Why None of Us Can Know God

B.R.
For all practical purposes, let's assume God does exist; and by 'God' I'm referring to the one central to the mainstream monotheistic religions of today (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity). While the purpose of this article is to discuss the possibility of "knowing" God, in other words, cognize him as knowledge, it is not important to discuss either the efficacy or rationality in believing in his existence. Rather, this is an attempt to distinguish the possibility of any knowledge of God in the meaningful sense. To move forward, we first must define the boundaries for which monotheistic religion terms the a priori conditions of God, and the limitations of knowledge of Man. These will be the premises for which I will follow with a conclusion.

In terms of God himself, what are his characteristics as upheld by mainstream religion? First, we have assumed he is all-powerful, otherwise he would not be worthy of our worship and his very existence in relation to our own would be doubtful. This is also part of mainstream religion's own description of God (insofar as he can be 'described'). But it follows that if such a God were all knowing and all powerful enough to bear any significance or worth as such an entity, he must certainly be above humanity and all natural beings in his makeup and virtue. Without these conditions it would be of no more importance to devote one's life to 'God' than the stock-boy at your local grocery store responsible for placing desired products on the shelf for you to purchase and consume.

Hence, we have established the necessary condition for the divine 'God' to have at least at the very basis of his nature a particular power far greater than what we may attribute to humanity (or any other natural organism). I believe such a description of the very basic necessities of a God worthy of worship to be indisputable, while the details from such a groundwork may certainly be subjective to interpretation of scripture.

Next, we must make certain some particular posits in regards to mankind. Mankind, as the most complex sentient being we are at least empirically aware of, has in him structure within his brain that make him distinct from other creatures. However complex and awesome his brain may be, in relation to 'God' he is no less imperfect. The imperfection of man must be a necessary condition for him to be labeled 'subject' under a kingdom created by any known deity for which he is then expected (or obligated) to worship.

The limitations of man to apply his reason, which has been previously defined as his faculty of the brain for which he can contemplate, predict, and assess aspects of his existence but only in his material world, would make such cognition of God as an object of knowledge then, inextricably impossible. For, if he can apply his reason in terms of objects with any amount of certainty, then it stands that he can only know his empirical world. Whether not this is a perfect or imperfect representation of true existence is debatable to some, but not of any great importance in our discussion. Thus, 'God' - whether he exists or not, cannot be said to be an object of knowledge insofar as we create a concrete and precise definition of knowledge.

Then it follows, what exactly is 'knowledge?' There has never been, nor will there probably ever be, a succinct definition of knowledge for which everyone will agree. However, we may understand knowledge for all general purposes as the theoretical application of our knowledge towards the world in which we can objectify something. By objectify, I mean to say we can cognize it definitively through our observations, experiences, and inductively (with varying degrees of certainty) by various methods, but specifically the scientific method. It is not controversial to say that belief in 'God' is just that, a 'belief.' But to say one knows God exists, but cannot substantiate that claim on empirical grounds that would be of any meaning or value to other neutral observers is simply false. Thus, by virtue of our own accepted limitations of theoretical reason that makes it unthinkable to claim to know things as if they were objects is an illegitimate over-stepping of the bounds of reason and rational application of the brain - in other words, irrational.

Thus far I have presented my argument as follows: that God being perfect, all powerful, and all knowing, whether relative to man or in the absolute sense, is a necessary condition for the possibility of any metaphysical entity to exist that extends itself beyond the boundaries of the natural world and thus worthy of worship or devotion. My second premise logically follows from the first; man must in some sense be imperfect then, for otherwise he would have no reason to worship God (and indeed this is posited as fact by virtue of religious scripture itself). Thirdly, posited from my aforementioned premise, I was able to deduce that man's own limitation of reason and cognition limits his ability to make objects of knowledge only that in which he may experience in the physical (material) world. Thus, the objectification of knowledge does not and indeed cannot be applied to the metaphysical world (if such thing exists) by virtue of our own imperfection compared to the absolute perfection of God, as admitted by monotheistic religion.

As we move towards our conclusion then, it only logically follows that we cannot know God in any meaningful sense. To say otherwise then is to over-step the boundaries our own limited cognition and move from knowledge into only speculation, belief, and faith. If God exists, we most certainly cannot make him an object of knowledge cognizable through reason. It follows that any rational explanation for God would be illegitimate and unfounded within the already established grounding of our own mental capacities.

This reduces the relationship one may have of God simply to one of an idea. This is not particularly controversial either, as was posited by Kant that God himself is not knowable but merely exists as an idea of reason; however, a necessary one.

Published by B.R.

Too much metaphysics will make one melancholy.  View profile

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  • Brian Rice11/2/2007

    Kant was a lot of things (including a life-long celibate and mustard grinder) but not an idiot. He was, however, quite wrong on a lot of things :)

  • Edward Cox10/31/2007

    Kant was an idiot, but good article

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