Why Did Soviet Troops Invade Hungary in October 1956?

The Soviet invasion of Hungary came at a climax in the rebellion of the Hungarian people to what they saw as government rule run amuck. The country was suffering from food shortages, high prices, an economy in tatters and a complete disinterest in communism. The ethos of Communism was totally opposite to the Hungarian belief structure. A proud and independent people, the rule of Communism was oppressive and degrading to Hungarians. The idea of collectivism was not a welcome concept, and the Soviet ideal that people worked for the benefit of the state rather than for themselves chafed the people and pushed them to the edge. The Soviet practice of taking resources on the cheap, and then selling a finished product back to the people at over inflated prices was one premise that did not serve to endear the Soviet communistic ideology to the Hungarians. Rather, this served as the beginning of a tide of rebellion that would sweep through the country and cast a worrying climate over the Soviet hierarchy and their ability to retain their presence and stranglehold over Eastern Europe. The rebellion would cause great anger to the Communist party leaders in Moscow, and subsequently lead to a deadly game of cat and mouse as the Soviet hierarchy toyed with the resistance, giving them false optimism that they could be live free of the stranglehold of Communism, an optimism that was to have deadly and catastrophic consequences.

As World War 2 was drawing to a conclusion, the soon to be victorious Allied combatants met in Yalta to decide the fate of Nazi Germany in the post-war climate. The division of the conquered Nazi state, brought on by the American president Franklin Roosevelt's need to covertly concentrate his countries resources to the Pacific theatre of war, but not to allow the Soviets and British to gain the upper hand in Europe, led to Soviet control of a large area of the German occupied zone. While on the surface this may have seemed innocent enough, the Soviet hierarchy set about a systematic campaign of conversion of large segments of the population of German population and most of Eastern Europe to the 'benefits' of a Communist regime, and the occupation of their lands.

Joseph Stalin set about creating a 'buffer' zone, which was to become better known as the Iron Curtain, and of which many Eastern European states were a major part. This zone would serve as a cushion between the Western world and the vast holdings of Communism and the Stalinist way of thinking. In essence, the countries of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary, the so-called satellite nations, among others, were part of the Soviet Union's defence strategy to protect the Motherland from the enemy (Germany), which had destroyed much of the Soviet Union's population centres during the war. It was this threat, and the possibility of capitalistic invasion from the Western world that Stalin perceived was of the most danger for the Soviet Union and Communism.

These countries were part of the vast Soviet machine in terms of ideology and dogma but remained independent of the Soviet Union itself. The British did not hinder Stalin in his actions either by the Americans or, as it was determined that allowing Stalin his 'buffer' countries would keep him and the threat of communism out of the way. Stalin was not worried about taking over the Western countries; he was preoccupied by taking over the whole of Eastern Europe, under the noses of the Americans and the British. Stalin's actions gave the Hungarians a vehement dislike of Soviet style government and their inclusion into the Soviet system of control. In 1945, the Hungarians held free elections, and the Communist part received less than one fifth of the vote. This enraged Stalin and he set about forcing a reshuffle of the elected government and giving many of the key positions to Communists who were sympathetic to or in line with the Soviet policy. Elections were again held in 1947 and this time Stalin took no chance of the Communist party facing any sort of defeat. He rigged the election to make sure that the Communist party was in power. From that point onward until 1953, the Hungarian nation was treated as a criminal who needed to be handled in the harshest manner, so that they always remembered who was in control of their destiny.

Stalin did not live to see his dreams come to complete fruition, dying in 1953. However, the remains and effects of his ruthless regime on Eastern Europe in general, and the Hungarian nation in particular was of extreme importance in understanding the dissatisfaction and disharmony felt by the general populace. Under Stalin's rule, many changes had taken place in Hungary. The economy and religion were two areas, which underwent significant changes under Stalin guise of Communistic reform. People opposed to the new regime were brutalized, heads of the Church were imprisoned, and priests and nuns who were opposed to the new regime were arrested. Industry was nationalised, the people were forced to give up their land to the collective farms, and many people were sent to labour camps because they spoke out against the measure Stalin had implemented. It was these changes that enraged the Hungarian people, and began to ferment the anger and rebellious attitudes that were to lead the Soviet regime to the extraordinary events leading to the invasion in late 1956.

Nikita Khrushchev took over after Stalin's death, and his agenda was seemingly a complete opposite to that of Stalin. Stalin was a hardliner Communist, whereas Khrushchev took a softer approach. He allowed Hungary and the other countries more latitude in conducting their politics. Certain political prisoners were released and the government closed the interment camps that had been a favoured form of punishment of those who opposed Stalin and his policies. At this point in time, the Soviet Bloc was still a tight group, and to this end, Hungary joined with the other Eastern European communist nations to create the Warsaw Pact, and to become more active in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Even though Soviet policy was taking a lighter approach to the nations in the Soviet Bloc, the Hungarian people were overwhelmed by the desire to be free of Soviet rule and to chart their own destiny. All the satellite nations had become immersed in the quest for freedom, and in these countries, the citizens generated a series of strikes and protests, which spread like wildfire throughout the region.

Hungary seemed possessed to drive their quest much harder than her companion nations, and in the first few years after Stalin's death, the Hungarian nation became a hotbed of rebellious activity by students, intellectuals and the workforce. Khrushchev was tolerant of many things, but the reforms that the Hungarians wanted angered him and this placed the Hungarians in a rather precarious position. The Hungarians were observing what was happening to the rest of the satellite nations and within the Soviet regime itself, and this was giving them some hope that the horrors of the Stalin years would be erased to some degree. Khrushchev was critical of Stalin and his policies, and when Poland became somewhat anti-Soviet in their political views, Khrushchev did not retaliate to this with a show of force, but chose to compromise with the Poles to allow a certain leniency toward policy reform. These events were looked upon as a stepping-stone for the Hungarians to be given their independence and freedom from Soviet rule and tyranny.

Khrushchev's seemingly easy attitude to the Polish situation was in reality a choice of his facing the lesser of two evils. To allow the Poles these latitudes, which they were given, was far easier than the threat of a military invasion to quell the dissident population. Khrushchev knew that vast amounts of troops and armament would have to be expended to quell the Polish resistance. He reckoned that the Polish Communist party was in control of the situation, and thus he left them to keep the country firmly in hand. This policy seemed to be working, and the Hungarians felt this approach could be a path that would lead them closer to their collective destiny.

The Hungarians began to envisage moving away from Soviet rule and embracing neutrality, and to Khrushchev, the idea of Hungary leaving the Warsaw Pact was tantamount to the complete breakdown of the buffer zone painstakingly created by Stalin. This was something that could never be accepted, let alone allowed, and the Soviet regime began to implement measures to stem the tide of rebellion and restore order the nation. Changes were made to the Hungarian Communist central leadership. The Soviets forced Matthias Rakosi, the general Secretary of the Hungarian Communist party and the current, but highly unpopular Prime Minister, to resign as the premier but to retain his position as general secretary. Erno Gero replaced him, but he was viewed as a man who was far too enmeshed in the Soviet ideology to be of any good by the people, so this had little effect in changing the views of the general population. The state funeral and reburial of Laszlo Radk, who became a martyr of the abuse poured upon Hungary by Stalin, led to thousands of people to honour his memory and to spark the fire of reform. A mass demonstration on 23 October 1956, which led to the army aligning themselves with the demonstrators, and called for the removal of Gero from his post and the replacement of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister became the catalyst needed for Khrushchev to send Soviet troops into Hungary.

This caused great outrage and fighting and led the Soviets to announce the reinstatement of Nagy on 24 October 1956 as the Prime Minister. This move was calculated to appeal to the nation as a show of goodwill on the part of Moscow; however, the Soviets never intended this to be anything but a ploy to gain the trust of the Hungarian people. The Soviets had not counted on Nagy affirming his loyalty to the dissident population by announcing free elections, economic reform, disassociation from the Warsaw Pact, demanding the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and declaring Hungary's neutrality. While this was a disturbing development to Moscow, Khrushchev could have used Nagy's ideas for reform as a cover for what he actually had planned to do to take control of Hungary, and draw the garrotte of Communism tighter around the Hungarian people without them realising what was occurring until it was beyond their ability to change things. Nevertheless, the situation in Hungary was taking a different turn.

Nagy's policies were not keeping the people under control, and this gave rise to further concerns as the population threatened strikes and other forms of protests. They set up revolutionary council and called for reinstatement of a free Press. The Soviet troops began to leave Budapest, lulling the Hungarian's into a sense of false satisfaction and victory. One observer to the pullout was amazed that the removal of the mighty Soviet army could have been influenced by such a comparatively small rebellion. This was a farce, as Khrushchev had never intended to let the army retreat out of Hungary to any degree. Even as the army was moving out of Budapest, the Soviet heavy arms units crossed into Hungary to join the troops already in country and return to Budapest much stronger and larger and with one goal in mind.

This time, there was no compromise or negotiation as the Soviet military crushed the rebellion in earnest. Nagy pleaded with the West for help, but for the moment, their attentions were drawn to the Suez crisis. There was nothing to stop the Soviets from regaining control. The Hungarian people put up a valiant fight to oppose the Communists. There were thousands of men; women and children who stood in the streets, in defiant protest, to stop the advance the army. While Budapest fell quickly, there were isolated pockets of resistance that continue with the effort, and retained control for a time, but is was to no avail, the troops and the overwhelming firepower of the Soviet army were too much and the rebellion was left in tatters. However, even within the Soviet army there were dissidents in the ranks. The Soviets did not hesitate to kill Hungarians civilians who stood in their way, but also their own troops. The story of the tank commander who refused to run down women and children protesters with his tank and was murdered by his fellow troops, demonstrates that the Soviet regime was willing to go to any length, to take any measure, to completely neutralise the rebellion and anyone who would not turn to the side of the Communist forces.

The Communists took control of the situation, the country and its government. There were more than 20,000 deaths in the rebellion and more than 200,000 fled. The Communists systematically punished and/or executed many rebels, while others were deported to the USSR, likely to face lengthy terms in the labour camps. Nagy and many of his supporters and government officials were tried and executed in the first few years after the crushing of the rebellion. A new government was set up, and Janos Kadar, who had been Nagy's underling, was installed as the prime minister and as the head of the Hungarian Socialists Worker's Party. The Soviets poured vast sums of money and resources into the country, nearly $250 million in aid was promised by Moscow in order to placate the people and prevent a reoccurrence of the rebellion. The Soviet hierarchy was to rule with an iron hand, based on threat and intimidation to maintain their control. The needs and wants of the people were of no importance, only what the people could contribute to the great Soviet machine was what mattered. The Soviets could ill afford to let the people of Hungary rise in protest again. Hungary was made an example of to other nations, and one mistake the Soviets would not allow happening again.

While on the surface the Hungarian revolution was an overwhelming victory for the Soviets and Communist party, it can be viewed instead with contempt for an ideology and dogma that could only be achieved by the complete control and domination of a nation that was unable to fight back. It was only with the threat of death or imprisonment, the complete abolition of rights and privilege, and the total control over what the people said and thought, which would allow the mantle of Communism to be effective. The façade of Communism that was shown to the Western world, while appearing to be solid and impregnable, was in reality, a precariously balanced hypocrisy, bent on satisfying the dictatorial festering of a despotic regime.