Why Islamic Revolution Failed to Spread

For many in the Muslim world, the success of the 1979 Iranian Revolution was viewed as a harbinger of a bright new future for Islamic politics; it was a sign that Islam as the foundation for a government could triumph over a strongly embedded ruler. The fact that the Shah of Iran had numerous ties to the superpowers of the West, including the United States, and was still toppled by the revolution only strengthened the belief that Islam could serve as the basis of a political system. To many, it was just a matter of time before other governments in the Middle East succumbed to the rising tide of Islamic politics; two of the most prominent states in the region, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, were seen as prime candidates for undergoing an Islamic revolution.

As the 1980s progressed, however, and then the 1990s, neither state underwent anything remotely similar to Iran's revolution; certainly, both Iraq and Saudi Arabia faced Islamic opposition from domestic and foreign sources, but never on as grand a scale as Iran had. The reason Iraq and Saudi Arabia didn't experience the same type of Islamic upheaval is evident in viewing the fundamental structures of the states under their respective leaders. Every single factor that combined to allow the success of an Islamic revolution in Iran was absent from both Iraq and Saudi Arabia: a strong, financially-secure religious institution independent of and alienated by the state, an alienated merchant or middle class, and a weak, vacillating leader who was no longer seen as a nationalist, and was instead seen as a puppet of the West. Interestingly, despite both states sharing a lack of these factors, Saudi Arabia and Iraq staved off Islamic revolutions in very different ways. By closely examining these factors in Iran, and comparing them to the state of affairs in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, it is easy to see why the Islamic revolution was unable to spread to these two countries.

Perhaps the most important reason the revolution in Iran succeeded, and succeeded as an Islamic revolution, was due to the structure of the religious institution, which had its origins in the beginning of the Qajar dynasty in 1781. While the religious community had been connected to the state apparatus under the Safavid empire, the Qajar dynasty saw a separation of state and religion. This occurred largely because the Qajar dynasty was too weak to exercise control over the Shi'i religious community; the state simply didn't have the resources or support to play a leading role in religious matters, and thus were forced to strike a deal with the clerics, where both sides agreed to simply leave each other alone. This state of affairs allowed Shi'i leaders in Iran to develop an independent religious organization, complete with its own hierarchy and tax collection system, separate from the state tax collection system, which at the time was extremely limited. This gave the religious institution not only an independent source of income, but the ability to disassociate itself from the government and take its own positions on social questions.

The legacy of an independent religious institution was a factor in the 1891-1892 Tobacco Revolt, in which religious leaders teamed up with nationalist forces to impose a boycott of tobacco, effectively ending a controversial tobacco concession granted to the British by the Qajar leaders. The end of the Qajar period in 1925 did not see an end to an independent religious establishment; if anything, Iran under the Pahlavi Shahs saw even more distancing between the state apparatus and the religious establishment, with Ayatollah Khomeini, who would later become the figurehead of the revolution and eventually the leader of the country, expelled by Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1964. Clearly, the independent religious institution also factored heavily into the 1979 revolution, in which the Shi'i clerical establishment combined with other groups in society, including nationalists, Marxists, and liberals, to execute the revolution. The Islamists were able to lead and later completely dominate the revolutionary movement, however, due to their strong organizational system, which they used to exercise social control over the entire revolution. Thus, the fact that the religious institution was independent from the state, was very well organized, and had its own independent source of income, allowed Islamic politics to play a leading role both in the revolution and in the reshaping of the country.

The fact that the religious establishment was independent would not have figured so prominently into the revolution, however, if the Shah hadn't already alienated the religious leaders so thoroughly. In fact, without this alienation, it is arguable that a revolution may never have occurred; the Shah did alienate the clerics in a number of ways, however, most notably with socioeconomic reforms. These reforms began in 1963 and included the redistribution of land, which broke the power of large land owners who paid hefty Islamic taxes, and extending certain legal rights to women, including the right to vote. Additionally, the Shah attempted to move Iran away from an Islamic identity and towards a Persian identity, replacing the Islamic calendar in favor of a strictly Persian calendar in 1976, and holding a celebration for the founding of Persia, both of which were viewed by many clerics as un-Islamic. These reforms and changes, while perhaps helpful to certain segments of Iranian society, clearly did much to push the religious establishment to the side, and install a sense of extreme dissatisfaction with the government within the clerical community.

Dissatisfaction with the government and programs causing alienation were not restricted to the religious establishment. Another factor that helped cause the Iranian Revolution was the Shah's alienation of the bazaaris, or the merchant class. The bazaaris had a long-running connection to the religious establishment, and it was through the Islamic taxes on the bazaaris that the clerics got most of their income. The remarkable rise in oil prices in the early 1970s saw a growing middle class that had plenty of economic power, but very little political power. This was because the Shah went to great lengths to discourage the practice of politics, outlawing all political parties except for one created and controlled by the government, and completely ignoring the Iranian constitution. While the poor people of the country had no time to devote to politics, the middle class certainly did; what the middle class lacked, however, was any type of outlet for political discourse. This led them to turn to the religious establishment, providing both the financial and physical support necessary for a revolution. The Shah also alienated the bazaaris through projects aimed at modernizing the country, including paving over the traditional bazaar areas and erecting modern malls or parks. This only gave the middle class more reasons to be dissatisfied with the Shah's government.

Still, it is possible that these factors, the alienation of a strong, independent religious establishment and the political repression of a growing middle class, would not have been enough to cause the 1979 revolution by themselves. This is where the character of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, comes into focus. The Shah, who took power from his father in 1941, made a number of missteps that can be seen to have led to the revolution. Aside from the alienation of powerful portions of society, the Shah failed to take the lead on a number of popular issues which may have helped alleviate and soften the dislike from the clerics and bazaaris. One issue in particular was that of nationalism; the Shah simply did not have any nationalist credentials. In 1953, his regime was almost toppled by a strong nationalist movement under the leadership of Mohammad Mossadegh; the Shah was saved in large part due to the direct intervention of the United States. While the Shah saw a strong relationship with the United States as a plus, especially in terms of foreign aid and arms deals, many Iranians saw the United States and the West in general as imperialists looking to directly control the Middle East. The Shah's clear pro-Western dealings lost him much support in the country, and only served to further alienate the clerics and the bazaaris.

Additionally, the Shah's character was instrumental in the actual success of the revolution. In the early days of the revolution, as uprisings were first beginning, the Shah had a chance to put the uprisings down using the military, which remained loyal to him until the end of the revolution. What was unknown at the time, however, was that the Shah was terminally ill with cancer. He knew he would soon have to hand the throne over to his son, and was worried about whether his son could rule effectively after the civilian massacre that would have been necessary to put the revolution down. Possibly playing into this decision was a new stance by the United States' President James Carter, who placed a strong emphasis on human rights. While there is no direct evidence that the US would have taken action against Iran for using the military to put down a revolution, and a good deal of circumstantial evidence against this, such as the fact Iran was looked to by the US to stay Soviet advances in the region, the threat of US displeasure may have played a role in the Shah's failure to use significant force against the revolutionaries. It almost certainly played a role in emboldening the citizens of Iran, including college professors, who felt more free to speak out against the regime.

These factors, then, can be seen as contributing directly to the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran: the strength of an independent religious community that could take the lead in a revolution, the alienation of that community and other communities, including the middle class, that would cause those communities to actually desire a revolution, and the failure of the regime to effectively put down the revolution in its early stages, (which, in this case, it almost certainly would have been capable of doing). Immediately following the revolution, there was a push by Ayatollah Khomeini to export the revolution to other Muslim countries, hoping to spread Islamic rule. The failure of the Islamic revolution to spread to either Iraq or Saudi Arabia, as mentioned earlier, can be seen in how the respective regimes were different than that of Iran in terms of these three factors.

For Iraq, the problems that could have been posed by an independent religious community in the years following the Iranian revolution never materialized, largely because there was no independent religious community. While Iraq has a Shi'i majority, Sunnis had for much of the country's admittedly short history controlled the government. By the time of the revolution, Saddam Hussein had firmly entrenched himself and other Sunni Arab leaders into positions of power, and kept power out of the hands of the Shi'i majority. This is significant because the Sunni clerics, unlike the Shi'i clerics in Iran, were not a strong independent community. Additionally, the Sunni clerics had a vested interest in Saddam remaining in power, in that if a Shi'i led revolution was to overthrow him, the years of Sunni dominance would be over, and the Sunnis themselves could face discrimination.

The Shi'i religious community, however, located largely in the southern portion of Iraq, did have an interest in an Islamic revolution, but lacked the resources that the clerics in Iran had at their disposal. Additionally, Saddam, unlike the Shah, was more than willing to use force to squash even the hint of a revolution. Immediately following the success of the Islamic revolution in Iran, Shi'i elements in Iraq responded to a call from Iran to revolt; this was met with the torture and execution of several prominent Shi'i leaders, including a brother and sister, and the deportation of up to 35,000 Shi'a with Persian-sounding names. Ultimately, the tensions between the two countries led to the Iran-Iraq war, beginning in 1980. From this point on, the main Shi'i opposition to Saddam came from elements within Iran; these elements, however, were fairly unorganized, with an umbrella group, the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, responsible for several other groups, all representing different leaders, views, and goals. In addition to this, many of the Shi'a remaining in Iraq had no desire to participate in an Islamic revolution, thinking that the outcome of such a revolution would be control of the country by the Islamic forces in Iran.

Despite an economic downturn caused by the years-long Iran-Iraq war, Saddam was very careful to make sure the middle class of his society, which had grown largely due to the oil boom of the early 1970s, remained economically comfortable. While the nature of his regime forestalled any meaningful political participation by members of society outside of his family or tribe, Saddam went to great lengths to ensure the middle class would not become too alienated; he achieved this largely through the strategic spending of the massive amounts of foreign aid pouring into the country from states such as Saudi Arabia.

As mentioned previously, Saddam's personal character was extremely different from the Shah's. Saddam managed to champion the nationalist issue, which had long been a part of his party, the Ba'th's, platform. This did not stop him from accepting aid throughout the Iran-Iraq war from the West, which now viewed Iran as a threat in the region, but it did allow him to avoid being seen as a puppet of the United States; nowhere was this more evident than in his 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Even when the U.S. and the United Nations threatened to take action, Saddam refused to back off, instigating the 1990-1991 Gulf War, which firmly fixed him in the nationalist camp.

Immediately following the conclusion of the Gulf War, Saddam had a chance to once again show his character as different from the Shah's. The defeat of the Iraqi army had many in Iraq viewing the Saddam regime as toppled; this led segments of society to intifadha, or rebellion, in March of 1991. This intifadha was at first located in the south, within the Shi'i portions of the country, and, if it had been properly organized and funded, one could see the success of this intifadha leading to Islamic revolution. In the end, however, the intifadha failed; it didn't have the support of the Islamic government of Iran, which was busy dealing with its own affairs; the violence and chaos caused by the intifadha made many people wary of it, and unwilling to throw their support into it; the middle of the country, that is, Baghdad and the surrounding towns, failed to join the call for rebellion, weakening the movement of a huge base of support; and, most importantly, the military failed to join the intifadha. While certainly being in disarray following their defeat, the military saw the chaos of the intifadha as possibly turning on them; thus, Saddam was able to pull the military together, and violently put the rebellion down in the south, further showing he was not afraid to use force to stay in power.

The remainder of the 1990s and the early 21st century (2000-2003) saw Saddam remain in power. Internationally isolated by the strict economic sanctions following the Gulf War, Saddam was free to operate in his country as he saw fit; by using a combination of carrots with the middle class Sunni Arabs and sticks with the possible Shi'i opposition, Saddam was able to remain on top. The lack of a strong, independent religious establishment, Saddam's retention of the nationalist issue, and his obvious willingness to use force to put rebellion down effectively kept Islamic revolution from spreading into Iraq.

The factors that kept Islamic revolution from spreading to Saudi Arabia are slightly different than in Iraq, but can be examined through once again comparing them to the factors in Iran: the independence and strength of the religious organization, the degree of alienation felt by a powerful middle class who would support a rebellion, and the relative character of the country's ruler, as defined by willingness to put down revolutions.

In Saudi Arabia, the religious establishment has never been independent of the modern state apparatus; in fact, the religious institution goes hand in hand with the state, each relying on the other for power. This partnership was the result of a deal made between the al-Sa'ud family and the al-Wahhabi family in 1744, which said the Wahhabists, who preached a fundamental, puritanical version of Islam, would support the al-Sa'uds as the legitimate rulers of the country, if the al-Sa'uds would support Wahhabism and the conversion of other Arabs to Wahhabism. This deal was beneficial to both parties, giving the al-Sa'uds the Islamic legitimacy necessary to rule, and giving the Wahhabists a vehicle with which to spread their particular view of Islam. This partnership continued through the next two and a half centuries to the present, with religious leaders official employees of the state. This means clerics in Saudi Arabia rely on the government for jobs, income, and support; thus, the religious establishment has a vested interest in the continued rule of the state, through the al-Sa'ud regime.

This vested interest manifested itself when the ulama, the Saudi Arabian Sunni clerics, supported the regime in the late 1920s in putting down a brief rebellion of the ikhwan, or the tribal military forces. The ikhwan rebellion was motivated by serious misgivings of the ikhwan community with the character of the ruler, Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, including a lack of nationalism, a possibly deviant lifestyle with many, many wives, and a lack of pressure on the minority Shi'a, who were seen as "innovators", and thus enemies of the Wahhabists. All of these complaints could be seen as perhaps falling in line with what the Wahhabists might believe, but the clerical leaders backed Abdul Aziz's use of force against the ikwhan, because of the nature of the symbiotic relationship.

This same relationship meant that any Islamic rebellion would have a very difficult time finding support within the official religious establishment. Additionally, the Shi'a, who would have been most sympathetic to an Islamist uprising in Saudi Arabia following the Iranian revolution, had been marginalized for centuries. It had been the official business of both the state and the religious community to ignore Shi'a history and practices, calling them "innovators" and warning the Sunni majority of the country about falling prey into such un-Islamic innovations. This meant the Shi'a minority, located primarily in the east, were neither organized nor strong, and they did not have the ability to launch a revolution.

Despite the close relationship of the state and the official religious establishment, Islamic opposition to the regime did eventually surface. In the 1970s, King Faysal's strong relationship with the West caused many in the country to view the king as not being a nationalist, but instead heavily influenced by what was perceived to be imperialist interests. This caused a neo-ikwhan group to claim the royal family wasn't legitimate or truly Islamic, and demand the removal of the al-Sauds. This group even went so far as to seize the grand mosque in Mecca in 1979. Once again, however, the close state-clerical relationship was used to condemn the uprising, which allowed the government to put it down. So, even though Islamic opposition existed, and even though it appeared to some the regime had lost the nationalist cause, the nature of the state-dependent religious establishment kept a serious challenge to state power from materializing.

More Islamic opposition developed in the 1980s, when the fall in oil prices exposed problems with the Saudi relationship with the US, such as a heavy reliance on the US for security. This problem was seen most clearly in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, when the Saudis invited US forces into the country. This invitation set off a number of Islamic opposition groups, including one led by Osama Bin Ladin. While external Islamic groups, such as Bin Ladin's and groups based in London called for the overthrowing of the regime, internal Islamic groups, including the official religious establishment, continued to support the regime.

In addition to a strong relationship between state and religion, Saudi Arabia's massive oil wealth created not only a large middle class, but a large upper class; these people did very well financially, and the state went to great lengths to keep them comfortable. Additionally, the regime has used a state-sponsored version of historical events to ensure loyalty to the state. The curriculum endorsed by the regime teaches only certain things, leaving other things out; it is not concerned with historical accuracy as much as establishing loyalty to the state and the ruling family. This type of education clearly doesn't prepare people to rise up against the government. The fact that the leading ulama support this type of education also gives it Islamic legitimacy, making it all the more acceptable and desirable to the Saudi public.

Finally, the character of the Saudi rulers, as far as willingness to put down rebellions, has been demonstrated many times, including during the ikhwan revolt of 1927-1929, as well as the neo-ikhwan revolt of the late 1970s. As the religious establishment has condoned the use of force by the state in these instances, however, the public has for the large part not been outraged by the use of force; the relationship between the state and the clerics ensures that most state actions are labeled "Islamic", while at the same time allowing religious actions to be labeled "official".

The strength of this relationship has not caused all tensions between the state and religious establishment to disappear, however. For example, the celebration of the founding of the Sa'udi regime, held in 1999, was challenged by many official Islamic leaders as being decidedly "un-Islamic", as the celebrations revered the figure of Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa'ud, something which is not allowed under Islamic law. The challenging of the celebration, however, did not cause a rebellion, or even a major schism between the state and the clerics; the two groups' continued reliance on each other ensured that the problems would be swept over, and, while perhaps not forgotten, at least ignored, for the time being.

Viewing the fundamental differences between Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in terms of the strength of the religious establishment, the degree to which the respective regimes went to keep both the religious establishment and the wealthy, possibly powerful middle class happy, and the willingness of the leaders to use force to put down a rebellion, it is quite easy to see why the Islamic revolution of Iran failed to spread through the Gulf States, as many thought it would. The fact that Iran had a strong, independent religious establishment, which was alienated along with the middle class by a weak ruler unwilling to use extreme force set the stage for a successful Islamic revolution. The fact Iraq did not have a strong, independent religious establishment, a middle class which was not as alienated as Iran's, and a leader that had no qualms about crushing rebellions kept Islamic revolution from occurring. Similarly, Islamic revolution was kept out of Saudi Arabia by the fact the religious establishment, while strong, was completely dependent on the state, the middle class was not alienated, and that the regime could use force when necessary, and have that use of force legitimized by the religious authorities. The 1990s saw a gradual lessening of Iran's call to export the Islamic revolution to other countries, and the first few years of the 21st Century have only reenforced this trend. While Islamic revolution may not be out of the picture entirely, the idea that the revolution could still "spread" from Iran to Iraq and Saudi Arabia is dying; if an Islamic revolution occurs in either country today, it would be not only a surprise, but also the result not of any Iranian influence, but instead a fundamental change within the countries themselves in terms of the three key areas mentioned above.