate and UN peacekeepers are subject to withdrawal similar to the forces of foreign companies in the face of shifting political demand in the supplying country's politics.[52] UN peacekeeping forces would also demand a certain amount of time and political wrangling to procure for Iraq's security, time that the US might not have. Instead, a more direct solution would be to begin rotating the Coalition-led military forces from the population centers - where they are increasingly becoming the target of attacks that also inflict casualties on civilians - to the borders for security as their positions are filled by Iraqi security forces.

The idea here is two-fold; the US's immediate presence in the highly urbanized population centers (most of which are found along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers) will be diminished which will defuse some of the Iraqi tensions over the occupation (an out-of-sight, out-of-mind strategy), while affording the US and its allies in Iraq to seal off the lines of support for insurgency and political instability more effectively. The securing of borders, then, could be augmented as time goes on by well-trained Iraqi border guards as position in the internal security apparatus begin to fill up. John Nagl, in his analysis of counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam argued "The essential features of guerilla warfare are avoiding the enemy's strength...while striking at outposts and logistical support from unexpected directions."

Though Nagl was referring to the way in which guerilla forces operate, such a statement should betaken to heart for anti-guerilla actions along the borders of Iraq. It is important to remember that while Iraq, like Afghanistan before it,[53] is literally awash in military-grade ordinance and high-tech weaponry, the supply is limited. Some estimates put the amount of unaccounted-for military supplies in Iraq at 600,000 tons[54], with every improvised explosive device detonated and every cache discovered and destroyed by Coalition forces, that amount dwindles, despite its seemingly gargantuan proportions. Without outside influence and supply, the amount of weaponry will eventually dry up to the barest of trickles. Additionally, as the cost of outside aid spirals upward through tough crack-downs at the border on smuggling, the amount of financial support for the insurgency will become prohibitively expensive. But the securing of the borders should not become a one-way street, however, for the possibility of a reverse flow is equally dangerous.

It is critically important that the borders be secured from both incoming and outgoing illegal activity, particularly given the region and its strategic importance to the US. Should the insurgency feel either its supply lines or hideouts have been compromised, it is entirely likely that they will seek sanctuary in a sympathetic country, similar to the way that the FLN established bases in Morocco and Tunisia in the 1950's.[55] Such a development would be easier for insurgent groups to find financial and material support, similar to examples in Afghanistan and Algeria.[56] If the US is unable, or unwilling, to focus more and more on border security, the result could quickly become dangerous and destabilizing as it has in Afghanistan. [57]

The collapse of government in Afghanistan, coupled with the internationally-backed factionalism, led to destabilizing influences in Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekestan.[58] Though Pakistan's government is now stable, it only became so after a military coup, while Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are still feeling the influence of displaces muhejideen and insurgent forces.[59] The implications for Iraq, however, are even more devastating; turmoil in US allied Turkey, Jordan or Saudi Arabia from insurgent forces from Iraq could lead to civil war, refugee flows, or regime change. Similar effects in Iran, a nascent nuclear state, could become even graver, as Larry Goodson queries "What happens when (terrorists) get tactical nuclear weapons? When terrorists strike anywhere, everywhere, against anyone, confident that a major force of integration (the international media, such as CNN) will cover it?"[60] Insurgent groups do not need even to get a hold on true nuclear weapons or even the expertise to make such a weapon, but merely come into possession of weaponizable radiological material, to wreak havoc with the US's global security. Such a possibility could come into reality should destabilizing influences in Iran topple the already troubled regime into anarchy and chaos.

The difficulty of securing these borders is not to be underestimated, or taken lightly however. Iraq's borders are home to some of the most inhospitable terrain in the world - desert in the south bordering Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and parts of Jordan to mountains in the north bordering Syria, Turkey, and Iran - and the size of the borders is impressive, with Iraq occupying twice the amount of space as the state of Idaho, in the United States.[61] Despite these obstacles, Ahmed Hashim notes that "We must never lose sight of the ultimate goal if the situation gets messier. Our goal is to ensure the emergence of a politically stable, democratic, and reconstructed Iraq"[62], and ensuring the stability of a fledgling democracy in Iraq would be impossible if it is constantly threatened by its neighbors or its neighbors feel threatened by it.

Tallying the Costs

The solution to the problem of democratizing Iraq will require certain realities be acknowledged by the US and its allies. First, the solution to the problem of insurgency will not be found in the use of torture, humiliation or through 'softening up' prisoners. As Ahmed Hashim noted earlier, and it bears repeating here, "We must be wary of simple formulaic approaches and attempts to implement the tried and tired strategies of the past from other counter-insurgency campaigns."[63] Neil MacMaster is less kind in his critique of imported French and Israeli counter-insurgency tactics, arguing that "Torture invariably (goes) hand-in-hand with a fatal corruption or erosion of the judiciary and the rule of law...In Algiers...in the longer term, military repression and torture led to the alienation of international opinion and the political defeat of French colonialism."[64] Like torture, the US's penchant for lightning raids of houses in the middle of the night should also be rethought. Ahmed Hashim notes that current US tactics "end up with missions invariably managing to enlarge the circle of alienated people"[65] while Norman Emery asserts that in order to be more effective in combating the insurgency, "the United States must change the way it interacts with the Iraqi population."[66]

This article, however, asserts that these measures may be too little too late, and instead of softening the image of the US, the Coalition must now make strides in the training, deployment and utilization of Iraqi security forces in order to restore security to the Iraqi people. The US needs to eschew the "quick fix" and dramatic visuals of overwhelming force in dealing with the insurgency - a difficult proposition in an environment where the US government must account for the deaths of its sons and daughters - and adopt a more refined and informed approach, or as john Nagl puts it "Undue focus on military action clouds the key political realities, which can result in a military-dominated campaign plan that misses the real focus of an insurgency. An inability to match the insurgent's concept with an appropriate government one...is conceptually flawed and will not achieve success."[67] Part of the reason for this assumption is that, in light of recent developments and rumors about US treatment of prisoners, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the US to restore some of its reputation, at least in the short-term.[68] The other part is based on the fact that, despite even the best image, outside nations are often resented by local populations (often, though not always), particularly in times of economic, social, and political crises.[69] Part of this stems from the fact that foreign troops, even those from other Arab countries, might be unfamiliar with the "Local sensitivities and social mores"[70] of the Iraqi people, thus the implementation of Iraqi personnel in an Iraqi-led security team would ameliorate this feeling, and begin to bridge the divide between the communities, an important aspect if Iraq is to remain whole and healthy in its governance.

Daniel Byman notes that "Democracy cannot take hold if voters are afraid to go to the polls or its citizens believe they cannot trust 'strangers' from other tribes or communal groups to protect them. (Without proper security and trust in the government) Iraqis may look to warlords, thugs, (or outside forces) who will offer security even at the price of good governance."[71] Part of this insecurity stems from the lack of political, social and economic development necessary for democracy. Though much progress has been made by the Iraqi people - the election of city and communal leaders through balloting, the deposition of old Ba'athist party leaders in unions and associations, the first nationally held elections[72] - much lies ahead as elections tend to fall along ethnic and religious lines. For example, Kurds unsurprisingly elected Kurdish leaders, while the Shi'a community voted along religious lines to elect Shi'a representatives, meanwhile Sunnis refused to vote resulting in a very low amount of Sunni elected officials and dissatisfaction in the Sunni community with the positions offered in the government.

This dissatisfaction resulted in an upswing in insurgent attacks and increased fractionalization in the Iraqi society.[73] This paper argues that the establishment of a framework for open and civil airing of grievances in a political forum, the institution and encouragement of civil society and the expansion of the middle class all must occur in concert in Iraq. Adeed Dawisha puts it succinctly by stating "The success of the democratic experiment will depend on whether the constitutional and political arrangements put in place can adapt to the country's social and communal imperatives"[74], with Daniel Byman adding "(The US) must reconstruct a devastated economy, reform a corrupt system, establish the rule of law after decades of tyranny, and satisfy Iraq's myriad communal factions..."[75] This requires a set of principles that will be very unpopular with the large corporations in the US and elsewhere that have a very large stake in the reconstruction of Iraq.

It means turning over the lucrative and high-profit-margin contracts to local Iraqi businessmen, who will employ (hopefully) a large amount of skilled and unskilled labor, thereby reducing dissatisfaction with the occupation and the interim government, as well as depriving the insurgency of its most valuable assets - recruits and sympathizers. Counterinsurgency expert John Nagle argues "When there are no economic and political foundations for the guerilla movement, there will be no guerilla movement...If the great mass of the population knows it will be protected by a strong, just government, it has no reason to cooperate with the guerillas, and the system of intelligence and supply that sustains the guerilla movement breaks down. Without popular support the mopping up of the hard-core die-hards is fairly easy."[76] Add to this already Herculean feat of juggling and unpopular fiscal policy is the need to secure Iraq's borders, both physically and politically.

This aspect - the securing of Iraq's borders - of "Operation Iraqi Freedom", as the Bush administration terms it, will perhaps be the most costly in lives and treasure. The Iraqi borders are long, inhospitable, and ripe with ambush sights. Desert and mountainous terrain will most likely take as many Coalition lives as any given firefight with insurgents or improvised explosive device ever has. Syria and Iran already have been accused of colluding with international "jihadists" to infiltrate and destabilize Iraq or to kill Americans. Daniel Byman notes that "even under the best circumstances, some western forces will die",[77] while further noting that while these costs may be unbearable initially, "If the United States and its allies are not willing to bear the burden of occupation, the long-term strategic costs will be heavy."[78] This paper has suggested that the securing of the borders should be done, at least at first, by mostly Coalition-led forces. Partially in order to defuse the brewing insurgency by eliminating a bone of contention - the overt reminder of the occupation - while devoting the largest amount of troops possible to cutting off and denying the insurgency its vital flow of cash, arms, and international insurgency expertise. Add to this the fact that the Coalition has in its possession the best trained, best equipped fighters utilizing the best technology available - satellite imagery, unmanned drones, night vision and air support - which, at present, Iraq has virtually no access to through its own means. Likewise, the Coalition has the political muscle to coerce, cajole, or otherwise compel a "hands-off" policy for Iraqi external sovereignty until the Iraqi government can stand on its own, politically.

In the final analysis, the operation in Iraq will only succeed if the US and its allies are willing to accept certain realities - such as the fact that there will be no clean, dramatic ending to the war like in 1945 - and is willing to be operationally flexible, as John Nagl, Norman Emery, Daniel Byman and other experts seem to argue. The occupation of Iraq will last for a long time, in one phase or another, and will require the sacrifice of much in lives, money, and pride on the part of the Coalition, if Iraq is going to establish a democracy. The true test of democracy will come, David Rappaport asserts, when the second and subsequent round of national-level voting takes place.[79] If done correctly, the quashing of the insurgency, the emergence of the civil society, a law abiding and transparent legal system, a stable and expanding middle class, as well as minimizing the external interference will result in the peaceful and constitutional transfer of power from the incumbent party to the successor party. Such a step would be monumental, because as to date, there are no truly democratic regimes in the Middle East, despite recent turn of events in Egypt and Lebanon.[80] If that occurs, then all the sacrifices the Coalition and Iraqi people have made will be worth it. If there is no second or subsequent election, and the Iraqi people, and the region at large, is thrown into chaos created by the failed- or weak-state of Iraq, then the "failure of Iraq's democracy could prove a nightmare for the Iraqi's, for the region, and for the United States"[81] as warlordism, massive refugee floods, and terrorist camps become the dominant factor in regional politics for years to come. The US needs to act quickly though, for as Ahmed Hashim notes, "The coalition's margin of error is getting increasingly narrower by the week."[82]

Works Cited

Books

Nagl, John A. Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport Ct.; Praeger, 2002)

Goodson, Larry P. Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle, London; University of Washington Press, 2001)

Weiss, Thomas G. Military - Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and The Responsibility to Protect (Lanham, Boulder; Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005)

Laremont, Ricardo R. Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria 1783 - 1992 (Trenton, NJ; African World Press, Inc., 2000)

Journal Articles & Newspapers

Byman, Daniel "Insecuring Iraq" in National Interest Summer 2004, Issue 76

Byman, Daniel "Constructing a Democratic Iraq" in International Security Summer 2003, Vol. 28 Issue 1

Emery, Norman "Information Operations in Iraq" in Military Review May/June 2004, Vol. 84 Issue 3

Hashim, Ahmed "The Insurgency in Iraq" in Small Wars & Insurgencies Autumn 2003, Vol. 14 Issue 3

MacMaster, Neil "Torture: From Algiers to Abu Ghraib" in Race & Class, 2004 Vol. 46 Issue 2

Collins, Bruce "Regulars Versus Rebels" in History Today Sep 1986, Vol. 36 Issue 9

Dawisha, Adeed "Iraq: Setbacks, Advances, Prospects" in Journal of Democracy Jan 2004, Vol. 15 Issue 1

Los Angeles Times 13 June 2003

The Washington Times 2 May 2005

Christian Science Monitor 16 June 2003, 20 May 2005

Boston Globe 15 June 2003

New York Times 28 July 2004

Egypt Today 11 August 2004

Toronto Star (Canada) 5 August 2004

The Australian 2 August 2004

Chicago Tribune 18 April 2005, 27 April 2005

Knight Ridder Tribune 12 April 2005

Interviews, Lectures

Ebeid, Mona Makram Interviewed by Author at Northeastern University, Boston MA, Nov. 2004

Rappaport, David Interviewed by Author at University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati OH, May 2005

Online Resources

CIA World Factbook 3 June 2005

(accessed online at http://www.CIA.gov/cia/publications/factbook)

All Things Considered (trans.) 2 June 2005

(accessed online through EBSCO database)

[1] Norman Emery "Information Operations in Iraq" in Military Review May/June 2004, Vol. 84 Issue 3, Pg. 11

[2] Emery Pg. 11, See also Ahmed Hashim "The Insurgency in Iraq" in Small Wars & Insurgencies Autumn 2003, Vol. 14 Issue 3, Pp. 3, 16, 18 and Neil MacMaster "Torture: From Algiers to Abu Ghraib" in Race & Class, 2004 Vol. 46 Issue 2, Pg. 11 and Daniel Byman "Constructing a Democratic Iraq" in International Security Summer 2003, Vol. 28 Issue 1, Pg. 77 and Michael Slackman "U.S. Operation Yields Fury in Central Iraq" Los Angeles Times 13 June 2003, Ilene Prueher "U.S. Antiguerilla Campaign Draws Iraqi Ire" Christian Science Monitor 16 June 2003, Ellen Berry and Bryan Bender "US Support in Iraq Fades after Raids" Boston Globe 15 June 2003

[3] John A. Nagl. Counterinsurgency Lessons From Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport Ct.; Praeger, 2002) Pg. 29, "Five Principles for Counterinsurgency"

[4] Daniel Byman "Insecuring Iraq" in National Interest Summer 2004, Issue 76, Pg. 17

[5] Mona Makram Ebeid Interviewed by Author at Northeastern University, Boston MA Nov. 2004

[6] Daniel Byman "Constructing a Democratic Iraq" in International Security Summer 2003, Vol. 28 Issue 1, Pg. 49

[7] Ahmed Hashim "The Insurgency in Iraq" Pg. 2

[8] Ahmed Hashim "The Insurgency in Iraq" Pg. 2, Norman Emery "Information Operations" Pg. 11 - 12

[9] Bruce Collins "Regulars Versus Rebels" History Today Sep 1986, Vol. 36 Issue 9, Pg. 8, See also Neil MacMaster "Torture" Pg. 12 and John Nagl Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT., Praeger, 2002) Pg. 17

[10] Ahmed Hashim "The Insurgency in Iraq" Pg. 3

[11] Neil MacMaster "Torture" Pg. 11

[12] Norman Emery "Information Operations" Pg. 11

[13] Thomas G. Weiss Military - Civilian Interaction: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect Pp. xxxi, 105, 186, etc.

[14] Neil MacMaster "Torture" Pg. 15 see also Ricardo R. Laremont Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria 1783 - 1992 pg.206

[15] Neil MacMaster "Torture" P. 15

[16] Norman Emery "Information Operations" Pg. 11

[17] Neil MacMaster, "Torture" Pg. 12

[18]ibid

[19] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 16

[20] Bruce Collins "Regulars Versus Rebels" Pg. 8

[21] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 18

[22] Norman Emery "Information Operations" Pg. 12

[23]ibid

[24] North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap said "Without the people, we have no information...they hide us, protect us, feed us, and tend our wounded." (accessed online) see also Norman Emery for same quote in "Information Operations" Pg. 12, and John A. Nagl Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife Pg. 27 "Mao's own concept that the revolutionaries are like fish that swim in the water of the people; defeating the insurgents is then a matter of separating the fish from the water." See also Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 18

[25] Daniel Byman "Insecuring" Pg. 16

[26] Thomas G. Weiss Military - Civilian Interaction Pp. xxxi, 106 - 107, 187, etc.

[27] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 17, see also Adeed Dawisha ""Iraq: Setbacks, Advances, Prospects" in Journal of Democracy January 2004, Vol. 15 Issue 1, Pp. 15 - 17

[28] Norman Emery "Information Operations" Pg. 12, see also Daniel Byman "Insecuring" Pg. 16

[29] Norman Emery "Information Operations" Pp. 11 - 12, see also Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pp. 1, 18, 19, and Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 77

[30] Bruce Collins "Regulars" Pg. 9

[31] Alina Romanowski (Deputy assistant secretary of Defense, Near East and South Asian Affairs, USDOD) said "Iraq presents as unpromising a breeding ground for democracy as any in the world" and Chris Sanders said "There isn't a society in Iraq to turn into a democracy." Both quoted in Daniel Byman's "Constructing" Pg. 48

[32] Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 50

[33] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 14

[34] Larry P. Goodson Afghanistan's Endless War: State Failure, Regional Politics, and The Rise of the Taliban (Seattle; University of Washington Press, 2001) Pg. ix

[35] Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 50, see also Adeed Dawisha "Iraq" Pg. 15, and King Faisal I in 1933 said "There is still...no Iraqi people but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise against any government whatever" quoted from Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 64

[36] Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 49 - 50

[37] Adeed Dawisha "Iraq" Pg. 18 notes that even under Saddam Hussein, Kurdish leaders would conspire with the regime to attack rival faction, either through the supplying of information, or through active cooperation with security forces.

[38] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 12

[39] Daniel Byman "Insecuring" Pg. 18

[40] Daniel Byman "Insecuring" Pg. 15

[41] Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 58

[42]ibid

[43] Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 50

[44] Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 70

[45] Adeed Dawisha "Iraq" Pg. 17

[46] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pp. 10 - 12, 19

[47] Ian Fischer "Jordanian Company to Quit Iraq to Save Lives of 2 Hostages" New York Times 7/28/2004, see also "Egyptian Hostages in Iraq" Egypt Today 08/11/2004, Ravi Nessman "4 Hostages Freed in Raid" Toronto Star (Canada) 08/05/2004, and "7 Hostages Freed in Iraq" The Australian 08/02/2004

[48] Daniel Byman "Insecuring" Pg. 18

[49] Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 64, see also Melissa Block "Profile: Foreign Kurds enjoying the offer for them to attend a Kurdish-language university in Northern Iraq" All Things Considered (accessed online 2 June 2005)

[50]Ibid see also Scott Peterson "Iran Flexes its 'Soft Power' in Iraq" Christian Science Monitor 5/20/2005,

[51]Ibid see also James Janega "Too much border, not enough patrol on Iraq-Jordan line" Chicago Tribune (IL) 04/18/2005

[52] Thomas G. Weiss Military - Civilian Pp. 95 - 112

[53] Larry P. Goodson Afghanistan's Pg. 183

[54] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgent" Pg. 13

[55] Ricardo R. Laremont Islam and the Politics of Resistance in Algeria 1783 - 1992 (Trenton, NJ; African World Press, Inc., 2000) Pg. 75 See also Bruce Collins "Regulars" pg. 9

[56] Bruce Collins "Regulars" pg. 9, see also Larry P. Goodson Afghanistan's Pp. 184

[57] Larry p. Goodson Afghanistan's Pp. xiii, 167, 183

[58] Larry P. Goodson Afghanistan's Pg. 183

[59]ibid

[60] Larry P. Goodson Afghanistan's Pg. 185

[61] CIA World Factbook (accessed online 3 June 2005)

[62] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 19

[63]ibid

[64] Neil MacMaster "Torture" Pp. 4, 7

[65] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 18

[66] Norman Emery "Information Operations" Pg. 12

[67] John Nagl Counterinsurgency Pg. 27

[68] Susan M. Collins, Senator (R-Maine) "Worst of all, our nation, a nation that, to a degree unprecedented in human history, has sacrificed its blood and treasure to secure liberty and human rights around the world now must try to convince the world that their TV screens and front pages are not the real America, that what they see is not who we are." 7 May 2004, as quoted in Neil MacMaster "Torture" Pg. 2

[69] Bruce Collins "Regulars" Pg. 7 notes that in Algeria, the majority of the security forces were comprised of persons from outside the country, a situation which increased the feeling of occupation and isolation by the Algerians.

[70]ibid

[71] Daniel Byman "Insecuring" Pg. 15

[72] Adeed Dawisha "Iraq" Pg. 15

[73] Melissa Block "Efforts by the interim Iraqi government to persuade Sunni and Shiite leaders to stop supporting anti-US insurgents" (accessed online)

[74] Adeed Dawisha "Iraq" Pg. 15

[75] Daniel Byman "Insecuring" Pg. 15

[76] John Nagl Counterinsurgency Pg. 25

[77] Daniel Byman "Insecuring" Pg. 77

[78] Daniel Byman "Constructing" Pg. 78

[79] David Rappaport lecture at the University of Cincinnati May 2005

[80] Nir Boms, Erick Stakleback "Arab rulers and promises" The Washington Times (DC) 05/02/2005, see also Evan Osnos "Dissent finds voice in muted Egypt as protestors criticize Mubarak, government" The Chicago Tribune (IL) 04/27/2005, and Warren P. Strobel "Muslim Leaders say Democratic reform is inevitable, but disagree on US role" Knight Ridder Tribune Washington Bureau (DC) 04/12/2005

[81] Daniel Byman "Insecuring" pg. 78

[82] Ahmed Hashim "Insurgency" Pg. 19